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PREFACE
Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti, Joanna Gray & Mitu Gulati
Gaps in Governance
The Florence School of Banking and Finance (European University Insti-
tute) and the Brevan Howard Centre (Imperial College London) – in 
cooperation with BAFFI CAREFIN (Bocconi University) – organized a 
conference on 28 April 2016 held at the EUI in Florence with the theme 
of “Gaps in Governance”. This theme was inspired by the following ques-
tions. Can Greece be ejected from the Economic and Monetary Union if 
it restructures its debt obligations to the other Euro area states and that 
is deemed a violation of the No-Bailout clause?  Can Northern Ireland, 
Wales and Scotland stay in the EU if they vote overwhelmingly against 
the Brexit option, but the rest of the Uk votes the other way?  Can Italian 
banks circumvent the commitment of their state to its European partners 
to future Bail-ins of bank creditors by providing “voluntary” assistance to 
a fellow bank in trouble? 
All of these are basic questions about the treaty obligations of states 
in the European Union that are not clearly answered by the texts of 
any of the relevant treaties.  In other words, there are major gaps in the 
European governance structure. Now, of course, it is not surprising that 
there are gaps in the treaties.  Treaties are effectively long-term contracts 
among states and long-term collaborative contracts are famously plagued 
with gaps.  The reasons for gaps are myriad – some topics are just too 
difficult to discuss at the beginning of a beautiful relationship and other 
stuff is too difficult to anticipate and plan for.  The question that arises 
then though, is how to fill in the gaps ex post.  In the contractual and 
statutory literatures dealing with domestic legal systems, there is a rich 
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literature on the optimal strategies for gap filling (although, even there, 
there aren’t clear answers).  There is a lot less, however, on how one fills 
incomplete treaties. And while there are nice analogies between interna-
tional treaties and domestic contracts, the two are also very different ani-
mals and answers from one context do not necessarily translate perfectly 
to the other.
Our goal with our April 2016 conference was to begin a discussion of 
“Gaps in Governance” in the European governance apparatus.  To keep 
the discussions and papers grounded in reality, we gave each panel spe-
cific topics.  The first panel started with a discussion of the specific gap 
in governance that was produced in 2010-2011 as a result of the tension 
between the ECB’s informal “no restructuring” mantra and the Euro areas 
treaty requirement that there be “No Bailouts”.   And here, we had sov-
ereign debt guru Lee Buchheit, the German Economic Council’s Isabel 
Schnabel, political economics commentator Martin Sandbu of the Finan-
cial Times, and economic historian Kim Oosterlink.  Unsurprisingly, 
given the rising debt levels of many European countries in the period 
since the 2010-11, the discussion focused on whether much progress had 
been made in governance circles about how to tackle this particular gap 
when the next crisis hits.  The answer seemed to be a resounding no.
Following up on the first panel, a  keynote address by Mario Nava 
from the European Commission provided an extended and empirically 
documented overview of the strategic areas where loopholes, be they 
governance gaps or economic performance gaps, are plaguing the cur-
rent and possibly the future functioning of the European Banking Union. 
The second panel then moved on to the matter of withdrawals, exits 
and expulsions from participating in different levels of European govern-
ance represented by the Euro Area and the European Union itself. The 
implications of the forthcoming referendum on the Uk’s membership 
of the European Union was the topic addressed by Angus Armstrong 
of the Uk’s National Institute of Economic and Social Research. He can-
vassed likely scenarios and presented legal and economic implications of 
BREXIT contrasting them with BREMAIN (should the Uk vote to con-
tinue its membership of the EU). He was followed by the ECB’s Phoebus 
Athanassiou discussing the appropriateness of withdrawal and expul-
sion from the monetary union as a matter of the legal black letter (his 
answer was no). Roland Vaubel, taking a social contract perspective, then 
addressed the question of what the rights of secession were of regions 
within states in the European Union – and in particular, the question 
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of whether regions like Scotland and Catalonia were entitled to remain 
within the EU if they decided to secede from their national governments 
who themselves are current member states (Uk and Spain, respectively). 
And finally Ramon Marimon of the European University invoked the 
spirit and words of Niccolò Machiavelli, writing in the 16th century to 
offer insights from history on how best to mediate the ever present ten-
sion between polities and their governing institutions be they Princes of 
the past or the leaders of the European Union and Euro Area now.
The third panel discussed the newest layer of European governance, 
namely the Banking Union, which seems to be plagued by gaps in gov-
ernance even before it has really even got off the ground. Piers Haben 
from the European Banking Authority, Rosa Lastra from the Centre for 
Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London, Til Schuer-
mann from Oliver Wyman and Karl Whelan from the University College 
Dublin all explored different aspects of the incompleteness of, and incon-
sistencies within, the Banking Union framework as well as pointing out its 
positive contribution to the improvement of oversight of Europe’s banks. 
The missing pillars of the Banking Union – and crucially the absence of 
a fiscal backstop – were flagged as a potentially disruptive source to the 
stability of the new banking governance. More concretely, panelists came 
to grips with the shortcomings of stress testing, conflicts within the ECB’s 
mandate and its current tendency to concentrate powers and how best 
to resolve these. Lastly, the nascent problem of Non-Performing Loans 
(NPLs) on the balance sheets of Europe’s banks and how there is a need 
for far greater supervisory co-ordination in approach to measuring and 
dealing with these was brought forward in the policy discussion.
Patrick Honohan, former Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, 
delivered a very thought provoking dinner speech which argued that the 
most important gap in governance that lay behind the European banking 
and sovereign debt crises was that which surrounded uncertainty about 
the ability and will of the ECB to act decisively. He argued too that further 
governance gaps continue and are important in light of  the current dis-
cussion about (1) possible deployment by the ECB of “helicopter money”, 
(2) continuing question marks about the implementation and operation 
of the new framework for bank resolution and, finally, (3) the need to 
revisit sovereign risk weights and concentration limits that are applied to 
banks in what are very different political and financial stability environ-
ments to those that pertained at the time they were first devised. 
The conference follows a 2015 conference entitled “The New Finan-
Gaps in Governance  -  Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti, Joanna Gray & Mitu Gulati
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cial Architecture in the Eurozone”, a 2014 conference entitled “Bearing 
the Losses from Bank and Sovereign Default in the Eurozone”, a 2013 
conference “Political, Fiscal and Banking Union in the Eurozone”, a 2012 
conference, “Governance for the Eurozone: Integration or Disintegra-
tion” and that of 2011, “Life in the Eurozone With or Without Sovereign 
Default.” As with all five of those previous conferences, the debate after 
each panel and guest speakers was lively and thoughtful. We prefer not to 
take a stance here on any of the issues but simply provide all the papers 
presented and let the reader draw his or her own conclusions.
However, what we can say for sure from our first conference on Gaps 
in Governance in the European treaty context is that there are many and 
we do not have a clear and coherent sense of how to go about filling them 
or indeed whether it is politically possible to fill them. The primary solu-
tion appears to have been to muddle through which seems to be a peren-
nial European response.  That said, we are optimistic that research gath-
erings of this sort will help us begin thinking about the next big question, 
which is how to come up with a coherent and easily applicable framework 
for engaging in gap filling.
Preface
1EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Pierre Schlosser 
The incompleteness of Europe’s different levels of economic governance 
was the theme of this Florence School of Banking and Finance confer-
ence, held under Chatham House rules. The conference consisted of three 
panel sessions, one keynote lecture and one dinner speech. Opening the 
event, organizers highlighted that the agenda for this sixth annual confer-
ence showed some continuity with the previous ones. Indeed, the crisis 
response ushered in a step change in terms of new instruments and rules 
discussed previously and whose evolution and operation was revisited 
at this event. However, it also entailed innovative elements that reflected 
changing political dynamics (e.g. popular disenchantment with aspects of 
European governance and the perspective of possible exits from Europe’s 
different levels of governance). 
Session 1
The first session centred around the debate on the necessity and desira-
bility of a debt restructuring regime in EMU. This issue was considered 
as particularly acute given the debt overhang affecting several European 
countries and the potentially contagious fragilities that this could bring 
to bear on Europe’s economies. Can a ‘no debt restructuring regime’ be 
credible? Historically speaking, as a panellist recalled, a debt restruc-
turing occurs every year and a half. Although these processes occur 
much less frequently on the European continent, participants stressed 
that debt restructuring has been a recurrent debate since the first years 
of the euro crisis. Also, although it is sometimes forgotten, debt restruc-
turing has also been implemented in successive waves during the crisis 
in Greece and elsewhere, leading some participants to claim that such a 
2solution should not be viewed with such hostility since it is in fact not 
without precedent. 
Panellists’ views converged on the inconsistency (if not overt contra-
diction) that the coexistence of the no bail out rule and the absence of a 
debt restructuring regime embodies in the design of EMU. A distinction 
was offered between the legal no-bail out rule and the political imple-
mentation of this rule in the form of a non-restructuring rule. This ten-
sion, it was stressed, was reinforced because of the lack of possibilities to 
inflate away from debt or to revert to monetary financing in the existing 
European framework. Progress was noted however on how the reflection 
about debt restructuring has evolved over the last years. With a view to 
exploring new alternatives to debt restructuring one panellist suggested 
greater reliance on equity instruments in future for sovereign financing 
needs. Financial engineering could provide products where sovereign 
equities’ dividends would be linked to GDP for example. 
Against the background of recent discussions on the risks of over high 
concentration of debt holding and on the removal of sovereign privileges, 
another way to limit the pressure of rising debt levels, some participants 
argued, was to increase the foreign ownership of domestic debts as this 
could be used as a form of international risk sharing. Others emphasized 
that foreign ownership is however a two-edged sword as during the crisis 
it became a handicap. Lastly, the discussion focussed on how to enforce 
fiscal discipline in EMU and participants asked whether a purely rules-
based system could ever really work or if more European integration was 
the solution. 
Session 2 
The second session reviewed the implications of incomplete, horizontal 
agreements among EU and EMU member states. How to renegotiate 
existing agreements against the background of rising disintegration pres-
sures, in particular the risk of the Uk voting to leave the European Union 
(widely referred to as ‘Brexit’), was the guiding question which structured 
the session. Panellists insisted that multiple legal constraints are ensuring 
that an exit, either from the EU or indeed by any participating state from 
EMU, is an arduous process. In particular the existence of a Treaty clause 
providing for the irrevocable and irreversible legal obligation for Member 
States of the EU (bar Denmark and the Uk) of joining the euro serves 
the purpose of avoiding the risk that the EU (and especially so EMU) 
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3becomes a revolving door, where entry and exit occur on a frequent basis 
and commitments become more flexible. 
Panellists then entered into the core of the current debate on the pros-
pect of a Brexit occurring further to the June 2016 Uk referendum. The 
vast extent of the regulatory and supervisory implications should a Brexit 
materialize, was recognised. Moreover, the existence of a fundamental 
tension within the European space was restated. Two political objec-
tives seem indeed to be in conflict: a loose integration centred around 
Treaty freedoms of the single market vs. a more tight and deep integra-
tion driven by the needs of the single currency, encapsulated in the now 
famous ethos of the project of ‘ever closer union’. Participants identified 
that the area of banking and financial regulation, because it is located at 
the intersection of those two integration models, is under the spotlight 
as a source of real future tension. The risks of possible caucus voting by 
members of the European and Monetary and Banking Unions in setting 
policy direction for future single market legislation and the effects on the 
City of London’s financial markets was also raised as an issue left open in 
the Uk’s future relationship with Europe should it vote to remain in the 
EU (the ‘BREMAIN’ solution).  This fragmentation risk is particularly 
serious for the Uk given its oversized financial sector, whose cumulated 
balance sheet reaches 680 % of GDP. Sub-national secession dynamics 
(such as in Catalonia) were also marginally addressed, as the precedent of 
a Brexit could lead to chain effects within established nation states. 
Lastly, the issue of governance complexity was brought up to stress 
that in order to trust the EMU framework, people should first under-
stand it. It was however felt that the interplay of the different levels where 
European economic governance takes place is becoming increasingly 
complex and that as a result of this, the distance between European insti-
tutions and the people is growing, not narrowing. 
Session 3
The third session dealt with the incompleteness of the Banking Union 
(BU).  The latter was considered to be a major agreement, leading to a 
step change in governance. However, it was also stressed that the Banking 
Union is full of gaps and remains an unfinished building project. As a 
panellist indicated, it both suffers from incomplete and missing pillars. 
The Banking Union has half-finished elements because its scope only 
covers credit institutions, because the credibility of its resolution arsenal 
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4is contestable and because it still lacks an operational Common Deposit 
Insurance Scheme. The BU however is also characterised by gaps in 
its functions such as a clear lender of last resort and a fiscal backstop, 
which panellists insisted would be needed to make the BU more resilient. 
Inconsistencies due to the varying level of ambition and centralization 
between those essential elements of a genuine Banking Union were 
pointed out by participants. 
What has, however, been recognised as a major break-through is that 
the oversight of Europe’s banking system has improved. Sound stress tests 
have been conducted, although their existence should not lead, as a pan-
ellist warned, to a new wave of risk management complacency on the side 
of banks. Stress testing, it was suggested, is a useful instrument because 
it both helps to meet micro- and macro-prudential objectives. It is there-
fore not a coincidence that the US, for example, has become extremely 
reliant on such forms of supervision. In spite of its lower reliance on bank 
financing compared to Europe, it was indeed observed during the finan-
cial crisis that the US financial system was prone to a re-intermediation 
in periods when liquidity risks were on the rise. This spoke in favour 
of making US banks sounder through stress-testing. However, a short-
coming in the application of stress testing in Europe is the absence of a 
strong bank recapitalization regime. In other words, the absence of funds 
to recapitalize ailing banks creates incentives to limit the capital shortfall 
identified by the stress testing exercise, thus undermining its credibility. 
A parallel development highlighted during the discussion was the 
concentration of powers by the ECB. The risk was to see the manifesta-
tion of the ECB’s inherent conflict of interest between its price stability 
mandate and its new bank supervision tasks. Without denying this fun-
damental tension, participants disagreed however whether it was more 
desirable to solve this dilemma internally – by merging the two functions 
within one institution as is currently the case – or externally, by attrib-
uting the two objectives to two different institutions as in the so-called 
‘twin peaks model’.  Lastly, a particularly severe challenge of bank super-
vision identified by participants is the high rate of Non-Performing Loans 
(NPLs) in several euro area Member States as this  can act as a significant 
drag on banking profitability and therefore on the European economic 
recovery, panellists concluded. 
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5BANK REGULATORY REFORM  
SUPPORTING GROWTH:
THE WAY OUT OF THE SAFETY TRAP - 
Keynote Speech
Massimo Marchesi and Mario Nava1
In this article, we first discuss the regulatory response to the financial 
crisis, in particular the CRD4/CRR package implementing Basel III in 
the EU, and its impact on improving banks financial strength. We then 
look at banks business, and at the long lasting present recession in the EU 
that followed the financial crisis, with the important contraction of EU 
firms’ investments observed in recent years.
To investigate the reasons behind the EU long-lasting recession and 
the very severe reduction in investments, we start from a simple theoret-
ical model (the Safety Trap model) which describes how in the presence 
of an excess demand for safe assets, when interest rates cannot sufficiently 
decrease, the situation leads to a long-lasting recession.
On the basis of this model, we interpret the second phase of the crisis, 
mainly linked to the sovereign crisis, as a situation in which safe assets 
suddenly disappeared, creating the conditions for a recession. We there-
fore conclude that not the reform of bank prudential requirements, but 
rather the sovereign crisis is what might lie behind the persistent eco-
nomic recession and the important investment gap that has progressively 
1 Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Un-
ion of the European Commission. The views expressed in the text are the private views 
of the authors and may not, under any circumstances, be interpreted as stating an offi-
cial position of the European Commission. This text is the edited transcription of the 
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6grown overtime in the EU.
To support this conclusion, we review some of the consequences to be 
expected from a shortage of safe assets for bank liquidity management, 
investors’ asset allocation decisions and corporate financial behaviour, 
that actually took place during the crisis.
Finally, we describe the role of the Juncker Plan to fill at least in part 
the present EU investment gap. We notice in particular how this initiative 
can be interpreted as an important mean to increase the supply of safe(r) 
assets, consistently with the Safety Trap model and the suggested expla-
nation of the present difficult EU economic conditions.
1. The regulatory response to the financial crisis and to banks 
undercapitalisation
CRD4/CRR is one of the main elements of the response the EU gave to 
the financial crisis. The CRR Regulation regulates banks liquidity, the 
quantity and quality of banks minimum capital, banks leverage, banks 
counterparty risks and the national flexibilities. The CRD4 Directive reg-
ulates the ability of the supervisors to impose prudential buffers, cor-
porate governance rules, harmonised sanctions and general enhanced 
supervision rules.
CRD4/CRR created the financial stability which was so much needed 
to come out of the financial crisis. In response to CRD4/CRR, EU bank 
quality capital requirement (CET1, essentially equity) rose from 2% of 
Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) to 7% of RWA, leading to an overall Min-
imum Capital Requirement of at least 10,5%. 
The 2015 EBA Transparency exercise report published end November 
2015 confirms an overall continuous improvement in the resilience of 
the EU banking sector, with stronger capital positions and higher lev-
erage ratios. Actual CET1 ratios attained over times levels well above 
the required 7%, (see Figure 1). More precisely, the majority of banks 
present in June 2015 a CET1 to RWA capital ratio between 10% and 14%. 
Leverage ratios, represented by the ratio of Tier 1 capital over total lev-
erage exposures, with no weighting for risk, have also increased ranging 
between 3% and 6%.
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7Figure 1: Common Equity Tier 1 / RWA, EBA Report – 2015 EU-wide 
transparency exercise
 
2. Recent evolution of banks’ cost of equity (CoE) and return on 
equity (RoE)
In recent times, a concern has been voiced, more and more often by 
industry, that due to increased capital requirements banking may not be 
any more a sufficiently profitable business, and therefore a sustainable 
one in the long-run. For instance, in its response to CRR/CRD consul-
tation dated 06 October 2015, the IIF writes: “In order to form the full 
picture of the sustainability of banks’ businesses, Cost of Equity (COE) 
must be considered alongside the industry’s Return on Equity (ROE). 
Current levels of cost and returns call this sustainability into question. 
The gap between COE and ROE has not improved significantly through 
the post-crisis recovery, with ROE levels that remain insufficient to cover 
banks’ COE (as shown in Figure 2). This trend has been taking place con-
currently to rising capital constraints in Europe, including leverage.”
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8Figure 2: ROE and COE comparison on EU G-SIB banks sent by IIF in 
response to CRD/CRR consultation
COE and ROE are compared, and as ROE is lower than COE banks sus-
tainability over the long-run is put into question. Regulation is also called 
into question, as an insufficient ROE is claimed to have developed “con-
currently” to rising capital constraints, of obvious regulatory origin.  As 
one element of regulation, the leverage ratio is prominently mentioned 
in the text.
However, McKinsey (see Figure 3) has recently found that, at the 
global level, ROE of large banks has returned to the long-term average of 
8-12% after the temporary reduction due to the outburst of the financial 
crisis in 2008. There are nonetheless important geographical differences, 
with European banks still showing lower ROE than US or Asian peers.
Bank Regulatory Reform Supporting Growth: The Way out of the Safety Trap - Keynote Speech
9Figure 3: ROE recent evolution calculated by McKinsey in its “The 
future of bank risk management” publication (2015)
ROE is, as a ratio, influenced by elements that affect net income, its 
numerator (higher net income = higher ROE) and by elements that affect 
the amount of equity banks hold, its denominator (higher equity = lower 
ROE).
Concerning banks’ net income, it is important to note that banks in 
Europe tend to rely more on interest income, and less on fee income; and 
interest rate margins have over time come under pressure, also due to the 
“flattening” of the yield curve. In fact, as banks are – generally speaking - 
more profitable in a steep yield curve environment (as they borrow at low 
spreads on the short end of the curve and lend at higher spreads on the 
long end), low and flat yield curves have negatively impacted EU banks’ 
net interest margins.
At the core of this negative development have been falling rates on the 
loan book of banks. They have been declining continuously and mark-
edly over the past years, while the room to lower deposit rates has been 
limited in the present low interest rates environment.
A second important factor that can influence banks’ net income is 
obviously economic growth. Typically, in periods of low economic growth 
banks’ balance sheets tend to become less profitable due to the generation 
of more and more important amounts of Non Performing Loans (NPLs) 
and the need to provision them.
Massimo Marchesi and Mario Nava
10
Figure 4 shows the important effect that NPLs can have on ROE, usu-
ally with a lag with respect to the time the loans have been granted. In 
the US, problematic loans have swiftly emerged to the surface, and banks 
balance sheets have then been rapidly cleaned of NPL effects. ROE has 
been therefore able to quickly recover in the US and to return to levels 
comparable to the pre-crisis period.
In several EU countries, instead, the cleaning up of banks balance 
sheets has been much slower, with problematic loans that emerged only 
much later and probably only after the severity of exercises such as the 
Asset Quality Review conducted by the ECB. This difficulty in cleaning 
up EU banks’ balance sheets is indeed one important element that has 
acted as a “pulled handbrake” over recent years on EU banks ROE, with 
banks most exposed to countries that suffered most from the crisis being 
those where probably the gravity of the NPLs situation emerged most 
slowly in the books.
Figure 4: Evolution of Non Performing Loans in the US and in Europe
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The Cost of Equity (COE) of a firm/bank represents the compensation 
that the market demands in exchange for owning the asset and bearing 
its risk (as its value could fall): it is in essence a “required ROE” for inves-
tors not to sell the bank shares in their possession. It is usually calculated 
on the basis of a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), where the Beta, 
i.e. the ratio that exists between the idiosyncratic specific riskiness of the 
single bank as appreciated by the market, and the undiversifiable sys-
tematic risk of the market it belongs to, plays a critical role. Very simply, 
the higher the Beta, rebus sic stantibus, the higher the COE requested by 
investors.2
When Minimum Capital Requirements are increased due to, for 
instance, a (correct) revision of risk weights on the most risky assets, if 
this modifies the business choices of a bank redirecting it towards busi-
ness lines which are less profitable but also produce more stable profits, 
it is indeed possible that the banks business becomes more sustainable. 
This, in particular, can happen if the negative effects of the reduction in 
profits, i.e. a lower bank ROE, are more than outweighed by the positive 
effect of more stable profits, that translate into a higher reduction in the 
banks COE.
In relation to banks COE, it is important to know that the ECB has 
recently done an exercise very similar to that of the IIF mentioned above. 
When enlarging the sample, beyond EU G-SIBs, to a larger one made 
of 33 banks in the Euro Area, the situation immediately appears as less 
problematic (see Figure 5). COE and ROE are clearly much more con-
verging, at least in the very recent timespan, and COE seems to have 
moved back much closer too pre-crisis levels.
2 In very simplified terms, the idiosyncratic riskiness (or, in financial jargon, the Beta) of 
a bank depends on whether its profits are more or less volatile than those of the rest of 
the market. When profits become relatively more stable compared to those of the mar-
ket, the COE of the bank is reduced, and the bank finds more easily, supposing bank 
profits have not changed, investors who want to buy its shares. When instead the profits 
of a bank become relatively more volatile than those of the market, investors require a 
higher COE, and the bank finds less easily, supposing bank profits have not changed, 
investors who want to buy its shares.
Massimo Marchesi and Mario Nava
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Figure 5: ROE and COE comparison on a large sample of listed Euro 
Area banks
On the basis of the above, it is therefore possible to infer that during 
the crisis (2008-2011) investors seem to have indeed considered banks as 
riskier than the rest of the market, which explains the increase in COE for 
that period (nb: note in particular the spike after 2008). But, one could 
claim, especially thanks to CRD4/CRR and the important strengthening 
of prudential regulation that it entailed, that the market does not seem 
any more to consider banks so risky to demand a return much higher 
than in the pre-crisis period. This is better seen when using a sufficiently 
large sample of medium/large banks as in the ECB calculations.
Finally, and from a more theoretical point of view, on the issue of 
optimal bank capital requirements, i.e. on what level of bank equity max-
imises sustainable growth in the long term, economists are split. On the 
one hand, some economist even recommend capital requirements as high 
as 30%. On the other hand, other economists support an opposite view 
considering as optimal a situation with very low capital requirements and 
very high leverage by banks.
In recent interventions on this topic, Jean-Claude Rochet, in a 
dynamic model published with Klimenko and Pfeil in 2015, concludes 
that the short-term impact of higher capital requirements can be very dif-
ferent from the long-term one. Although the two dimensions of stability 
(given by higher capital) and growth (given by lower capital) are con-
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flicting in the short-run, in the long-run, if the capital ratio is not unrea-
sonably high, it is possible to find an optimal equilibrium level where the 
economy is the most stable and it grows at a highest rate possible.
To illustrate in a simple and visual way this point, Figure 6 shows a 
graph presented in one of the technical annexes to the Impact Assessment 
of the BRRD, dated 2012. As one can see, the costs (in terms of short-term 
reduced growth), the benefits (in terms of long-term increased financial 
stability), and the net effects in the long-term is what Commission ser-
vices also tried to evaluate and would tend to support the calibration 
achieved in Basel III and translated into CRD4/CRR.
Figure 6: Net Present Value of stream of total costs, total benefits and 
net benefits of CRD/CRR and BRRD
 
Source: BRRD IA 2014, Appendix 5, pages 189-199.
However, it should also not be forgotten that a suboptimal transition 
path to new capital requirements might have taken place in the recent 
past. After the outburst of the financial crisis, capital ratios have in fact 
increased very rapidly upon intense pressure coming from financial mar-
kets and in spite of capital requirements being raised only very gradually. 
This can have contributed to creating in Europe higher funding costs for 
banks which, in turn, might have contributed to lowering lending and 
economic growth, at least in the short term.
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3. Europe’s slow recovery from the economic effects of the 
financial crisis and its investment gap
The 2008 financial crisis has deeply affected the European economy. And, 
credit developments have become a major source of fluctuations during 
the current recession. The very high correlation between variations in 
credit flows and variations in growth rates over recent years is indeed 
quite striking (see Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Variations in GDP and credit flows in the Euro Area
Looking at the EU in comparison with the US (see Figure 8), what 
emerges is how the return to the pre-crisis output path has been much 
quicker in the US. This created a true and remarkable gap between the 
EU actual and potential GDP, with substantial social consequences, such 
as a decrease in real GDP per capita, and a substantial increase in unem-
ployment.
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Figure 8: EU (left graph) vs US (right graph) actual and potential GDP
The financial crisis has particularly hit EU investments (see Figure 9). 
Annual investment in the EU has fallen by about EUR 430 billion since 
its peak in 2007, with reductions concentrated in few countries. At the 
moment, investment is estimated to remain approximately EUR 230-370 
bn per year below sustainable trends. The low level of investments is one 
of the main reasons why Europe’s economic recovery remains weak.
Figure 9: Year-on-year EU real GDP and real investment growth rate 
(first graph) and real investment  absolute values (second graph)
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Euro Area investment has been much weaker in recent years than would 
normally be expected in a ‘typical’ recovery. While in previous crisis 
investment would stop declining after two-three years, in the recent crisis 
investment substantially accelerated their slump after two years from the 
beginning of the crisis (see Figure 10). This leads to think that while 
housing investment certainly played a role in this decline, there must have 
been more than just developments in housing investment affecting the 
total investment-to-GDP ratio in the last few years. Recent Commission 
analysis shows in particular that the weakness in investment behaviour 
during the last crisis can be to a large extent attributed to credit factors 
such as deleveraging in the private sector. This private debt deleveraging 
has indeed started to play a more important role over time through the 
recession with long-lasting effects on investment dynamics.
Figure 10: Gross fixed capital formation after 2009, % of GDP, EA12 
(BE, DE, IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, LU, NL, AT, PT, FI)
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4. What lies behind the investment gap: the Safety Trap
Over the last three decades, there has been a continuous, slow but steady, 
fall in real interest rates, especially in the US. There are various reasons 
behind it, but certainly a contributing factor to it has been the presence 
of long periods of expansionary monetary policy, for which often the 
expression “great moderation era” is used among academics. Since the 
beginning of the new century, this fall in real interest rates has acceler-
ated, and definitely spread outside the US to the whole world, in parallel 
with an increasingly expansionary monetary policy, not only in the US, 
but also in Europe and Asia.
Recent analyses show the importance along the years of a growing 
demand for safe assets on financial markets. The simple model repre-
sented in Figure 11 allows to see why. Consider an increase in the demand 
for safe assets, captured by an exogenous rightward shift in the demand 
curve. Equilibrium in the safe asset market is restored by a reduction in 
real interest rates. And with strong price or wage rigidities, this adjust-
ment can only occur through a reduction in nominal interest rates. When 
nominal interest rates reach the zero lower bound, further reductions 
cannot take place. At zero nominal interest rates, there is excess demand 
for safe assets and excess supply of goods (i.e. an insufficient aggregate 
demand). Because of the deficit in the aggregate demand, output and 
income decrease, generating a recession.
Figure 11: A simple model of the Safety Trap
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The recession lowers wealth at any given real interest rate, endogenously 
shifting the demand curve for safe assets to the left. Equilibrium in the 
safe asset market is restored when the reduction in wealth matches the 
initial increase in the demand for safe assets at point E’. This mechanism 
is the essence of a safety trap. And when the economy falls into a safety 
trap, output can only be stimulated by reducing the demand for safe 
assets or by increasing their supply.
In the years before the 2008 international financial crisis, the shortage 
of risk-free assets proved a powerful stimulus to US and European secu-
ritisation markets, which provided large amount of “privately labelled” 
risk-free asset as an alternative to government bonds, increasing the 
supply of safe assets in response to their growing shortage. In Figure 12 
one can see, for instance, the evolution of Euro Area banks assets and 
liabilities. In the years preceding the crisis, intra-financial assets and lia-
bilities grew enormously (Figure 12) while, after the outburst of the crisis, 
a contraction of these assets led to a very unstable funding condition for 
banks.
Figure 12: Evolution of assets and liabilities of Euro Area MFIs 1998-
2014 (Euro Area, € billion)
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This dynamics depends on the fact that, in essence, large investment banks 
bought mortgages from retail banks (especially, but not always, in the US) 
and used them as the raw material from which they produced financial 
assets such as MBS, mortgage-backed securities, and CDO, collateralized 
debt obligations that materially increased the size of their balance sheet, 
making them even larger. Investment banks can be considered to a large 
extent risk neutral economic actors: they invest in a financial asset as long 
as there is a sufficiently positive expected return on it, and they can find 
enough funding on the market for their activity. Given this scenario, one 
can consider that the financial cycle begins with a rise in asset prices, 
such as real estate. This strengthen the balance sheet of banks thanks to 
mark-to-market accounting, especially after the securitization of those 
assets. As a consequence – and parallel to the role played by collateral 
in allowing (especially US, but also Spanish, for instance) households to 
borrow more when the price of their house goes up - both commercial 
banks and investment banks can borrow more. And the additional assets 
they can create/buy further increase the size of their balance sheet and 
push the asset prices even higher up.
When instead the price of the assets, and as a consequence of the 
asset-backed securities falls, the balance sheets of both commercial and 
investment banks suddenly weaken and they have to swiftly reduce their 
indebtedness in order to keep open their access to funding on the market. 
They therefore start selling more and more (securitized) assets, so that 
asset prices start falling, and then keep on falling as the downswing con-
tinues. A banking crisis obviously occurs when for several banks the fall 
in the value of bank assets is sufficient to wipe out bank equity.
From 2007 onwards, lots of assets perceived to be safe in the previous 
years, have been suddenly realised by financial markets to be indeed not 
safe at all. This, going back to the safety trap model, is equivalent to a 
reduction in the supply of safe assets, which can generate the same con-
sequences of an increase in the demand of safe assets.
Figure 13 provides an illustration of the investors’ perception of the 
reduction in safe assets that took place during the financial crisis. In the 
US the loss of the safe asset status by US government agencies such as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the first phase of the crisis were to a large 
extent compensated by an increase of US Federal Debt held by the public. 
At this time, the EU was mainly hit by an important contraction in the 
funds made available from international investors to large EU banks, 
as shown also in the right graph in Figure 12. EU governments, how-
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ever, intervened with important bail-outs intervention and this helped 
partially reducing the investor perception of risk in the banking sector, 
although at the expense of raising the investor perception of risk for sov-
ereigns. It is at this time, 2009,  that the European sovereign crises burst 
out in Europe. When that occurred, safe assets in the EU simply shrank, 
mostly concentrated in some countries, without any readily introduced 
compensating measure opposing this trend.
Figure 13: Evolution of safe assets in the US and some EU countries
Figure 14 shows that after the end of the most acute phase of the Euro-
pean sovereign crisis, sovereigns spreads went back to a convergence path 
also thanks to a series of important reforms including on the one side the 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to cut the doom loop 
between banks and sovereigns and, on the other side, the strengthening 
of public finance surveillance tools within the European Semester. Still, 
in spite of this convergence, some sovereign spreads are higher than they 
were before the crisis.
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Figure 14: Sovereign bond spreads in FR, IT, ES
5. The consequences of a shortage of safe assets during the 
sovereign crisis
Risk-free assets are a cornerstone of the functioning of the financial 
sector. The sudden perceived scarcity of risk-free assets created by the 
sovereign crisis created unfavourable conditions for economic growth in 
the EU in several ways.
• Consequences on bank liquidity and monetary policy 
In the presence of a large set of risk-free assets, the banking system 
can promptly use them for secured financing transactions that allow to 
provide it with the liquidity that it needs. For instance, sovereign debt 
securities, as a highly liquid relative risk-free asset, play a central role 
in the banking system because banks not only invest in these assets but 
also use them as liquidity buffer. Moreover, they serve as collateral for 
refinancing operations, both in the interbank market and in credit oper-
ations with the central bank. Government debt in fact represents the 
single most important type of collateral in these operations. But when 
the sovereign crisis kicked in, creating a scarcity of risk-free assets, much 
more collateral started being requested by investors, and the EU banking 
system risked becoming illiquid.
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• Consequences on financial asset allocation
When managing their portfolios, investors take decisions on how 
much money to invest in the different asset classes available to them. In 
this process, the presence of riskless investments allows for more sepa-
ration between investment decisions and risk profiles. This means that 
investors with different risk aversions have a wider array of investment 
opportunities, as they can use the riskless assets to alter the overall risk 
exposure of their portfolios.
The main consequences of not having sufficiently available risk-free 
assets during the sovereign crisis were less diversified investment portfo-
lios, and higher risk premiums The absence of sufficiently available risk-
less investments made risky investments seem even riskier to all inves-
tors. Investors then invested less in risky assets, demanded higher risk 
premiums (and paid lower prices) and were quicker to flee any assets 
in the face of danger. Put another way, not having a safe haven that they 
could return to made investors less willing to take risk. As a consequence, 
we saw lower prices for all risky assets, higher volatility in prices in finan-
cial markets and abrupt, painful market corrections.
• Consequences on corporate financial behaviour
Having access to risk-free assets plays an important role in corpo-
rate finance, i.e. in how firms invest their resources, the mix of debt and 
equity that they use to fund these assets and the choices they make in 
how much cash they return to shareholders in the form of dividends and 
stock buybacks.
In the presence of risk-free assets, cash is a neutral asset and it does 
not drive investment choices.3 When there are no risk-free assets or an 
insufficient amount of them, companies that find better cash generating 
investments will be viewed as more valuable than companies that do not. 
It can therefore be expected that some companies may generate more 
excess returns on their cash generating investments than on their busi-
3 Firms invest in an asset/project when they believe that they can generate returns that 
exceed a “hurdle rate” that reflects its risk, with the risk-free asset (and rate) being the 
baseline hurdle rate. For risky investments, the hurdle rate will be comprised of two 
components – a base of a risk-free rate and a risk premium, reflecting the perceived 
risk in the investment. The net present value is the measure that captures the difference 
between what an investment is expected to generate in cash flows (and returns) and 
what it needs to generate, given its risk. Investing in risk-free assets (such as cash) 
and earning the risk-free rate produces a zero net present value investment. Any firm 
should therefore look for investments that generate a positive net present value.
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ness/operating investments. As a result, managers would spend more of 
their time and resources researching short-term cash generating invest-
ments and less on their long-term (in principle higher added value) busi-
ness/operating investments. This is what happened during the second 
phase of the crisis, with important reduction in firms’ long term invest-
ments.
Furthermore, in relation to dividend policy, when a firm has a cash 
surplus from it business operations, after meeting its reinvestment needs 
and debt obligations, it can pay the cash out as a dividend, use it to buy 
back stock or retain it as a cash balance. The presence of risk-free assets 
makes the dividend policy choice in principle neutral for the firm, as 
demonstrated by Modigliani and Miller in 1961. In fact, a firm that pays 
less dividends than the cash available for payouts, can always invest the 
cash in risk-free assets and thus leave investors unaffected in terms of 
overall returns, by substituting price appreciation for dividends.
When no/less risk-free asset is available, companies would instead 
be penalised when they hold back from paying dividends and invest, as 
the investment would in no/fewer cases be risk free. Stockholders would 
therefore increase the pressure on firms to have their cash back, or would 
discount more the value of companies that reinvest their cash. This is 
another important element that might have played a role in reducing EU 
firms’ investments in the recent crisis.
6. The Juncker Plan as a mean to increase the supply of safe(r) 
assets
Given the protracted effect of private sector deleveraging on investment 
dynamics, the importance – in order to try and avoid a deeper and longer 
economic recession – of policies to support capital formation in the EU 
appears very clearly.
After three weeks into office, the Juncker Commission announced an 
Investment Plan aimed at reducing the EU investment gap that origi-
nated during the crisis and widened since then. Being the budget of the 
EU limited and in any case unsuitable for traditional demand policy, 
non-conventional ideas had to be put in place in order to ensure that 
investors could close (directly at least one third, and indirectly the other 
two thirds) the investment gap per year of some €300 billion required to 
boost growth.
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EFSI builds on an important finding linked to the safety trap logic: in 
the current market environment, characterized by uncertainty and low 
investor confidence, investors seeking a safe haven for their funds tend 
to shy away from the risks associated with infrastructure investments. In 
response to that, EFSI aims to tackle the issue of low confidence and lim-
ited risk appetite on the part of investors by using public funds to absorb 
some of the risks involved in infrastructure projects, creating new safe 
assets by means of an “leveraged demand” policy, i.e. a demand policy 
which uses public money as a lever for private investment.
EFSI builds in fact on a guarantee of EUR 16 billion from the EU 
budget and EUR 5 billion in capital from the European Investment Bank 
(EIB). This initial contribution of EUR 21 billion serves as the basic risk 
buffer, enabling the EIB to then provide financing to infrastructure pro-
jects with a high risk profile, primarily through subordinated debt. This 
initial risk absorption by the EIB which is backed by the EFSI’s guaran-
tees, in turn, is expected to catalyse large-scale additional investments 
from private investors into more senior tranches of infrastructure debt 
with lower risk exposure. According to Commission estimates, this lev-
erage mechanism is expected to reach a blended multiplier effect of up to 
15. In other words, every EUR 1 of public funds provided as guarantee for 
risk protection will catalyse a total investment of EUR 15, adding value in 
the real economy (see Figure 15).
Figure 15: EFSI leverage mechanics
Based on the leverage ratio of 1:15, the initial EUR 21 billion in public 
contributions is expected to mobilize a total of EUR 315 billion between 
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2015 and 2017. Of this overall amount, approximately EUR 240 billion is 
earmarked for long-term strategic investments of European significance 
in key areas of infrastructure and innovation. Results to date are encour-
aging., EFSI has mobilised investments up to 82.1bn EUR, approving 
11.2 bn EUR of financing (see Figure 16).
Figure 16: EFSI implementation dashboard up to 12 April 2016
 
The additional investment and the creation of safe(r) assets EFSI gen-
erates is an important response to the EU investment gap and a natural 
complement to the supply side response of repairing the financial system 
and strengthening bank capitalisation levels. However, EFSI is clearly just 
one of the possible means that could be used to increase the supply of 
safe(r) assets. Other means could be also considered and discussed, such 
as CMU and securitisation. The analysis of these other means is nonethe-
less beyond the scope of this paper.
Conclusion
In this article we analysed the regulatory response to the financial crisis 
given by the CRD4/CRR package and its merits of having improved 
banks financial strength.
On the issue of bank business sustainability, we concluded that the 
present increased level of Minimum Capital Requirements, even if 
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occurred at a faster speed than foreseen by the regulatory reform, does 
not overall appear to have made banking a non-viable business.
To investigate the reasons behind the EU long-lasting recession and 
the very severe reduction in investments, we suggested to look at a simple 
theoretical model (the Safety Trap model) which describes how in the 
presence of an excess demand for safe assets, when interest rates cannot 
sufficiently decrease, the equilibrium is re-established via a long-lasting 
recession.
On the basis of this model, we interpreted the second phase of the 
crisis, mainly linked to the sovereign crisis, as a situation in which safe 
assets suddenly disappeared, creating the conditions for a recession. We 
therefore conclude that not the reform of bank prudential requirements, 
but rather the sovereign crisis is what might lie behind the persistent eco-
nomic recession and the important investment gap that has progressively 
grown overtime in the EU.
It follows that a more resilient economic EU can be obtained, in our 
view, by the appropriate combination of mutually supporting initiatives 
that, while maintaining financial stability thru initiatives such as the 
Banking Union, also ensure an increase in the supply of safe assets and 
the activation of a sufficient volumes of public-private investments such 
as EFSI. Other measures that we don’t discuss here, such as CMU and 
securitization can also contribute positively to getting out of the reces-
sion by increasing the supply of safe(r) assets.
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GAPS IN THE GOVERNANCE  
OF THE EURO AREA - DINNER SPEECH
Patrick Honohan1 
To what extent do gaps in euro area governance matter?  I suggest that 
they matter a lot and that this issue is quite complex – even if we ask of 
governance no more than two things: (a) do we know who is in charge; 
and (b) are decision-making procedures adequate?  
First I will argue that it was a major governance gap that effectively 
prevented the euro crisis from being addressed promptly and effectively. 
This gap is not the one most often mentioned in this context, relating 
to bank supervision. No, the gap lay in leaving unclear what European 
entity, if any, had the mandate, in the face of national fiscal weakness, to 
deploy collectively the financial resources of the Union and bring them 
to bear on the corrosive loss of confidence that spread during 2010-2012. 
Second, I would like to illustrate the complexity by drawing on three 
quite live issues in the development of the monetary and banking union 
which display contrasting governance puzzles.
Governance gap explains depth and duration of the euro area 
crisis
I begin with what may seem like a large claim, namely that it was a major 
governance gap – and not merely a handful of policy errors – that was at 
the heart of the euro area crisis.  
I’m not speaking about the banking supervision gap
1 An expanded version of remarks presented at the dinner session of the Conference: 
“Filling the Gaps in Governance: The Case of Europe” Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, April 28, 2016.
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It is conventional to say that the design of the euro was flawed by the 
omission of an active role in banking supervision.  Indeed, I made that 
point myself over a quarter century ago.2  
Now that particular architectural gap has been filled.  After an aston-
ishingly quick gestation period, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
of the ECB has been up and running now for 18 months, and it has a gov-
ernance structure which seems to have functioned effectively up to now. 
Despite complexities deriving from pre-existing legal underpinnings of 
decisionmaking in the ECB (which among other things required that all 
substantive decisions be taken by the Governing Council), the SSM has 
managed to get through a very substantial body of work including the 
Comprehensive Assessment of the main banks in Europe—which had 
consequences for capital raising by some of those banks—as well as many 
decisions, both routine and exceptional, of the type which are the bread-
and-butter of banking supervision the world over.
Valuable though it is, I doubt that having the SSM would have dra-
matically reduced the chances of a severe euro crisis emerging.  After all, 
serious bank supervision failures occurred in the US and Uk—countries 
where regional politics are not thought to be obtrusive in the governance 
structures of bank supervision.  Perhaps an SSM-like institution might 
have been effective in restraining the excesses of the Irish and Spanish 
banking systems, but banking was not the source of the malaise that 
swept Greece, Portugal and Italy.  
No: the lack of a “banking union” – to use the overblown term that 
has attached to the SSM – is not what I think was the governance gap 
that meant that the global financial crisis spiraled into such a deep and 
sustained euro area crisis. 
Whose task to address the crisis of confidence?
Instead, I believe it is the lack of clarity on how the collective resources 
of the euro area could be deployed, in the event of a crisis of confidence 
2 When I wrote: “The expectation is that the ECB will have a role [in banking super-
vision], it will be mainly a coordinating role. If so, an opportunity may be missed….
Arguably, a centralized bank supervision authority (whether a department of the ECB 
or a separate entity) with wide powers, would be more able to operate above national 
political pressures in acting decisively to prevent a failing bank to operate in an un-
sound manner…It may be worthwhile for national governments to cede power to the 
centre in order ‘to save them from themselves’”.  
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as acute and severe as emerged in 2008-10, that can be faulted.3  Until the 
survival of the euro itself was at risk, it could not be said to be clear that 
the Treaty mandated the ECB to take the steps that were technically avail-
able to it to stem and reverse the crisis of confidence.  This is essentially 
because of the fiscal dimensions of the crisis which immediately inter-
posed the prohibition of monetary financing as an obstacle to action.
Indeed, the monetary policy regime created by the Maastricht Treaty 
was designed to be robust to moderate shocks of the type that had been 
encountered in advanced economies in the second half of the 20th Cen-
tury.  The severely autonomous decisionmaking structures were well-
adapted to insulating monetary policy from the kinds of political pres-
sure that had caused repeated bursts of inflation in many countries.  
The experience of the Great Moderation period suggested that man-
aging monetary stability was something which could be left to tech-
nocrats.  Central Banking was primarily a task of stabilizing inflation 
at a low level.  (Of course this pre-supposed an effective payments and 
banking system, but that was something which could be thought of as 
part of the plumbing, requiring merely routine skills and, as such, easily 
assured.)  Banking failures in advanced economies had been rare and – 
even in the case of the US savings and loan crisis – never threatening to 
the smooth functioning of finance at large.  Isolated banking problems, 
even with banks that were consider too big, complex or connected to fail, 
could be handled by regulatory authorities with at most a short period of 
emergency liquidity provision by the central bank to bridge transitional 
issues. (The ECB even delegated the provision of emergency liquidity – 
ELA – to national central banks, reserving only the right for a superma-
jority of the Governing Council to object to ELA that could threaten the 
monetary policy stance).
But a combination of weak supervisory and fiscal policy in several 
member states left the euro area ill-equipped to deal with the conse-
quences of the almost unprecedented shock of the global financial crisis 
in 2008-9. 
Never had it been supposed that, not only would wide swathes of the 
euro area banking system find it impossible to obtain needed liquidity 
at scale or term in the market, but that euro area national governments 
could also lose market access.  
3 This is not the place to review the complex negotiations leading ultimately to the ESM. 
These were clearly necessary to deal with the most acute country-level challenges, but 
were not sufficient to the larger task. 
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The first contingency (loss of banking liquidity) was manageable 
within the legislative framework established for the ECB.  Open-ended 
liquidity provision prevented disorderly failure of banks in the period 
2008-10.  
But the second contingency (loss of sovereign market access) pre-
sented legal challenges precisely because of the deliberate separation of 
the ECB from Government both through the ECB’s independence and 
through the prohibition on monetary financing.  This was reinforced by 
an expansive interpretation of that prohibition as applying far beyond the 
narrow wording of the treaty (explicitly prohibiting, as it does, the pur-
chase of Government debt instruments only in the primary market, i.e. 
directly from the issuer).  If this interpretation was pushed too far, Europe 
would have denied itself the ability to deploy its financial resources to the 
full in the face of an existential crisis.
It was not until, during 2012, the deepening debt problems of Greece 
above all, but also other EA member states, combined with a growing 
fear that some countries might exit the currency regime (an eventuality 
not contemplated in the Treaty, and one which raised in the market the 
spectre of a contagious wave of exits) made it clear that more far-reaching 
action by the ECB was now not only desirable, but within the ECB’s man-
date.
Eventually, with the announcement and detailed planning for the Out-
right Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme in the period July-Sep-
tember 2012, such action was forthcoming; the threat of break-up receded 
comprehensively.  The OMT killed what some referred to as the run on 
the system.  (The earlier 2010-11 asset purchase programme known as 
the SMP was on a limited and much smaller scale).
But that action happened almost two and a half years into the euro 
area phase of the crisis.  Output and employment had been severely dam-
aged in the interval, with consequences that can be felt today.
Could an OMT type solution have been adopted earlier?  Techically 
yes.  Indeed, the ability of other countries, including (within the EU) the 
Uk, to deal with much less severe fiscal and debt market issues with Cen-
tral Bank action to purchase Government securities on a very large scale 
had already been demonstrated almost contemporaneously.  
What was lacking in the euro area’s governance was clarity on what 
entity (if any) was responsible for and legally empowered to deal with 
the extraordinary situation that had emerged and in particular whether 
various forms of central bank action which could have had the indirect 
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effect of lowering the funding costs of government would be permissible 
given the Treaty’s emphasis on monetary financing prohibition.  
Only when the situation had become extremely acute did it become 
sufficiently clear that the ECB – where the buck inevitably stopped – must 
act in a very dramatic way.  
The fact that its OMT programme was challenged in court – and the 
challenge was supported by the Bundesbank – confirms the lacuna in 
governance arrangements relating to action of this type. I thus believe 
that insufficient attention in the Treaty to the full panoply of potential 
interactions between Central Bank and Government contributed to a 
costly delay in deploying needed tools.
That big issue has now been resolved.  But many smaller issues raising 
puzzling governance questions remain.  
Types of Governance Gap in the Euro Area: Three Current 
Examples
Let me illustrate how lack of clarity on governance can inhibit policy-
making in a few other areas of current relevance.  I’m going to list three 
topics with contrasting governance gaps.  The first one – helicopter 
money – has the problem that governance for it in the euro area is quite 
unknown.  The second, bail-in and resolution, is where the governance 
structures seemed at last to have been settled at the European level, but 
the practice in the early months of the new regime differs from what one 
might have expected: in a sense, the ostensible governance structure is 
being bypassed.  The third example is one where again there are well-es-
tablished governance structures, but they seem unlikely to be sufficient 
to deliver a good result, essentially because the entities formally charged 
with addressing the topic are not equipped to weigh the full systemic 
ramifications.
Helicopter money 
There has been an increasing amount of discussion about the possible 
deployment of an unusual policy tool namely “helicopter money”.  This 
tool – previously confined to theoretical papers, including famous ones 
by Friedman and Bernanke – is considered by some to have greater poten-
tial than quantitative easing (QE) to accelerate the return of inflation to 
target; however it also is seen as conveying a risk of overshooting that 
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inflation target. Without prejudging the substantive merits of its intro-
duction in current conditions, the question arises: what agency in the 
euro area has the authority and responsibility to consider, and if appro-
priate implement, “helicopter money”?
The tool has various alternative modes of implementation, but each of 
them is distinguished by the fact that new money is created and distrib-
uted without the normal quid-pro-quo of an indebtedness or the sale of 
an asset. Since the distribution is not based on a market transaction, its 
essence amounts to a grant to the recipient of the money.  That is not the 
normal way for central banks to do business and indeed can be seen as a 
quasi-fiscal operation.  
Here once again the central bank of a single state could discuss and 
legitimate actions of this type – if they were considered appropriate – by 
agreement with the government.  But in the euro area the idea of the 
central bank discussing with government who should benefit from a free 
distribution of newly created money is certain to be questioned by many 
as a potential violation of Article 123.  In terms of governance, we are in 
uncharted waters.
Bail-in and bank resolution
Here is a second area where governance lines have been quite unclear and 
the policy lines pursued in the euro area over the period 2008-13 were 
erratic and overall rather incoherent.  
Who was in charge? This was at first seen as a matter for natural 
authorities. However, by September 2008 the ECB had already begun to 
take the role of facilitator (for example in the Fortis affair). Subsequently, 
European institutions began to take a larger role when sovereigns them-
selves had come under pressure. 
Out of the long list of examples, I will not dwell on the well-known 
case of Ireland where bailing-in out-of-guarantee debt in failed banks 
was ruled out by the official lenders at the time of the negotiation of the 
EU-IMF programme in 2010. 
An important contrasting case, where again European institutions 
– in this case including the eurogroup – were involved (at least infor-
mally), was Cyprus.  There were some puzzling features of the discussion. 
Not only was a questionmark raised (at first) over the deposit guarantee 
scheme. In addition, the eventual arrangements around the bail-in were 
surprisingly structured in such a way as to spare depositors at Greek 
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branches of a Cypriot bank being resolved. 
Eventually, a relatively clear governance structure was established 
by the BRRD and other legislation at European level, and this has been 
brought into force since the beginning of 2016.  But at this moment, it is 
less clear that the structure is working out in practice fully in line with 
expectations.  Portuguese and Italian resolution or pre-resolution cases 
(Novobanco bonds; Atlante investment fund) have been dealt with by 
national authorities in a manner not evidently foreseen in the European 
legislation. 
Thus here we have a situation where governance seems clear in theory, 
but practice is not evidently in line with what one might expect.  Perhaps 
this just reflects transitional or teething issues.
Sovereign risk weights and concentration limits
We do know which bodies are in charge of deciding and enforcing risk-
weights or concentration limits for bank assets in Europe.  Governance on 
this matter is very clear and is largely left in the hands of the micro-pru-
dential authorities.  But, when it comes to applying risk weights or con-
centration limits to sovereign debt, deeper political and financial stability 
issues arise than were imagined when the governance structures for such 
matters were decided.  If so, we can expect the standard governance pro-
cess to stall and to be superseded by some ad hoc process.
If it was only a question of risk-weights for the debt of regional gov-
ernments there would be little to debate.  Analogously, failing to account 
for sovereign default risk is certainly problematic for international banks. 
But the absence of a central fiscal authority in the euro area complicates 
this matter, and makes it much less of a technical issue than it might 
seem.
Indeed, the current scale of legacy overall indebtedness of some 
euro area sovereigns means that this issue cannot be safely settled at the 
level of the micro-financial supervisor.  Furthermore, it is evident that 
it dealing with it should be done in parallel not only with an adequate 
collective replacement funding for deposit insurance -- that would not be 
at all sufficient as a counterweight to the risks potentially generated by a 
major change to the treatment of sovereign debt -- but also with sufficient 
and effective European arrangements for dealing with the fiscal costs of 
the failure of a bank which (despite BRRD) is too big, or too connected, 
to be allowed fail.  More generally, introducing risk-weights raises deep 
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questions about the status of government guarantees in the area of bank 
and financial stability.
So, although the governance structure is in place (EBA, SSM), it is 
not sufficiently equipped to deal safely and sufficiently comprehensively 
with the associated challenges that are entailed in moving towards a more 
coherent treatment of the issue of the credit risk to banks of their hold-
ings of member state sovereign debt.  Other entities, ESRB, eurogroup, 
Council, will ultimately be more central in the evolution of decisions 
here.
Indeed, it is not clear that there is a stable and coherent solution to 
all of the puzzles that are raised here in the absence of a euro area fiscal 
authority and a collectively underpinned euro area safe asset.
Conclusion
Governance issues in the euro area remain in several dimensions.  
In some cases we do not know what entity is in charge; in others the 
responsibility has been assigned in a manner which in practice is not 
working effectively. 
Some of these issues are fluid and not readily resolved.  As with many 
other aspects of financial regulation and policy for financial stability, the 
rules and the institutional structures are both incomplete and represent 
too complex a structure.  A sufficiently simplified yet fully effective gov-
ernance structure for banking and finance in Europe remains elusive.
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TALKING ONE’S WAY OUT  
OF A DEBT CRISIS
Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati
Abstract
The policy of Euro-area officialdom in the period 2010-2011 was to avoid, 
at all costs, a default and restructuring of the sovereign debt of a member 
of the monetary union.  This policy was motivated principally, but not 
exclusively, by a fear that the international capital markets, if forcibly 
reminded of the precarious position of overindebted, growth-challenged 
members of a monetary union, might recoil generally from lending to 
European sovereigns.  In short, they feared contagion.
The only alternative to permitting a debt restructuring, of course, was 
an official sector bailout.  The afflicted countries -- Greece (until 2012), 
Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus -- received loans from official sector sources 
sufficient to allow them to repay in full their maturing bond indebted-
ness.  Whenever and wherever the crisis erupted, contagion was thus held 
in check by the blunt technique of smothering the outbreak -- in money.
The proponents of this policy argued at the time, and argue now, 
that many European sovereigns in 2010 were far too fragile to endure 
a bout of market contagion.  They argued that an acute crisis needed 
to be averted in order to buy time for the implementation of a gradual 
but more durable remedy.  Had the intervening eight years been used to 
reduce the debt vulnerabilities of the peripheral (and even some core) 
states, this argument would now be powerful, indeed invincible.
Unfortunately, the opposite happened.  Average state indebtedness in 
Europe today is about one-third larger than it was in 2008.  Both the 
member states and the market saw the reprieve as spreading a reliable 
official sector safety net under their exposure.  So they kept on borrowing 
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and lending.  Only the zero interest rate policies of the world’s major cen-
tral banks during this period have kept debt servicing costs at tolerable 
levels.
Imagine a treaty creating a monetary union that expressly forbids the 
union from assuming unsustainable debts incurred by member states. 
Imagine further a central bank for the monetary union that is explicitly 
precluded from providing monetary financing directly to member coun-
tries.  If a member becomes financially overextended, how can union offi-
cials jolly the markets into continuing to lend to the country in order to 
stave off a debt crisis?
There are three options:
1. Assure the markets that the weak sister will indeed be bailed out, not-
withstanding the treaty prohibition against doing so.   
2. Artificially maintain the country’s access to private capital markets 
by giving investors a “put” of those debt instruments -- “in unlimited 
quantities” -- to the union’s central bank. 
3. Repeatedly and relentlessly declare, as a matter both of policy and of 
sacred honor, that no default on, or restructuring of, sovereign debt 
within the union will ever be tolerated. 
At the commencement of the Eurozone debt crisis in May of 2010, Euro-
pean officialdom could not embrace option 1 for political and other rea-
sons. 
Even broaching option 2 at that stage would have been hazardous, 
again for political reasons. 
Which left only option 3.
The risks of attempting to talk the Eurozone out of a contagious debt 
crisis (as opposed to restructuring the unsustainable debt loads of the 
affected countries at the outset) were of course visible when the problem 
began in 2010.  The majority of official sector players apparently per-
suaded themselves that this was the least bad alternative at the time.  The 
reprieve purchased by implicitly promising bondholders an official sector 
guarantee of their lending to Eurozone sovereigns, however, now puts 
those official sector actors in a remarkably uncomfortable position.  Any 
suggestion that the implicit guarantee is being withdrawn or even limited 
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could trigger another bout of the financial contagion that the guarantee 
was originally intended to suppress.  The financial firewalls established in 
Europe since the onset of the crisis are manifestly insufficient to contain 
an outbreak of that kind.  In short, the official sector may have grasped 
the wolf by the ears and the tiger by the tail.  They cannot safely back away 
from the implicit promise they have given to private sector creditors but 
they also lack both the financial resources and the political backing to 
honor the promise if called upon to do so in a contagious crisis.  
Limited Choices
When a sovereign debt instrument falls due, the borrower has two, 
but only two, choices -- pay it or don’t pay it.  If the borrower does not 
itself have the financial resources to pay and cannot access commercial 
markets to borrow the funds needed to refinance the maturing debt, 
paying requires the borrower to seek financial assistance from an official 
sector source, multilateral or bilateral.
The “don’t pay” alternative is equally simple.  The sovereign either 
negotiates a restructuring of the debt before the claim falls due (and thus 
avoids an actual payment default) or it fails to pay on the maturity date 
and attempts to negotiate a restructuring afterwards.  Either way, how-
ever, “don’t pay” means “restructure”.
In the case of Greece in the spring of 2010 (and later in Ireland, Por-
tugal and Cyprus), European officialdom could not promise the mar-
kets that the afflicted countries would pay their maturing bonds; this 
would have been tantamount to a pledge to use taxpayer money to bail 
the countries out.  Although such a promise would undoubtedly have 
resulted in continued market access for the afflicted countries, uttering 
it aloud was unthinkable for two reasons.  First, it would have instantly 
been attacked as inconsistent with the no-bailout provision of the treaty 
establishing the monetary union.  Second, official sector assistance for 
the debtor countries was conditioned upon fiscal reform.  Promising the 
markets a bailout -- in effect, committing to bail them out -- would have 
obviously weakened the official sector’s hand in negotiating those fiscal 
reform programs.
Calming the markets through an official sector assurance that the 
debtor countries would pay was thus not feasible.  But if the dichotomy 
boils down to only two choices -- pay or restructure -- the official sector 
could obliquely promise the markets that maturing debts would be paid 
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by vehemently ruling out the option that the debts would ever be restruc-
tured.  Stated differently, if the only options are x or y, you don’t need to 
say “x”, you only need to promise “not y”. 
Abolishing the Death Penalty
This is precisely what some senior European officials attempted to do in 
the early years of the Eurozone debt crisis.  A sovereign debt restructuring 
in the Eurozone, they broadcast, was impossible, unthinkable, illegal, 
immoral and fattening.1  Here are some examples:
 “A debt restructuring . . . would be like the death penalty -- which we 
have abolished in the European Union.”2
 “Restructuring . . . would entail a major economic, social and even 
humanitarian disaster within Europe.”3
 “How can people invest in the euro area . . . if they are told ‘we are not 
sure if you will get your money back’?  What kind of advertisement 
is it for the euro if we tell people ‘you can come and invest but we are 
encouraging restructuring’?4
 “In the worst case, the restructuring of a member state could over-
shadow the effects of the Lehman bankruptcy.”5
 “A debt restructuring in Greece would have major consequences on 
the soundness of the banking sector in Greece as well as on any banks 
having exposure to Greek securities.”6
1 For vivid descriptions of what occurred, see Martin Sandbu, Europe’s Orphan: The 
Future of the Euro and the Politics of Debt (2015); Paul Blustein, Laid Low: The IMF, 
the Eurozone and the First Rescue of Greece, CIGI Working Paper 61 (2015); Landon 
Thomas & Stephen Castle, The Denials That Trapped Greece, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 
2011.
2 Ralph Atkins, Interview Transcript: Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, member of the Executive 
Board of the European Central Bank, Financial Times, May 29, 2011.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Euro Restructuring Could Overshadow Lehman -- ECB’s Stark, Reuters, April 23, 2011 
(quoting ECB Executive Board member Jurgen Stark); see also Blustein, supra note 1 
(reporting on ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet’s fears of a Lehman-like moment in 
Europe should Greece embark on plans to restructure its debt in 2010).
6 Jonathan Stearns, EU’s Rehn Warns of ‘Devastating’ Impact of Greek Restructuring, 
Bloomberg, May 11, 2011 (quoting Olli Rehn, EU Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Commissioner).
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Contagion
These and similar declarations of the impossibility of a sovereign default 
or debt restructuring in the Eurozone had one overriding objective -- 
avoid contagion.
“Contagion” is an interesting word.  Most people immediately asso-
ciate it with a communicable disease.  The common cold is contagious. 
But so, they say, is yawning.  Even a catchy tune can be said to be conta-
gious if you find yourself humming it for the rest of the day.
“Financial contagion”, in the context of a sovereign debt crisis, can 
describe one of two possible phenomena:
Blind contagion occurs when markets, observing fiscal malfeasance 
or simple misfortune in one debtor country, irrationally recoil from 
lending to other sovereigns that are wholly innocent of, or unaffected by, 
the causes of the problem in the trigger country.  Blind contagion thus 
resembles the transmission of a communicable disease.  The victim has 
the bad luck to be in the wrong place at the wrong time when a virus or 
bacterium is abroad.  The sovereign victim of blind financial panic simi-
larly suffers from bad luck; the occasional tendency of markets to become 
skittish and undiscriminating.
Perceptive contagion, however, results from the market’s sudden real-
ization that the causes of the financial distress in the trigger country are 
also present elsewhere in the region or in the asset class generally.  This 
produces a “golly, if it could happen there, it can happen here” revelation. 
Countries affected by this form of contagion are not innocent victims of 
bad luck or bad geography.  They are themselves in some way financially 
vulnerable and thus become predictable casualties whenever investors 
are forcibly reminded of the risks of sovereign fragility.
If blind contagion is best compared to catching a cold on a crowded 
subway, perceptive contagion resembles a midsummer cocktail party 
when a torrential rain storm erupts.  Someone at the party, remembering 
that he left his car window open, bolts outside to effect a remedy.  His 
action reminds the other guests that the front seats of their own auto-
mobiles may similarly be at risk.  The result?  A suddenly empty cocktail 
party.
Politicians usually try to convince us that sovereign financial conta-
gion is of the blind variety while in practice it is normally of the perceptive 
kind.
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Financial Contagion in Europe
The main propellant for the official sector’s response to the Eurozone debt 
crisis was thus a fear of contagion -- more precisely, perceptive contagion 
-- on the part of the markets.  Greece, which had been borrowing not 
too many months before at a spread of only 20bp over German Bunds, 
openly acknowledged its inability to pay its maturing debts out of its 
own resources.  That was a revelatory moment for investors.  Might the 
problems that were laying low the Hellenic Republic -- a huge debt stock, 
anemic growth, chronic public sector deficits, the inability to devalue 
the currency -- similarly affect other Eurozone sovereigns?  Gosh, the 
markets might ask themselves, if it happened in Greece, could it also 
happen in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Belgium or France?
The official sector therefore felt itself confronting a clear and present 
danger of financial contagion across other Eurozone sovereigns.  Not 
a blind contagion, however, in which the markets react irrationally.  A 
spasm of irrationality might have been expected to pass quickly.  In 2010, 
the official sector feared an acutely perceptive contagion once investors 
had been reminded of the limited options facing overindebted coun-
tries that belong to a monetary union.  The only effective antidote to the 
spread of that perceptive contagion, thought some in the official sector, 
was an assurance that Eurozone countries would never be permitted to 
default on or restructure their maturing debts.  The implication -- which 
the market was left to draw for itself -- was that these countries would be 
the inevitable beneficiaries of a bailout if they lost market access.
When a restructuring of Greek debt did occur in early 2012, of course, 
Europe did not collapse.  The death penalty was not reinstated.  Investors 
did not shun other European sovereigns.  There was no Lehman moment. 
Affected holders of Greek Government Bonds grimaced and grumbled 
but then moved on, as some observers had always maintained they 
would.  As for the belief that markets, once bruised, never forgive and 
never forget, Greece itself punctured that theory by issuing new bonds, 
at a coupon of under 5%, less than two years after inflicting a savage debt 
restructuring on its old bondholders. 
To be sure, the “no default; no restructuring” policy avoided 
unpleasant negotiations with the private sector creditors of Greece (until 
2012), Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus.  But the price of this policy was to 
force a substantial migration of the debts onto the shoulders of official 
sector creditors.  What awaits now is an even more unpleasant discussion 
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of whether, when and how those official sector lenders will themselves 
provide the concessions that they generously deflected from private 
sector investors.
The Implications
Establishing firewalls or shock absorbers like the European Stability 
Mechanism (authorized share capital € 700 billion) are undoubtedly 
helpful to quell outbreaks of blind, irrational contagion.  An afflicted 
country can be expected to return to normal funding operations once the 
panic subsides.  Unless vastly expanded in size, however, such firewalls 
are of less utility when the problem is a fear of perceptive contagion.
By its very nature, perceptive contagion results from a sudden recog-
nition by investors that they -- as sensible, risk averse commercial actors 
-- ought not to be lending to a group of sovereign borrowers, at least not 
at the coupon levels those countries have come to expect.  To be effective, 
therefore, a financial firewall against perceptive contagion needs to have 
both the financial resources and the political backing necessary to fund 
the maturing debts of multiple countries for prolonged periods.  The 
ESM, even augmented by IMF resources, lacks the money and the polit-
ical support to attempt that gargantuan task.
The latent policy question is whether the official sector wants to con-
secrate a system by which the market access of a number of European 
countries is premised not on a sober investor assessment of the credit-
worthiness of the individual sovereign borrowers, but rather on the mar-
ket’s assumption about an inevitable official sector bailout should a bout 
of perceptive contagion again break out.  If it does, then the objective of 
European fiscal integration long promoted by some commentators will 
have largely been achieved, indirectly of course.  It strikes us as unlikely, 
however, that this proposition would enjoy the necessary political sup-
port were it to be put directly to the national parliaments.
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ARE “NO BAILOUT” AND  
“NO DEBT RESTRUCTURING”  
IN THE EMU COMPATIBLE?  
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Kim Oosterlinck
Introduction
The recent Eurozone crisis has led to an increasing interest in the 
management of sovereign debt crises in the framework of a union of 
sovereigns. The vast literature dedicated to sovereign debts has in most 
instances focused on sovereign viewed in isolation. The limited number 
of state unions explains this choice. But to which extent are the insights 
gained from the literature on sovereign debts in general relevant for the 
case of sovereigns within a union? 
The feature that distinguishes sovereign debts from other debts is 
the sovereign nature of its issuer. And in turn, this sovereign nature is 
at the basis of the sovereign debt paradox: depending on the premises, 
sovereign debts may either be presented as risk-free assets or as extremely 
risky ones (Oosterlinck, 2013). The sovereign nature of the issuers creates 
an imbalance between the powers of the issuer and the bondholders. Sov-
ereigns may unilaterally decide to renege on their obligation. Repaying, 
defaulting, restructuring or repudiating the debts are decisions that the 
sovereign takes alone. Sovereign debts are thus by nature “political” 
financial instrument. The inclusion of a sovereign within a union raises 
questions regarding the freedom enjoyed by the state in terms of deci-
sions regarding its debts. To which extent are sovereigns, sovereigns 
within a union? The recent Eurozone debt crisis has also led to a series of 
suggestions regarding the rules to apply within the Union. Should sover-
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eigns who find themselves in trouble be allowed to restructure their debt? 
Should the union or part of its members step in and bailout the distressed 
countries? Many voices were raised against either a bailout or a restruc-
turing. How would these rules compare in a historical perspective? And 
to which extent are sovereigns bound by “the rules of the game” decided 
by the union? What happens when states are “created” or when part of a 
union decides to split?
To address these questions this note will first present the no-bailout 
and no restructuring rules in a historical perspective. It will then present 
alternative ways in a historical perspective, discuss the role of supersanc-
tions (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2010) as well as the potential of guar-
anteed bonds. The last part of the note will present the lessons from a 
historical state union and briefly discuss the impact on sovereign debts in 
the case of secessions. 
1. No bailout and no restructuring: historical evidence and 
credibility
Bail outs and debt restructuring are two ways to help restore the financial 
credit of an ailing sovereign. They are however markedly different. Bailouts 
and bailout expectations may lead to a double moral hazard (if investors 
expect to be bailed out they are likely to scrutinize less the quality of the 
issuer, and if a sovereign expects to be bailed out its government has little 
incentive to follow prudent macroeconomic policies). For these reasons 
bailout are quite exceptional from a historical perspective. By contrast 
debt restructuring may be viewed as normal following a default.
Bailing out a sovereign is thus essentially an uncommon endeavor. The 
number of cases is extremely limited. Broadly speaking, and depending 
on the helping hand, bailouts may be divided into two categories. In some 
cases it was a sovereign which bailed out another one. In other instances, 
it was the underwriter who supported the failing sovereign. The moti-
vation behind these interventions differed dramatically. In the first case, 
political motives seem to have been the main driver of the bailout. In the 
second one, the motivation was of a reputational nature. Underwriters 
willing to protect their good reputation helped sovereigns overcome tem-
porary difficulties. 
In 1867 Benito Juarez repudiated bonds issued by the Emperor Max-
imilian. According to Juarez these bonds had been floated by an illegit-
imate foreign ruler and there was therefore no reason for the Mexican 
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population to repay these. The bonds issued by Maximilian’s regime had 
been strongly supported by its French ally, Napoleon III. Following the 
repudiation, and because of the high profile it had played when the bonds 
had been issued, the French government decided to partially bail out 
these bonds. The bailout of the Mexican bonds by the French government 
was thus essentially motivated by political reasons. In the absence of data 
on the holders themselves it is hard to know if political connections drove 
the decision to partially repay the bonds. The fact that the bailout was 
limited to French holders of these bonds suggests in any case that there 
was a good reason to extend the favor only to nationals. Wynne (1951, 
[2000], p. 30) estimates that bondholders managed to recover more or 
less 50 per cent of the face value of their investments. 
Even though the amounts involved were relatively small, the Mex-
ican bailout created a long-lasting impression on French bondholders. 
More than fifty years later this case was mentioned by the French press 
when Russia repudiated its debts1. The parallel was certainly warranted 
as the French government had promoted the Russian bonds even more 
than the Mexican ones. As a result French holders of Russian bonds 
hoped someone, maybe the French government, or the French banks 
which had issued these bonds would reimburse them (Landon-Lane and 
Oosterlinck, 2006; Oosterlinck, 2016). Whereas French holders of Rus-
sian bonds hoped their government would support their claims, British 
holders knew from experience that Great Britain would be reluctant 
to bail them out. Because of the First World War new rules had been 
implemented in London. In practice these rules prevented any arbitrage 
operations. As a result prices of Russian bonds cross-listed in Paris and 
London began to trade at a higher price in Paris (Bernal et al., 2010). 
All other things being equal, this price differential represented the value 
assigned by French bondholders to the potential bailout. The hopes of 
the French bondholders never fully materialized. The French govern-
ment allowed the use of coupons in arrears to subscribe to a new French 
loan but the limits imposed on the number of coupons to be exchanged 
meantbondholders only received a minimal compensation. The amounts 
lent by French investors to Russia were huge by any standards (Girault, 
1973). This certainly explains why the French government was reluctant 
to recognize any financial responsibility. The fact that France was in the 
midst of a terrible and costly war did of course not help. 
These examples show that when a country bailed out another one it 
1 See for example Le Rentier, 7 June 1921.
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was mostly for political motives. Expectations of bailout were thus linked 
to politics. In the case of bonds issued by colonies, and even though the 
bonds in question were by no means officially guaranteed, bondholders 
expected the colonial power to step in should a problem arise. The guar-
antee was so much ingrained in investors’ beliefs that the economic fun-
damentals of the colonies didn’t really matter in the pricing of their bonds 
(Accominotti et al., 2011). Of course it would be an oxymoron to talk 
about sovereign colonial debts. But one could credibly argue that even 
if they were not sovereign at the time the bonds were issued, all colonies 
had a non-zero likelihood to become sovereign one day. They were in a 
sense “sovereigns in waiting”.
Banks also engaged in bailout operations during the 19th century. 
At the time underwriters were keen to protect their reputation. The best 
underwriters were able to cherry-pick the sovereigns with the best pros-
pects and to charge them fees reflecting their reputation (Flandreau and 
Flores, 2009). As a result defaults were not random across underwriters. 
Defaults were almost unheard of for bonds issued by the best under-
writers such as Rothschild. For a sovereign, managing to get its bonds 
issued by high quality underwriters signaled its quality (Flandreau et 
al., 2010). Consequently the market rapidly distinguished the quality of 
the bonds on basis of the underwriter. Underwriters were however not 
always right in their choices and sometimes lent to states which ended 
in trouble. To protect their reputation underwriters were then ready to 
financially support these states (Flandreau et al., 2010). Brazil is a case 
in point. In 1889 a coup deposed the Emperor of Brazil and established a 
republic. The next decade proved extremely turbulent on the political but 
also on the economic side and by 1893 Brazil was on the verge of bank-
ruptcy. The House of Rothschild, which was acting as Brazils’ under-
writer, stepped in. It provided a series of rescue loans amounting to £13.1 
million between 1893 and 1895 (Weller, 2015). In parallel the house sup-
ported the prices of these bonds on the secondary markets. The rescue 
loans allowed Brazil to overcome its financial problems but they came 
with conditions attached: Brazil was to follow a sound monetary policy 
or the loans would stop2. 
During the 19th century underwriters had thus a dual role as provider 
of liquidity and as agent to signal the quality of the bonds. The emergence 
2 This clause was imposed upon Brazil because of moral hazard risk which was rapidly 
materializing in the form of reckless spending by the Brazilian government (Weller, 
2015).
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of rating agencies gradually removed incentives to engage into signaling. 
As a result the correlation between the quality of the underwriter and 
the likelihood of default has disappeared (Flandreau et al., 2010).Bailouts 
were in most of the time not expected. But could bondholders expect a 
different treatment for bonds issued in the framework of a union. There 
is unfortunately no historical example which would perfectly match the 
case of the EMU. The defaults which occurred in several states within the 
United States in the 1840s might however provide some insights. 
Between 1841 and 1843, eight states (Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi and Pennsylvania) declared 
themselves unable or unwilling to service their debts. Even though the 
defaults and repudiations were made by states, argues that the complex 
legal status of the states regarding debts allows assimilating them to sov-
ereigns. Indeed according to English (1996, p. 272), “Under the United 
States Constitution, states are sovereign and cannot be compelled to 
repay debts”. The defaults had consequences beyond the borders of the 
defaulting states. According to contemporaneous observers a form of 
contagion occurred temporarily affecting the Federal government. Euro-
pean investors who had suffered from the states’ defaults were reluctant 
to lend to the Federal government fearing it might also default. It seems 
European bankers were conditioning lending to the Federal government 
to using part of the proceeds to pay the debts in default (English, 1996). 
Despite this attempt to coerce the Federal government, it did not bail out 
the various states.
 
2. No restructuring: historical evidence and credibility
Whereas bailouts are uncommon in historical perspective, debts 
restructurings seem to be the norm in case of default. On basis of data 
from various bondholders’ associations Suter and Stamm (1992) report 
120 successful debt settlements between 1820 and 1975. Agreements were 
reached on average after nine years of negotiations. In the vast majority 
of the cases negotiations led to a net loss. Suter and Stamm (1992) show 
that investors lost on average a third of the value of interests in arrears, 
experienced a reduction of 22% of the interest rate and a write-off of 
18% of the bonds’ original face value. These average figures hide a vast 
diversity in terms of settlements.
The terms of the debt restructuring may range from small losses to 
huge write-offs. Computing the present value of the losses is compli-
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cated by the need to decide which discount rate to apply. Sturzenegger 
and Zettelmeyer (2008) assess the size of the haircuts by comparing the 
net present value of the stream of cash flow pre-default with those pro-
posed after the settlement. To discount these cash flows they rely on the 
yields of the new bonds. They show that haircuts may range from rela-
tively low figures (13%) to extremely high ones (73%). The intensity of 
default covers thus a broad range. History shows that debt restructuring 
is extremely common but it seems that the terms of the agreements have 
changed over time. According to Suter and Stamm (1992) in a long term 
perspective the terms of the deals have gradually favored more and more 
the debtor, with contemporaneous debt reliefs higher than the one pre-
vailing at the beginning of the 19th century. 
If restructuring is ruled out, the options become extremely limited3. 
One option would be to engage into what Mitchener and Weidnemier 
(2010) have named supersanctions (gunboat diplomacy or imposing the 
loss of fiscal sovereignty on the defaulter). Gunboat diplomacy would 
in all likelihood generate public outcry today. By contrast it has become 
relatively common to see direct intervention into the public finances of 
defaulting countries. Programs sponsored by the IMF have indeed been 
frequent following default. But it should be noted that these interventions 
usually come after some form of debt restructuring. Another option for 
the defaulting country would be to stick to its decision to default and 
refuse any form of settlement with the bondholders. In a historical per-
spective the only countries which managed to stick to such a position in 
the long run are the communist countries which repudiated their debts 
(Oosterlinck, 2016). But if “no restructuring” is ex ante announced as 
a rule, then the defaulter is faced with an all or nothing decision which 
may prompt the government of the defaulting country to favor the latter. 
Another alternative would be to insure that a third party (another sover-
eign for example) would guarantee the bonds. This will be discussed in 
the next section.
3. Guaranteed bonds, Eurobonds, State Union and Secession
To avoid bailing out or restructuring one may wonder whether some 
prophylactic measures could help. Maybe a sovereign could guarantee 
3 In fact Buchheit and Gulati (2016) exploit the limited number of options to argue that 
by signalling their unwillingness to restructure senior European official were in fact 
signaling their willingness to bail out bondholders during the Eurozone crisis.
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the bonds issued by another one. Or the debt could be mutualized in the 
framework of a Union, in a way close to the blue and red bonds suggested 
by Delpla and von Weiszäcker (2010). 
Guaranteeing the bonds issued by another state is probably as 
uncommon as bailing out another state4. Esteves and Tunçer (2016) 
analyze the case of five guaranteed bonds issued in Europe during the 
19th century. All the loans in question were linked to a war or a mili-
tary campaign. The guarantors were European powers (depending on the 
loan Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy or Russia) 
and in many instances there were several guarantors for a given loan. 
The market distinguished the guaranteed bonds from the others (Esteves 
and Tunçer, 2016). The spreads between normal bonds issued by a given 
country and its guaranteed equivalent seldom fell below 100 basis points. 
Markets thus valued the guarantee.
The case of guaranteed bonds is insightful but the amounts guaran-
teed were relatively modest compared to the debts of most guarantors. 
Furthermore, since these bonds were related to specific events, they did 
not engage the guarantor for any other bond. By contrast, when sover-
eigns join to form a new country, one may expect that the commitment 
will be of a long-term nature. There are very few examples of independent 
countries merging to become a new country. Italy is probably the best 
case one could imagine in order to analyze this issue.
The Italian unification was a gradual process. More than 25 years 
passed by between the first independence war (1848-1849) and the final 
unification of Italy in 1871. Before the unification seven independent 
entities ruled parts of Italy: the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, the Kingdom of 
Piedmont Sardinia, the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia (under Austrian 
rule), the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Duchy of Modena, the Duchy 
of Parma and the Papal States. Four out of the seven sovereigns (all but 
the Duchies) had issued debts in Antwerp and Paris prior to unification. 
These debts were actively traded on these markets.
Collet (2012, 2013) exploits the price evolution of these debts to gauge 
market reactions regarding the Italian unification. The first independ-
ence war failed but the second one paved the way to the creation of Italy. 
In 1861, Victor Emmanuel II proclaimed himself king of Italy. The new 
Italian state was composed of all the seven entities but for the Papal States 
4 This section only deals with guarantees which were clearly defined in terms of scope 
and nature. Guarantees by sovereign may however be much more complex (see Buch-
heit and Gulati, 2014)
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and the Kingdom of Lombardy Venetia. The debts from the former inde-
pendent entities were merged to create a new Italian debt. Markets were 
however suspicious and decided to trade the bonds by referring to the 
previous state they had belonged to. Collet (2012, 2013) exploits this ele-
ment to assess how markets perceived the new Italian bonds. She shows 
that the new Italian bonds traded at a higher yield than the weighted 
average of its constituent entities. In fact their yields were close to those 
of the worst credit before the unification (bonds issued by the kingdom 
of Piedmont-Sardinia). Furthermore Collet (2012, 2013) finds that yields 
began to converge only in 1871 when the unification was completed but 
also when taxes were harmonized across the country.
The Italian example is not very encouraging for mutualized European 
debts. Markets seem indeed reluctant to view these bonds in a positive 
manner unless fiscal union is established. Guaranteeing bonds seems a bit 
less problematic but one may wonder if large scale issues of guaranteed 
bonds would not lead to a different outcome than the one observed in 
history. Furthermore both cases ignore the likelihood that part of union 
may wish to secede. In this case the common debt has to be partitioned. 
Following the Vienna Congress in 1815, the Netherlands acquired the 
formerly Austrian territory which would become Belgium in 1830. The 
debts from the two entities were merged into a new debt. The Dutch debts 
dwarfed those from the South of the country. When Belgium managed 
to become independent, the question of the partition of the debts arose. 
Belgian representative wanted each former entity to take back its own 
debts. Their view did not prevail however, and Belgium was forced to take 
half of the overall debts on the grounds that it had a population similar 
in size than the Dutch one (Collet, 2012). This example clearly highlights 
an additional risk when it comes to mutualizing debts. The US civil war 
provides another example of debts affected by Secession. The debts issued 
by the Confederacy were repudiated and ended up valueless (Oosterlinck 
and Weidenmier, 2007; Mitchener et al., 2015).
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4. Conclusion
The statement that no bailout would ever occur could, from a historical 
perspective, be viewed as credible. The number and the nature of bailouts 
which happened in the past suggest indeed that bailouts are uncommon. 
This is the case even for states belonging to a union. By contrast 
announcing no restructuring seems hardly credible. As a matter of fact 
restructurings are the norm when sovereign default and history is replete 
with examples of restructuring.
The creation and the potential dissolution of unions raise further 
questions. The example of the Italian unification would tend to indicate 
that markets penalize at first the newly created country. One may fur-
ther conjecture on basis of this example that fiscal union is viewed as a 
condition for markets to believe in the credibility of the union. As for 
dissolution or secession they raise the question of the apportionment of 
the debts. In the absence of an international recognized rule, the appor-
tionment is usually done on an ad hoc basis. This creates uncertainty 
regarding the amounts to be taken over by the different parties. If the 
credit rating of these entities differs, this uncertainty will in all likelihood 
be reflected in the bonds’ yields. 
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ARE “NO BAILOUT” AND “NO DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING” IN THE EMU  
COMPATIBLE? HOW TO UNDERSTAND  
THE DILEMMA
Martin Sandbu
The question that was raised in the title of this conference panel was 
well-posed, for two reasons. First, it captures the widespread sense that 
Europe’s single currency was constructed as a halfway house that cannot 
keep standing without some serious structural strengthening. Second, 
it highlights a particular policy choice that had to be made at the very 
start of the sovereign debt crisis: whether or not to refinance Greece’s 
public debt through official rescue loans in May 2010. I have argued 
elsewhere1 that most of the eurozone’s awful economic performance and 
fragmenting political fabric since then, must be blamed on policymakers’ 
making the wrong choice then.
In this essay, I set aside the question of whether one should prefer 
bailing debtors out or bailing creditors in, and explore whether the 
dilemma can been avoided in the first place. In the first section, I show 
that in principle, the answer is yes. In the second, I show that in prac-
tice, however the eurozone countries closed off the alternatives routes 
out of the dilemma. That was not something they were predetermined 
to do because of the nature of monetary unification, but an effect of the 
policy choices they made or failed to make. In the third section, I draw 
conclusions about what this means for the way forward for the European 
Monetary Union.
1 Martin Sandbu, Europe’s Orphan: The future of the euro and the politics of debt, 
Princeton University Press 2015.
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Are “No Bailout” and “No Debt Restructuring” compatible in 
general?
Yes. The dilemma between bailing out a debtor and “bailing in” the 
creditors by restructuring the debt is not, in general, a dilemma. The 
dilemma only binds when all the escape routes are closed off. What 
are these escape routes? Here we consider them in the abstract, before 
turning to the concrete case of the European Monetary Union.
A. No debt
If there is no debt, there is nothing to bail out and nothing to restructure: 
the dilemma does not arise. 
This need not mean a situation of financial autarky, in which a country 
or a state cuts itself off from outside financing. That could presumably only 
be achieved, if at all, by running permanent surpluses and keeping large 
reserves for cash management. That is rarely feasible, and never optimal. 
(Norway runs large surpluses and has an $800bn sovereign wealth fund 
for the benefit of its 5m citizens, but it still issues sovereign debt in small 
portions for cash management purposes and to provide financial markets 
with benchmark assets in Norwegian currency.) 
Instead, “no debt” could be understood as a situation where a country 
or a state funds its deficits with capital that takes other forms than debt. 
For national economies as a whole (including the private sector not just 
the government), non-debt financing is conventional if insufficiently 
common. Alternatives financing the current account with debt include 
portfolio equity funding (foreigners investing in the domestic stock 
market) or foreign direct investment (foreigners buying productive assets 
such as companies, real estate, or mines). 
For governments, debt financing - whether through marketable 
bonds or non-marketable bank loans - is virtually the only game in town. 
But economists have designed more equity-like funding products for 
governments too. Robert Shiller, for example, proposes non-redeemable 
securities that would pay an amount defined as a fixed share of the coun-
try’s gross domestic product.2 And many have advocated a greater use 
of GDP-indexed debt, where repayment and debt service would vary in 
step with the health of the debtor economy, again akin to how corporate 
2 Robert Shiller, Finance and the Good Society, Princeton University Press 2012.
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equity can pay greater dividends in good times than in bad ones.3
The general point is that in the absence of debt, or when the bulk 
of external financing takes the form of irredeemable investment such as 
FDI or equity, the choice between bailout and debt restructuring need 
not be faced. One way to escape the dilemma, then, is for governments 
to fund themselves in ways that have the characteristics of equity rather 
than debt.
B. No refinancing
If it’s not reliance on external capital generally, but specifically debt that 
can make the dilemma bind, what is it about debt that is dangerous?
It is the characteristic that debt falls due, that is to say, a creditor’s 
right to redeem the loan at a particular maturity date or under specific 
conditions. Debtor unable honour their debts, who therefore must either 
be bailed out or restructure their obligations, are typically brought to 
this point not by unaffordable interest service but by a bulky redemption 
requirement. 
It is often observed that sovereigns rarely pay back their debts. In his-
torical cases when public debt-to-GDP ratios have come down it has usu-
ally been thanks to growing (nominal) GDP more than a falling absolute 
level of debt. Instead of paying down and retiring maturing bonds, gov-
ernments typically roll them over into new bonds. A debt crisis tends to 
happen when private investors refuse to play their part of that game, and 
old creditors insist on being paid back what they are due on redemption 
while new creditors refuse to buy the new bonds whose proceeds would 
normally repay the maturing ones.
The average maturity of OECD country governments’ debt has tended 
to be in the 5-8 year range. In the eurozone when the crisis hit (2008), this 
average maturity ranged from just under 4 years (Finland) to just over 8 
years (Greece). Now a 5 year average maturity means that on average, the 
whole stock of debt is rolled over every five years, or on average one-fifth 
needs to be rolled over every year. Given that the debt structure is usu-
ally front-loaded, the typical short-term rollover requirement is probably 
even greater than that. So if a typical government’s debt level approaches 
3 Olivier Blanchard, Paolo Mauro, and Julien Acalin, “The case for growth-indexed 
bonds in advanced economies today”, Peterson Institute for International Economics 
Policy Brief 2-2016, https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/case-growth-indexed-
bonds-advanced-economies-today. 
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(let alone exceeds) 100 per cent of annual GDP, it may be looking at refi-
nancing the equivalent of one-fifth of its economy every year. It’s imme-
diately clear that in low-inflation environments this dwarfs interest costs 
as well as all but the most exceptional budget deficits.
This also means that as long as big refinancing humps could be 
avoided, so can the choice between bailout and restructuring, even when 
a government is debt-financed. For concreteness, consider a country 
that has 100 different bond issues outstanding, with maturities falling 
evenly on every year over the next century. If the total principal is 100% 
of annual GDP, then even in a refinancing crisis, the debtor government 
would only need to find an additional 1% of GDP in any one year to pay 
the maturing bond from its own resources instead of rolling it over. Since 
that is eminently possible at only a small economic cost, neither a bailout 
nor a restructuring would be needed in a refinancing crisis, which would 
make it unlikely for one to occur in the first place.
C. Money printing
Finally, the dilemma between bail-out and restructuring can be avoided 
if the debt is denominated in a currency that debtor can issue at will. 
In sovereign finance, this the case when the government can call on 
its central bank to print the currency in which the debt obligations are 
denominated, but it should be noted that the principle is more general. 
“Payment-in-kind” securities allow private borrowers to pay coupons 
in new debt securities, which is equivalent to monetary financing for a 
government.
We shall ignore this way out of the dilemma. One reason for doing so 
is that our interest is in Europe’s monetary union whose members have 
foresworn this option. Another is that from a strictly economic point 
of view, it can be seen as equivalent to either an outright restructuring 
(when inflation erodes the real debt burden) or a tax (money printing 
redistributes resources from domestic currency holders to the govern-
ment).
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Are “No Bailout” and “No Debt Restructuring” compatible in 
the euro?
The previous section showed how the dilemma posited in the title 
question actually has a number of escape routes. Accordingly, this section 
rephrases the question as asking the degree to which the eurozone 
has, intentionally or unintentionally, left these escape routes open, or 
alternatively acted so as to tighten the dilemma.
We can immediately dispose of the money printing option: by 
entering the euro, member states gave up national control of the base 
money supply and agreed to a ban on primary-market financing of gov-
ernments by the European Central Bank. That means eurozone govern-
ments can never rely on the central bank in a situation where refinancing 
cannot be found for maturing debt, which is where the dilemma binds. 
The best it can hope for is that central bank policies make such situations 
less likely, for example if secondary market purchases of the bonds of the 
government encourages private investors to keep refinancing the debt.
There is more to say about the other two escape routes: “no debt” and 
“no refinancing”.
A. “No debt” in the eurozone
This was, in a limited sense, precisely what the Maastricht Treaty 
attempted to legislate. Would-be euro members faced a strict entry 
condition on public deficits and a less strict one on the public debt-to-
GDP ratio. The 3% fiscal deficit-to-GDP limit and 60% debt-to-GDP 
limit also function as “reference” values for what is counted as acceptable 
fiscal behaviour after entry to the euro, in the monitoring (and now 
sanctioning) framework that has been steadily tightened since the global 
financial crisis.
There are many reasons, by now well understood, why this ostensible 
“no debt” (or at least “low debt”) requirement did not actually help to 
avoid the bailout-or-restructuring dilemma in the crisis. The least impor-
tant (but not unimportant) reason is that many countries had very high 
legacy debt levels from before the euro; and that a number of countries 
(notoriously France and Germany in 2003-4) exceeded the deficit limit 
during the euro’s first decade. A much more important reason is that the 
fiscal rules focused only on explicit government debt, not on govern-
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ments’ contingent liabilities, let alone liabilities they might gratuitously 
volunteer to take off private debtors’ shoulders. 
Thus Ireland was passing the Maastricht criteria with flying colours 
before the crisis, even as its banking system was loading up on debt. 
When Dublin decided to stand behind its banks, debts worth several 
times annual GDP migrated onto the government’s balance sheet, which 
immediately sank under its own weight. 
It should be noted that the nationalisation of private debts is itself a 
result of a parallel dilemma between bailouts and restructuring at the 
private-sector level. Most of the most crisis-hit eurozone countries, and 
all those that received official rescue loans, saw their public debt increase 
in part as a result of having bailed out banks. And the justification for 
these bank bailouts was that a restructuring of senior bank bonds had 
to be prevented, even though they generally constituted entirely private 
transactions between banks and investors. In other words, when euro-
zone governments faced the dilemma between bailout and bailin in their 
banking sectors, they usually made choices which forced the dilemma 
onto the public sector.
B. “No refinancing” in the eurozone
While the eurozone’s attempts to limit public debt were unsuccessful, 
limits on refinancing requirements were hardly even attempted. There 
was no general policy before the sovereign debt crisis on making liquidity 
crisis impossible by evening out redemption dates sufficiently. Even after 
it became clear that large refinancing requirements could get vulnerable 
countries in trouble, there has been little in the way of forceful action.
Even in the absence of a general policy, some individual did achieve 
longer average debt maturities in the decade and a half between the 
Maastricht Treaty and the global financial crisis. In Italy, Spain and Por-
tugal, average maturities went from about 3 years or less in the mid-1990s 
to above 6 years in 2007.4 It was, of course, not enough; and the progress 
stopped with the debt crisis. Greece, uniquely, saw a huge extension of 
its maturities as part of the 2012 sovereign debt restructuring package, 
4 Martin Sandbu, “The Virtue of Flexibility”, 18 May 2016, http://on.ft.com/1Tnv08t. 
Data from the OECD central government debt database, available on https://stats.oecd.
org/index.aspx?queryid=8089. 
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which took average maturities from 7 to 16 years.5
And it does seem like the benign financial environment that finally 
was put in place by the European Central Bank’s large-scale asset pur-
chase programme, announced in January 2015, has provided a window 
of opportunity for governments to unilaterally “reprofile” their debts by 
issuing longer-dated bonds to replace shorter-maturity ones: so far in 
2016, Ireland has issued a 100-year bond and Spain several 50-year ones. 
It is too soon to say, however, whether this opportunity will be used vig-
orously enough to make a difference.
Where should the eurozone go from here? 
The overall conclusion from the argument up to this point is that the 
eurozone can in principle do a lot but has in practice done vanishingly 
little to avoid the dilemma between sovereign bailouts and sovereign debt 
restructuring. That conclusion, however, should be seen as optimistic in 
the sense that it points straightforwardly to how the eurozone countries 
can do better. Those recommendations fall naturally into three categories.
Keep up the good work. In three areas, current policy efforts go in 
the right direction. They are: the tentative debt management efforts men-
tioned above; the new rules on banking which require investors to be 
bailed in before governments bail banks out; and the work to promote a 
“capital markets union” in the EU. The first of these help to cut average 
annual refinancing needs. The latter two help to keep public balance 
sheets safe from bad private debts - the former by writing down private 
debts directly, the latter by encouraging alternatives to debt funding for 
private businesses. All of these are positive and should be pushed further.
Sweep the legacy away. Even in the best case scenario, the aforemen-
tioned reforms will not do much more than chip away at the existing 
large overhang of public debts, close to or above 100 per cent of GDP 
in many eurozone countries. As the benign financing environment may 
not last forever, it would be good to deal with the debt overhang while 
the times are good. Since the taboo on sovereign debt restructuring was 
broken by the Greek bond swap in 2012, after which the world did not 
end but Athens actually returned to markets for a while within two years, 
a lot of good research has gone into how to make a broader sovereign 
debt swap work. Two recent plans by prominent economists propose con-
5 European Central Bank data, available on http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.
do?SERIES_KEY=121.GST.A.GR.N.B0X13.MAV.B1300.SA.Y, accessed 18 May 2016.
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verting existing sovereign bonds into perpetual zero-coupon debt, with 
the loss covered by the future revenue stream of ECB seigniorage revenue 
which would otherwise have accrued to national government budgets.6 
I would go further and explore negotiating a simultaneous large-scale 
restructuring plan with private holders of the bonds of the most indebted 
eurozone countries, backed by retroactive insertion of collective action 
clauses where necessary and feasible. Given that a more sustainable debt 
profile is also less risky, there should be an opportunity to negotiate 
something that a majority of creditors would agree to, especially in the 
current environment where yield is hard to come by.
Be more radical in the future. Finally, there should be a willingness 
to explore much more exotic instruments for sovereign finance in the 
future. Even the least radical option, GDP-linked bonds, would be a big 
break with tradition. But from a financial perspective, there is nothing 
particularly mysterious about them. And the economic attraction is that 
they would make debt behave a little more like equity - in a word, they 
avoid the dilemma in the title question. There is solid research showing 
bonds that suspend payments when growth is bad may be treated as less 
risky and therefore command higher prices among investors.7 Other pos-
sibilities are perpetual bonds (a return to tradition rather than a break 
with it) or collateralised bonds that permit settling by handing over the 
collateral rather than in cash in a sort of built-in debt-for-equity swap.8 
There are two slightly contradictory points to finish on. One is that 
there are many ways to “equitise” sovereign finance in the eurozone, and 
so one should let a thousand flowers bloom as states experiment with 
different types of new sovereign securities. The other is that the success of 
a financial security depends on critical mass: the deeper and more liquid 
the market for it is, the greater the attraction to investors and therefore 
the more attractive the pricing for the sovereign issuer. This is an argu-
6 See Pierre Pâris and Charles Wyplosz, “The PADRE plan: Politically Acceptable 
Debt Restructuring in the Eurozone”, 28 January 2014, http://voxeu.org/article/pa-
dre-plan-politically-acceptable-debt-restructuring-eurozone and Giancarlo Corsetti, 
Lars P Feld, Philip R. Lane, Lucrezia Reichlin, Hélène Rey, Dimitri Vayanos, and Be-
atrice Weder di Mauro, “A New Start for the Eurozone: Dealing with Debt”, 15 April 
2015, http://voxeu.org/content/new-start-eurozone-dealing-debt. 
7 David Barr, Oliver Bush and Alex Pienkowski, “GDP-linked bonds and sovereign de-
fault”, Bank of England Working Paper No. 484, January 2014, http://www.bankofeng-
land.co.Uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2014/wp484.pdf.  
8 Olivier Garnier (2014). “Eurozone: Promoting Risk-Sharing Through Cross-Border 
Ownership of Equity Capital”, Applied Economics Quarterly Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 107-
113, doi: 10.3790/aeq.60.2.107.
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ment for a large, concerted effort at introducing new types of sovereign 
finance for many eurozone issuers at once and en masse - which could 
best be achieved if it were part of a large-scale, multi-country restruc-
turing operation to get rid of the large existing debt overhang.
So if there is a case for letting a thousand flowers bloom, there is a 
parallel case for managing the blooming - a case, to paraphrase Voltaire, 
for the eurozone countries to collaboratively cultivate their gardens.
Are “No Bailout” and “No Debt Restructuring” in the EMU Compatible? How to understand the 
dilemma  -  Martin Sandbu
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CREDITOR PARTICIPATION CLAUSES: 
MAKING NO BAIL-OUT CREDIBLE IN 
THE EURO AREA 
Jochen Andritzky, Lars P. Feld, Christoph M. Schmidt, 
Isabel Schnabel, and Volker Wieland1
Europe is still in a fragile situation. Threats are coming from many sides. 
The macroeconomic environment has weakened: The world economy 
has been slowing down, especially due to lower growth in China and 
other emerging economies. Consumer price inflation has remained low 
in spite of an ultra-loose monetary policy in the euro area and elsewhere, 
mainly due to the massive decline in oil prices. The political situation 
has become less stable, with nationalist parties gaining ground in many 
countries, an increasing polarisation of the population, and the political 
balance shifting towards parties opposing reforms and consolidation. 
Epitomising these hazards, the danger of Brexit is looming.
Moreover, public debt levels are very high by historical standards, and 
the threat of a return of the euro area crisis is not banned. Greece, which 
is back in the headlines, may be a special case, but rising spreads in other 
countries like Portugal demonstrate that the problem is not confined to 
Greece. Finally, while the issue of refugee migration has dropped out of 
media attention, the current solution may not prove durable. Given these 
fragilities, the question of how to move forward in Europe is of great 
importance: Should we strive for more integration, or rather strengthen 
the existing framework?
1 Feld, Schmidt, Schnabel, and Wieland are members of the German Council of Eco-
nomic Experts, and Andritzky is its Secretary General. The Council is politically in-
dependent and stipulated by law to support all decision-makers in the economic and 
political sphere as well as the general public in Germany in forming their views about 
economic policy and its potential risks. To this end, every November it presents an 
annual report to the German federal government and the general public.
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National sovereignty and no bail-out as the only viable option
We start from the presumption that any consistent framework for the 
euro area has to satisfy the fundamental principle of the unity of liability 
and control, implying that those who take the decisions are also respon-
sible for bearing the resulting costs. This leaves only two fundamental 
options: transferring fiscal and economic sovereignty to European level, 
and allowing for the assumption of joint liability, or retaining sovereignty 
at national level, while excluding joint liability for government debt.
The first option would necessitate a central decision-making authority 
at European level, which would have the power to enforce tax increases, 
spending cuts, and even structural reforms. Given the resistance of 
many countries to give up sovereignty even in areas where it is generally 
accepted that the subsidiarity principle would call for European action, 
it seems highly unlikely that this option will garner support in the near 
future. This implies that only the second option is feasible. The main 
challenge is how the principle of no joint liability – the no bail-out clause 
enshrined in the European treaties – can be rendered credible.
Lack of credibility of the no bail-out clause
Regardless of high debt levels, sovereign bond spreads in the euro area 
remain low, displaying the lack of credibility of the no bail-out clause 
quite plainly. With the inception of the euro, spreads among sovereign 
bonds shrank to almost zero, in spite of large differences in countries’ 
fundamentals. Hence, market discipline was mooted, reducing incentives 
for consolidation and structural reforms. The financial crisis, but even 
more the euro area crisis, served as a wake-up call, reminding investors 
that not all euro area countries were equally risky. In the middle of 2012, 
the crisis threatened to become self-fulfilling, and it was only stopped by 
the intervention of the European Central Bank, which reduced spreads 
almost immediately – though not to pre-crisis levels.
There are generally two ways to ensure that there is no bail-out. One is 
fiscal rules, which reduce the chances that countries may run into a debt 
crisis in the first place. There are plenty of rules in the euro area, such as 
the Stability and Growth Pact, and these have been strengthened sub-
stantially in recent years. However, there is a lack of enforcement, so that 
a build-up of high public debt levels has not been avoided. Neither were 
the rules able to ensure a reduction of debt levels in recent years, although 
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admittedly the situation may have been even worse in the absence of such 
rules.
If a debt crisis has already materialized, the only option to avoid a 
bail-out is sovereign default. However, due to fear of contagion and the 
lack of a functioning crisis mechanism containing such contagion, a 
restructuring of sovereign debt was largely prevented in the crisis, except 
for the case of Greece and (to a much smaller extent) of Cyprus. In fact, 
the official language has been that sovereign default should generally be 
precluded. This was underscored by the treatment of sovereign exposures 
in financial regulation – they were and still are treated as risk-free.
Rendering the no bail-out clause credible is necessary to make the 
euro area architecture sustainable. As public debt remains high, shocks 
could trigger further debt crises. The ESM established in 2012 can pro-
vide financial assistance in liquidity crises and helps to contain conta-
gion. But the ESM is not allowed to extend loans to a country whose debt 
is unsustainable, since this would mean putting itself at risk. Yet, liquidity 
and solvency crises are inherently difficult to distinguish, particularly at 
the outset of a crisis.
Furthermore, when debt levels are high, a large portion of financial 
assistance has to be spent on repaying private creditors. Given limits to 
the ESM’s lending capacity, this reduces its firepower and its credibility as 
insurance mechanism against crises, at least for larger member countries. 
It is therefore desirable to involve creditors in crisis resolution, thereby 
also spreading the burden of adjustment more broadly. To this end, ESM 
lending needs to be enhanced by a mechanism to facilitate creditor par-
ticipation in crises.
A proposal to enhance the ESM through Creditor Participation 
Clauses
We propose a mechanism to involve creditors in ESM financial assistance 
programmes by employing Creditor Participation Clauses (CPCs). The 
mechanism provides for an orderly and rule-based restructuring of sov-
ereign debt if debt is unsustainable, ensuring equitable burden sharing 
and avoiding a shift of debt to the official sector. By stabilising investors’ 
expectations already ex ante, this reduces uncertainty and thereby con-
tributes to financial stability. This is important as the mechanism must 
not become destabilising itself, which would make its application incred-
ible.
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Moreover, from an ex-post perspective, ad-hoc creditor participation 
as in the case of Greece can be avoided, thereby reducing the potential 
costs of restructuring. By forcing creditors to contribute to crisis reso-
lution, the required financing envelope provided by the ESM is reduced. 
In turn, this could allow the ESM to provide financial assistance pro-
grammes with longer duration, such as 5 years or even longer, and free up 
resources to allow for a more gradual fiscal adjustment and to compen-
sate for potential costs of structural reforms.
The German Council of Economic Experts first proposed such a 
mechanism in 2015 (GCEE, 2015), which is described in more detail in 
Andritzky et al. (2016a). The proposal combines several aspects found 
in previous proposals (see Andritzky et al., 2016a, or Zettelmeyer, 2016, 
for an overview) and adds some additional features. Its overall design is 
similar to the IMF’s new lending framework.
The proposal is based on the following principles: First, the mech-
anism can only be applied as part of an ESM programme and is trig-
gered by the programme request. This ensures that countries do not 
trigger the mechanism intentionally to get rid of excessive debt, as the 
ESM programme ought to come with strict macroeconomic condition-
ality. Second, it stipulates a two-stage procedure re-establishing liquidity 
first before tackling a potential solvency problem. This takes account of 
the fact that, at the onset of a crisis, it is difficult to distinguish between 
liquidity and solvency crises. The two-stage procedure is illustrated in 
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Timeline of the proposed mechanism.
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While both stages comprise an assessment of debt sustainability, the 
first stage is to be based on hard, pre-defined criteria (including past 
compliance with fiscal rules), whereas the second stage requires a deep 
debt sustainability analysis. If debt exceeds the triggers in the first stage, 
the disbursement of ESM funds becomes conditional on the agreement 
on a maturity extension for the duration of the ESM programme. If debt 
is found to be unsustainable in the second stage, negotiations are taken 
up about a deeper debt restructuring, including the possibility of hair-
cuts, towards the end of the programme or prior to market re-entry.
If investors correctly anticipate the consequences of fiscal profligacy 
and price the risk of restructuring accordingly, market discipline – and 
hence fiscal discipline – is re-established. Important challenges concern 
the avoidance of holdouts and litigation, and of an intentional activation 
or circumvention of the mechanism, as well as the transition to the new 
regime.
Transition to the new regime
The transition to the new regime requires dealing with countries’ legacy 
debt. The German Council proposes to phase in the mechanism slowly, 
for instance by only counting newly issued debt or debt issued to fund 
current deficits towards the thresholds used in the first stage. This new 
debt should feature enhanced collective action clauses (CACs) with 
single-limb voting and hence stronger aggregation than the previously 
introduced euro-CACs, in order to mitigate holdout problems. In addi-
tion, the threat of litigation may be reduced by an enforcement morato-
rium anchored in the ESM Treaty, as proposed by Buchheit et al. (2013).
Existing bonds will gradually be replaced by the new bonds falling 
under the new regime. Nevertheless, old debt has to remain restructur-
able to avoid shifting the burden to new creditors only. Depending on the 
need to roll over debt and the level of debt to begin with, it takes some 
time until the first-stage criteria get bite. For a country like Germany, 
where public debt levels are projected to fall below 60 percent, this may 
not happen at all in the foreseeable future (see Andritzky et al, 2016a, for 
detailed simulations).
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Possible Objections
Two major objections against the introduction of such a mechanism are 
its presumed effects on the cost of sovereign debt and the issue of burden 
sharing. In light of the existing empirical literature, the effect of the new 
CACs on the cost of sovereign debt is uncertain. There is little evidence 
that the cost of sovereign debt increases (see the overview by Trebesch, 
2015). Analysing the effects of the new euro-CACs, Carletti et al. (2016) 
show that the affected bonds even trade at lower yields. The overall cost 
of sovereign debt has not increased. Interestingly, the quality of the legal 
system seems to matter: the decrease in yields is higher, the better the 
legal system. This speaks in favour of pushing for reforms of insolvency 
regimes, which stands high on the agenda also in the context of the Euro-
pean Capital Markets Union and the treatment of non-performing loans.
While the empirical findings on the cost of sovereign debt may miti-
gate some of the concerns of the opponents of introducing creditor par-
ticipation, another major concern is the strong home bias in the holdings 
of government debt. Therefore, the political economy is very different 
from typical debt restructurings in emerging markets where a large share 
of the debt holders is foreign. In the euro area, the burden sharing largely 
has to take place domestically.
Most problematic is the large share of government debt holdings 
by domestic banks. This could make a debt restructuring difficult as a 
haircut on government debt could threaten the stability of the banking 
sector, which would make restructuring unattractive. Part of this home 
bias may actually originate from bailout expectations and may disappear 
once market discipline is re-established. Crucially, the introduction of 
CPCs has to be accompanied by a removal of regulatory privileges for 
sovereign exposures. As argued elsewhere (GCEE, 2015; Andritzky et 
al., 2016b), the critical issue is the introduction of large-exposure limits 
to ensure sufficient diversification. Then a restructuring of the debt of a 
particular country would be less likely to constitute a threat to banking 
sector stability.
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Conclusion
To conclude, the need for a credible mechanism to involve private cred-
itors in the resolution of public debt crises has become ever more urgent 
in light of rising debt levels and the threat of a return of the crisis in 
the euro area. A mechanism like the proposed CPCs that enhances the 
ESM’s firepower and protects the funds provided by euro area taxpayers 
is necessary to make the no bail-out clause credible. Furthermore, such a 
mechanism would help to re-establish market discipline, set incentives to 
reduce excessive debt burdens, and thereby help preventing future debt 
crises. The design of the transition is crucial in order to deal with legacy 
debt problems. The home bias in government debt holdings and the 
sovereign-bank nexus make restructuring politically challenging. This 
makes it even more important to introduce such a mechanism, which 
would mitigate both problems and make it less likely that a debt restruc-
turing becomes necessary at all.
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PART II
Incomplete Contracts?  
Filling the Governance Gap  
in the European Union
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THE UK REFERENDUM AND  
GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL  
SERVICES
Angus Armstrong1
This paper looks at some governance issues that arise in financial services 
related to the UK’s referendum on EU membership. If the UK chooses 
to leave the EU this would be brought into effect through Article 50 of 
the EU Treaty and then repeal of the UK’s European Communities Act 
(1972). This would end the supremacy of EU law in the UK and the UK 
would no longer be bound by EU regulations or have the right participate 
in its institutions.2 This legal step would have important governance con-
sequences, including for financial services.
1. UK financial services
The UK, and the City of London in particular, has been a leading finan-
cial centre for around two centuries. Today financial services contribute 
8% to national output, and according to a trade body, when support ser-
vices are included this may be as high as 12%.3 They add twice to the bal-
ance of payments: first, to the current account as the largest net exporter 
of financial services in the world; and, second, to the financial account 
1 Angus Armstrong, National Institute of Economic and Social Research 
a.armstrong@niesr.ac.UK
2 Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act (1972) states “all such rights, powers, 
liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising under the 
Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by or 
under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to 
be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in 
law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly.”
3 The CityUK, 2016, A practitioner’s guide to Brexit.
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attracting the largest share of the UK’s inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Financial services also contributed 12% to income tax and 15% to 
corporation tax receipts in 2012-13.4 
The creation of the European Single Market in financial services 
began in earnest with the Financial Services Action Plan (1998). This 
enshrined the dual principles of a single market - a single set of rules and 
mutual recognition for products and services. This allows regulated firms 
in any Member State to establish a presence anywhere, or sell services to 
anyone, in the rest of the EU without requiring any further regulatory 
permission. This is known as ‘passporting’ which is synonymous with the 
Single Market. 
Passporting is extremely beneficial to the UK. Together with a sup-
portive political environment for finance, and a relatively coherent regu-
latory structure, many financial firms from outside the EU, in particular 
the US and Switzerland, have chosen to locate their EU headquarters in 
the UK. If they are registered and regulated by the UK authorities, then 
they have full access to the markets of the rest of the EU. Similarly, finan-
cial firms from the rest of the EU are free to establish in the UK and 
benefit from the agglomeration of financial firms and supportive political 
and financial environment.  
(a)Size and diversity5
An important contextual point for understanding the governance of UK 
finance is that the sector is large and has a substantial domestic banking 
system. Table 1 shows the size of each activity on a residency basis (i.e. 
within the UK border) relative to national output.6 Banking is roughly 
split between domestic and foreign owned institutions. On a national 
basis, UK banking sector assets including overseas operations are approx-
imately 450% of GDP. This is an important distinction between the UK 
and Luxembourg, a Eurozone country, which has a large but almost 
entirely foreign owned banking systems. Given the diversity of financial 
services, not all activities will be equally affected by EU membership.
4 Data from HM Government. Note, the contribution to corporation tax was above 25% 
before the crisis.
5 This section draws on Armstrong (2016).
6 See Armstrong (2016) for more details on the structure of the UK financial system. 
These measures exclude interbank assets and liabilities and derivatives and so avoids 
double counting.
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Table 1: UK financial sector by residency (2014)7
£bn % of GDP
UK banks  3,631 200%
Foreign banks  3,374 186%
Finance cos & SPVs  480 26%
Pension funds  1,430 79%
Insurance  1,830 101%
Unit, investment 
trusts & ETFs
 880 48%
Hedge funds &  
private equity
 760 42%
12,385 682%
Source: Table B1 Bank Stats and Burrows and Low (2015)
Perhaps the defining feature of the UK’s financial sector is the large pres-
ence of overseas firms. According to the Bank of England, around half 
of the world’s largest financial firms, commercial and investment banks, 
insurers, asset managers and hedge funds have their EU headquarters in 
the UK.8 This is in large part due to passporting.9 UK based firms also 
have almost full access to the Eurozone’s financial infrastructure, despite 
being outside of the single currency area. In particular, the payments 
system can be accessed by all firms in the European Economic Area 
(EEA), although on a slightly differentiated basis (see below). 
As an international financial centre, the UK financial system is a 
multi-currency area. Figure 2 shows that less than half of UK banking 
sector assets are denominated in Sterling. This is important when con-
sidering access to infrastructure and who supplies which currency in an 
emergency. The presence of international firms also has implications for 
FDI. When an overseas firm establishes a presence in the UK this gener-
7 Adapted from Burrows and Low, 2015, Mapping the UK financial system, Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin. Note that balance sheets show stocks and GDP is a flow. 
However, this is conventional use of the data.
8 Bank of England, 2015, EU Membership and the Bank of England. In 2014 there were 
348 banking companies in the UK; 248 are incorporated overseas of which 170 are 
from outside of the European Economic Area (EEA).
9 The City has the largest share of EU investment banking, wholesale finance, insur-
ance, asset management and hedge funds (various sources).
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ates inward direct investment. If it then sets up branches in the rest of the 
EU, this creates outward direct investment. The UK is the second largest 
hub for FDI in the world and by far the largest centre in the EU. Of the 
£937bn stock of FDI in 2012, 43% is from the EU and 40% of the total is 
related to financial services.10
Figure 2: Currency denomination of banking assets (2015)
Source: Bank Stats Table B1
(b) Financial governance
The UK has a relatively coherent governance structure for the financial 
sector.11 Given that domestic banks are ultimately a contingent fiscal lia-
bility on UK taxpayers, bank supervision and regulation is delegated to 
the Bank of England which reports to parliament.12 This ensures that ‘he 
who pays the piper, calls the tune’.13 Good governance also requires that 
supervision and lender of last resort operations are also within the same 
10 OECD.stat FDI series https://stats.oecd.org
11 This is not to say that there is a coherent governance in individual financial institutions.
12 According to the National Audit Office (2010), UK tax payers were exposed to £955bn 
of potential losses in the crisis. The potential exposure extends to insurance as US firm 
AIG was bailed-out by US taxpayers.
13 This old Scottish adage was first applied to finance by Goodhart and Schoenmaker. See 
Schoenmaker (2013). 
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institution. This is an important reason why the UK has its own currency 
as long as it intends to remain a global financial centre. 
However, finance is a global industry which requires international 
regulation. This creates a well-known tension in governance between 
international regulation and the policy domain of the nation state. A 
working solution for the UK is that international regulation is guided 
by G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and Global Standard Setting 
Bodies (GSSBs) and that the UK is influential at these fora. The EC imple-
ments the global standards set by these fora as EU regulations. Since the 
financial crisis the EC has increasingly sought maximum harmonisation 
of regulations across the EU. Some regulations are seen as unnecessarily 
intrusive.14
An important governance gap exists between Eurozone and other 
EU Member States. Eurozone countries have a qualified majority at 
the Council of Ministers so they can, in theory, caucus or operate as a 
single bloc to pass legislation in their own interests. The EU Heads of 
State Agreement in February goes some way to address this issue. First, 
it reinforces the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of currency. 
Second, the UK is permitted to attend the influential Eurogroup and raise 
matters of real concern to the Council. However, there is, in short, no 
good answer to the threat of caucusing by Eurozone nations.15
(c) Options after Brexit 
Three legal frameworks for the UK outside of the EU are routinely dis-
cussed. The simplest is for the UK to join the EEA, the ‘Norway’ option. 
This would allow UK firms full access to the Single Market and the Euro-
zone’s financial infrastructure. However, this would be unsatisfactory for 
such a large country and the UK would have much less influence on EU 
financial regulation. The Leave campaign has rightly excluded this as a 
viable solution. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the UK could revert back to its 
membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Some financial 
services are included under the WTO, but there is no comprehensive 
14 For example, the EU’s bonus cap for smaller companies and the Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) is thought to be unnecessarily burdensome on 
hedge funds.
15 Some suggest that the UK should have a veto over financial services regulation, similar 
to France having a veto over changes to the Common Agricultural Policy. However, 
finance is intrinsic to all transactions. 
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coverage. The UK would no longer be obliged to follow EU regulation 
and there would be no assumption of passporting rights or access to the 
financial infrastructure. The process of review of any breech of trading 
obligations is cumbersome. A firm would have to lobby the government 
to take its case to the WTO, which can take years. 
The third option is for the UK to re-join the European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA) and negotiate a bi-lateral agreement with the EU for finan-
cial services, the so-called ‘Swiss’ option. Again there is no presumption 
of passporting or access to the Eurozone’s financial infrastructure. The 
dispute settlement process would be the the EFTA Court, which is a sim-
pler and a more effective process for judgements relating to the rules of 
the Single Market than WTO.  
A key issue is whether the UK gains greater or less regulatory con-
trol outside the EU. If the UK is to have access to the single market for 
financial services its regulations must be deemed ‘equivalent’ to the EU. 
This judgement is in the gift of the EU Council as EU laws will always be 
sovereign in the EU.16 Second, in reality there is limited scope in practice 
for discretion for an international financial centre. Schoenmaker (2013) 
shows that if institutions operate across borders, regulatory discretion at 
the national level is inconsistent with financial stability.17 Third, outside 
of the EU the UK would have only consultative input into EU regulations 
but would have to abide by the outcomes.
2. EU financial infrastructure and the UK
An important reason why the UK can dominate Euro financial services, 
is that all EU and EEA countries have almost full access to the Euro-
zone financial infrastructure. This is unusual as access to financial infra-
structure is usually limited by the boundary of the legal tender issued by 
the central bank. The Eurozone is unusual as there is not an alignment 
between the infrastructure and currency area. The issue is whether the 
UK would continue to have access to the Eurozone financial infrastruc-
ture if outside the EU. 
(a) Payments system
All central banks, commercial banks and designated financial institutions 
16 At present ‘equivalence’ is granted on the basis of the package of regulations. There has 
been discussion that this become ‘line by line’ equivalence.
17 See Schoenmaker (2103) above.
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in the EU and EEA are invited to join the Eurozone payment system, 
whether or not they are in the Eurozone. Institutions are permitted to be 
direct members of the system. However, to protect Eurozone counter-
parties the non-Eurozone institutions have restrictions on counterparty 
exposures and have no access to overnight credit (including lender of last 
resort).
Given the scale of Euro transactions in the UK, access to the pay-
ments system is essential. Where there are substantial Euro imbalances, 
UK banks already often use the central bank of a Eurozone country. 
For example, Lloyds Bank London is reported to hold its Euro reserves 
account with the Dutch Central Bank. Access to central bank finance, 
such as lender of last resort, would be provided against collateral deliv-
ered by the Lloyds Bank local office.
If the UK were to leave the EU (and not join the EEA) then banks 
in the UK could no longer be direct members of the payments system. 
The key issue is again whether the UK is recognised as being regulatory 
‘equivalent’. If so, then firms in the UK could continue to use branches 
within the EEA (or more effectively, within the EU). If the UK were not 
treated as ‘equivalent’, they would have to operate through subsidiaries in 
the Eurozone. This would make Euro banking via the UK more expensive 
and erode the attraction of the UK as a conduit for non-EU institutions.
(b) Regulatory Collateral 
Leaving the EEA may mean that certain UK assets are no longer eligible 
as collateral for ECB for liquidity. At present assets denominated in Euro, 
such as corporate debt, covered bonds and ABS tranches (and possibly 
non-marketable debts) issued within the EEA and of the appropriate 
credit standard are eligible as collateral. If the UK is outside of the EEA, 
in the short term the ECB can simply amend is collateral requirements, 
but longer term this comes back to regulatory equivalence issue. There 
may also be consequences for the regulatory treatment of securitisations. 
UK securitisations may no longer be eligible for inclusion in the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio as the underlying assets would be outside the EU.
(c) Central counterparties
Another important part of the financial infrastructure is central counter-
parties (CCPs). In response to the global financial crisis, G20 committed 
to standardizing derivatives and moving trading from opaque over-the-
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counter bi-lateral transactions on to CCPs. The idea is that this creates 
greater transparency, security and enhances risk management. CCPs 
are especially important to the City which is the global centre of deriv-
atives and securities trading. These activities complement international 
banking and insurance activities. 
Analogous to the payments system discussion, the issue is where CCPs 
should be located when dealing with large volumes of Euro denominated 
contracts. CCPs are recognised as a source of systemic risk. According 
the the ECB, they should be in located within the Eurozone to be within 
the legal jurisdiction of the central bank responsible for supplying the 
currency in question. The UK sought a judicial review by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) which annulled the policy on the basis that the 
Treaties grant the ECB competence for payments but not settlements.
The next twist is of particular importance for the referendum debate. 
The Bank of England and ECB agreed to joint oversight of CCPs and 
reciprocal currency swaps to facilitate multi-currency liquidity support. 
This extends the existing swap agreements between the Federal Reserve 
and five major central banks. Note that this is not a pre-commitment and 
there is no indication of amount.18 However, Prime Minister Cameron 
re-affirmed the continuation of this liquidity support by negotiating a 
‘no discrimination’ clause on the basis of currency in the Heads of State 
Agreement in February 2016.
If the UK leaves the EU it would no longer be a shareholder of the 
ECB, it would not have access to the ECJ for judicial review of Treaty 
interpretations and the ‘no discrimination’ clause would not come into 
force. It is difficult to see why the ECB would be interested in renewing 
an arrangement that it had not wanted in the first place. The Fed has swap 
lines with other nations, but they do not have anything like one-third of 
wholesale markets offshore. This volume of Euro transactions could com-
plicate reserves management and obstruct monetary policy.
(d) Resolution procedures 
Large international financial systems bring risks as well as rewards. When 
cross border institutions fail, the actions of one government spill-over to 
other governments. Agreements between governments to cooperate have 
a poor track record as they end up acting in the interests of their own tax-
18 Pre-commitment would violate sovereign control of a central bank. 
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payers.19 Ideally, the answer is to remove any dependence on taxpayers. 
Both the UK and EU have introduced resolution procedures where the 
idea is that equity and subordinated debt holders absorb the losses – or 
are ‘bailed-in’ – to at least minimise the cost on taxpayers. The hope is 
that ‘bail-in’ is less contagious than ‘bail-out’. 
In the European Banking Union (EBU) the resolution procedure is 
overseen by the Single Resolution Mechanism. The advantage is that deci-
sions are to be taken with regard to all members and not along national 
lines. In theory, this reduces the coordination problem. 
Resolution of an institutions operating across the UK and the EBU 
requires cooperation between the ECB and Bank of England. Deutsche 
Bank is an example of a systemically important institution in the London 
and Frankfurt. If the UK remains a member of the EU, a collegiate rela-
tionship is more likely. The UK would also have the right of a judicial 
review by the ECJ against any perceived discrimination. If the UK is out-
side the EU this may reduce the prospect of cooperative behaviour. Given 
the size of the UK financial system, this may be a significant safeguard.
3. Brexit and possible implications 
This paper has focussed on the governance of UK financial services and 
the possible consequences of Brexit. As the Eurozone has amply demon-
strated, where there are governance inconsistencies this leads to risk 
shifting and the movement of capital beyond borders and multiple equi-
libria can occur. 
The UK faces a trade-off which is crystallised in the EU referendum. 
If the UK stays in the EU it is exposed to the risk of caucusing by Euro-
zone member states. As Eurozone nations move towards ‘ever greater 
union’ this increases the likelihood that their interests coincide. The 
non-discrimination on the basis of currency included in the Heads of 
State Agreement in February is the only defence against this possibility. 
In reality, there is no answer to this question as the UK holding a veto on 
such an important issue is impossible.
If the UK leaves the EU this would raise challenges for the financial 
services industry. In the near term, the UK would look to be treated as a 
19 For example, the when Lehman Brothers failed the cash reserves were taken out of its 
London subsidiary over the weekend, Fortis bank was finally resolved along national 
boundaries and the UK government famously used anti-terrorist legislation to prevent 
the Icelandic government removing resources out of UK bank offices.
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regulatory ‘equivalent’ country to maintain access to the Single Market. 
This means that the UK would transpose and adopt EU regulation with 
no meaningful gain in regulatory sovereignty but continue to have access 
to the Single Market. The EU is likely to grant equivalence and permit full 
‘passporting’ and UK bank branches in the Eurozone could still be used 
for large Euro denominated transactions. 
However, the interesting question is whether this is viewed by private 
investors and institutions as a stable equilibrium over the medium term. 
The UK would have only a consultative role in setting EU financial policy. 
The EU has already introduced regulations which the UK has opposed. 
Without the influence of the UK there is a risk that this happens more 
often. If the UK were at risk of being no longer considered ‘equivalent’, 
this would diminish the UK as a location for EU headquarters. There 
would be a regulatory ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over UK financial 
services.20
If the UK leaves the EU, the CCPs with a large share of Euro busi-
ness are likely to migrate to the Eurozone. Even if the ECB were to agree 
to keeping the current swap arrangement, this would have no basis in 
international law and no legal enforcement mechanism. If the UK is out-
side the EU it would no longer be a shareholder of the ECB. This would 
reduce the incentive to find a cooperative solution to resolving a failed 
cross-border institution.
Finally, some have argued that by leaving the EU this would finally 
reduce the size of the UK financial system and remove the contingent lia-
bility on UK taxpayers. Given that many banks are bigger today than they 
were before the crisis, it is easy to have some sympathy with this view. 
However, choosing to leave the EU as a means of achieving a smaller 
financial sector is rather like going to the end of the earth to find some 
peace and quiet: there are easier ways of achieving the same outcome. 
20 Experienced commentators such as Wolfgang Munchau in the FT (3rd March 2013) 
suggest that “if the Eurozone has a collective interest in anything, it is to stop the City 
acting as its main financial centre.”
PART I I  -  Incomplete Contracts? Filling the Governance Gap in the European Union
87
References
Allen and Overy, Brexit – legal consequences for commercial parties, 
http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/AO_06_
Brexit_Specialist_paper_Financial_services.pdf
A Armstrong, (2016) EU membership, financial services and stability, 
National Institute Economic Review, No. 236 pp31-38.
Bank of England, 2015, EU Membership and the Bank of England. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.UK/publications/Documents/
speeches/2015/euboe211015.pdf
Bank of England, Resolution Framework, http://www.bankofengland.
co.UK/financialstability/Pages/role/risk_reduction/srr/framework.
aspx
Bankstats (Monetary and Financial Statistics) http://www.bankofeng-
land.co.UK/statistics/Pages/bankstats/default.aspx
O Burrows and K Low, (2015), Mapping the UK Financial System, Bank 
of England Quarterly Bulletin, Second Quarter, pp114-129
EU Heads of State Agreement, (2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/press-releases/2016/03/07-eu-turkey-meeting-statement/
European Central Bank, 2011, Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework, 
General Court of the European Union, 2015, Judgement in Case T-496/11: 
United Kingdom v European Central Bank
R Jones, 2014, Who said payment systems are simple? European Banking 
Federation
W Schelkle and H Lokdam (Rapporteurs), 2015, Financial Regulation 
and the Protection of Eurozone Outs, London School of Economics
D Schoenmaker, 2013, Governance of International Banking, OUP
TheCityUK, 2016, A Practionaer’s guide to Brexit, www.thecityUK.com
The Uk Referendum and Governance of Financial Services  -  Angus Armstrong
88
89
REFLECTIONS ON THE  
INTERPRETATION, SCOPE AND  
PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF  
ARTICLE 50 TEU
Phoebus L. Athanassiou1 
Despite having expressly recognized the right of the Member States of 
the European Union to unilaterally withdraw from the Union, Article 50 
of the Treaty on European Union is silent in terms of its possible appli-
cation to euro area Member States. The silence of ‘the exit clause’ raises 
questions, over which clarity is desirable, and the same is true of two 
related issues, germane to, but distinct from, one another: (i) the extent 
to which Article 50 TEU or the concept of EU citizenship could provide 
a legal basis for an automatic accession to the EU of newly established, 
seceding state entities, and (ii) the extent to which the prospect of the loss 
of EU citizenship, in an EU exit or secession scenario, can provide the 
foundation for individual claims to its preservation or continuing enjoy-
ment, notwithstanding the acts of exit or secession. We examine, below, 
the legal parameters of the potential application of Article 50 TEU to 
euro area Member States, possible alternatives to Article 50 TEU, and the 
1 LLB (Queen Mary College, London/Panthéon Assas, Paris II), LLM (King’s College, 
London), PhD (King’s College, London), Principal Legal Counsel, European Central 
Bank; Adjunct Professor, Goethe Universität, Frankfurt am Main. The present study is 
based on P. Athanassiou, ‘Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and EMU: Some Re-
flections’, ECB Legal Working Paper Series, No.10/December 2009; P. Athanassiou and 
S. Laulhé Shaelou, ‘EU accession from within? – An introduction’, in Tridimas/Eeck-
hout (eds) Yearbook of European Law, 2014, pp. 1-50; and P. Athanassiou and S. Laulhé 
Shaelou, ‘EU Citizenship and its Relevance for EU Exit and Secession’ forthcoming in 
Kochenov (ed.) Citizenship and Federalism in Europe – The Role of Rights (Cambridge 
University Press, 2016 (forthcoming). The author expresses strictly personal views.
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relevance of Article 50 TEU and EU citizenship in an EU exit or secession 
scenario. The conclusions to which we come are as follows: (i) given its 
unilateral nature, and in light of the legal irreversibility of the transition 
to the single currency, the exit clause does not provide a sound legal basis 
for a euro area Member State’s exit from EMU; (ii) barring recourse to 
Article 352 TFEU, which would, however, be far from unproblematic, 
there is, de lege lata, no obvious legal formula through which to accom-
modate a euro area exit; (iii) neither Article 50 TEU nor the concept of 
EU citizenship are apt to provide a basis for an automatic or accelerated 
accession to the EU, for the benefit of a seceding state entity; and (iv) the 
concept of EU citizenship could, however, serve as the basis for justiciable 
claims brought by individuals, desirous of preserving its benefits in an 
EU secession scenario.  
1. Member State withdrawal from the EU under Article 50 
TEU 
One of the less well-known innovations brought about by the Treaty of 
Lisbon was that of the introduction, through Article 50 TEU, of a right 
for the Member States to unilaterally withdraw from the EU.2 Whilst 
public international law (PIL) recognizes the existence of a sovereign 
right to withdraw from consensual commitments,3 including unilater-
ally,4 it was at best questionable, pre-Lisbon, whether EU Member States 
could have availed themselves of a right to withdraw from the EU, espe-
2 There is no historic precedent of a member state withdrawal from the EU. However, 
Greenland, at the relevant time a part of Denmark, agreed on its withdrawal from what 
was then the European Economic Communities (see F. Harhoff, ‘Greenland’s With-
drawal from the European Communities’, 20 Common Market Law Review 20 (1983), 
p. 13).
3 Under PIL, a right of withdrawal may exist either because the parties to a treaty mutually 
agree that withdrawal is permissible, whether at the time of the treaty’s drafting or ex post 
(see Art. 54 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Treaty Series, vol. 
1155, 331) or because it is possible to read a right of withdrawal into a treaty, whether by 
interpreting the parties’ intentions or because such a right would be consistent with the 
nature of the treaty itself (ibid, Art. 56). 
4 Under PIL, unilateral withdrawal is possible under the rebus sic standibus (‘fundamen-
tal change of circumstances’) clause of Art. 62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. On the relevance of Art. 62 in the EU context, see J. Hill, ‘The EEC: the right 
of member state withdrawal’ (1982) 12 Georgia Journal of International and Compara-
tive Law p. 335; S. Berglund, ‘Prison or voluntary cooperation? The possibility of with-
drawal from the EU’ (2006) 29 Scandinavian Political Studies p. 147; and Athanassiou 
(op. cit., asterisked fn.) pp. 12-18.
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cially if purporting to do so unilaterally,5 given the perpetual nature of 
the Treaties,6 and the judicially declared irrevocability of the transfer of 
sovereignty from the Member States to the EU.7 Post-Lisbon, the right of 
the EU Member States to withdraw from the Union has been formally 
recognized, and it could, therefore, be exercised in the future.8 
As formulated, the exit clause raises a number of pertinent legal issues, 
inter alia with regard to its subject matter and scope rationae personae.
Despite referring to “an agreement [emphasis is ours] setting out the 
arrangements for [a Member State’s] withdrawal”, the exit clause estab-
lishes an unlimited right of unilateral withdrawal of a Member State 
from the EU, even where no exit agreement has been achieved between 
the withdrawing Member State and its EU partners, within the two year 
negotiation period stipulated in Article 50 TEU.9 A Member State’s right 
to withdraw from the EU by virtue of Article 50 TEU is not, in other 
words, a function of the outcome of the negotiations referred to in its par-
agraph 2, between that Member State and the Council, nor is its exercise 
subject to any express contractual limitations.10 The EU legislator’s rec-
5 The possibility of unilateral denunciation of EU membership has been envisaged by na-
tional courts in several jurisdictions, including the Uk (McCarthys Ltd v Smith [1979] 
3 All ER 325), France (Administration des Douanes v Société Cafés Jacque Vabre & J 
Weigel et Cie SARL [1975] 2 CMLR p. 336) and Germany (Maastricht Urteil (BVerfGE 
89, 155 vom 12. Oktober 1993); Lisbon Urteil (BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009)). The 
negotiated departure of Greenland would appear to confirm that unilateral withdrawal 
was, at least originally, neither intended nor implied under the Treaties (see F. Harhoff 
(op. cit., fn. 1), pp. 28-31). It has been argued that, ‘it was the very fact that Greenland 
remained a part of Denmark that made it necessary that its withdrawal from the EC be 
a negotiated one’ (M. Happold, ‘Independence: in or out of Europe? An independent 
Scotland and the EU’ (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 15, at 
p. 32), meaning that Denmark could have unilaterally denounced Greenland’s partici-
pation in the Communities if no consent had been reached for its departure. 
6 See Art. 53 TEU.
7 See Section 2, infra. 
8 At the time of writing, Great Britain was preparing for a simple ‘in/out’ referendum, 
scheduled for June 2016, to determine the future of the Uk in the European Union.
9 Paragraph 3 of Article 50 TEU is relevant here. It follows from that provision that the 
expiry of the time limit of two years since the application by a member state of its 
withdrawal request is sufficient to automatically cut the bond that connected it with its 
partners. See, inter alia, J. Herbst, ‘Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the Eu-
ropean Union: Who are the “Masters of the Treaties”?’, 6 German Law Journal (2005), 
p. 1756; R. Smits, ‘The European Constitution and EMU: An appraisal’, 42 Common 
Market Law Review (2005), pp. 464-465; and J. Zeh, ‘Recht auf Austritt’, 2 Zeitschrift für 
Europarechtliche Studien (2004), p. 201.    
10 See paragraph 1 of Article 50 TEU and its statement re withdrawal of Member States 
“in accordance with [their] own constitutional requirements”. 
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ognition of a unilateral right of withdrawal from the EU sits uncomfort-
ably with the sui generis “constitutional” character of the European legal 
order, as reflected in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU),11 and it is difficult to reconcile with the regular process 
for the amendment of the Treaties, as per Article 48 TEU (of which a 
Member State’s withdrawal would constitute an example par excellence).12 
In this author’s view, it is also not covered, not even per analogiam, by 
the limited right of unilateral withdrawal of a state from its conventional 
obligations under the Treaty of Vienna.13 
Turning to the scope rationae personae of the exit clause, Article 50 
TEU does not elaborate on the conditions of its possible application to 
Member States of the euro area, as distinct from non EMU-participating 
EU Member States, despite the particularities of the participation of the 
former in the European integration process, and the complexity of their 
inter-dependencies, on account of the surrender of their sovereignty 
in matters of monetary policy. Can Article 50 TEU be interpreted as 
providing a sound legal basis for the exit of euro area and non-partici-
pating Member States alike and, if not, are there any alternatives thereto? 
The legal parameters of the possible application of Article 50 TEU to 
a Member State of the euro area, and alternative withdrawal paths, are 
briefly outlined in Sections 2 and 3, below.
A word of caution is apposite, on what Sections 2 and 3, below, will 
not cover. Our analysis, below, is purely legal. Its aim is to explore de jure 
avenues for the withdrawal of a Member State from the euro area. The 
conclusion to which we come here (namely, that no such avenues appear 
to exist) is without prejudice to unilateral action on the part of a euro 
area Member State (such as, for instance, the issuance of IOUs), the de 
facto implication of which could be to bring a Member State outside the 
11 See inter alia case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 
1· case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585· case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v 
European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, paragraph 23; and F. Mancini, ‘The Making of 
a Constitution for Europe’, 26 Common Market Law Review (1989), p. 595 according 
to whom, ‘If one were asked to synthesise the direction in which the case law produced 
in Luxembourg has moved since 1957, one would have to say that it coincides with the 
making of a constitution for Europe’ (p. 595).
12 Contra Zeh, op.cit., (op. cit., fn. 8), p. 209, who comes to the conclusion that the withdraw-
al clause is lawful as a reflection of the member states’ independence; and Herbst (op.cit., 
fn. 8), p. 1758-1759, who expresses the opinion that the participation of the Council in the 
withdrawal process legalises the withdrawal clause.  
13 See Articles 56 and 62 of the Treaty of Vienna of 23th May 1969 (UN, Treaty Series, 
folio 1155, 331).
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euro area.14 However, such unilateral action would surely not amount to 
a de jure EMU-exit path but, merely, to an act, the logical implication of 
which would, in purely practical terms, be equivalent to a euro area exit. 
However subtle, this difference is significant in legal terms, and should 
inform the reader’s understanding of the views expressed by this author 
in the remainder of this study.  
2.  Application of Article 50 TEU to EMU-participating Member 
States 
 
Whatever its logic, the silence of the ‘exit clause’ of Article 50 TEU on its 
potential application to euro area Member States has attracted criticism, 
inter alia for generating legal (un)certainty.15 As formulated, the exit 
clause is open to two interpretations in terms of its application, or oth-
erwise, to EMU-participating Member States. The first is that Member 
States have, at least indirectly, established a right of unilateral termina-
tion of the Treaties in their totality, which would also cover Title VIII of 
the Treaty (on Economic and Monetary Policy). What this would entail 
is that no special withdrawal process is necessary in the case of euro 
area Member States. A second, radically opposed, interpretation is that 
Member States participating in the Third Stage of EMU cannot withdraw 
from it on the basis of Article 50 TEU unless they were to simultaneously 
repudiate their EU membership. Which of these two interpretations 
would be the most plausible? 
Starting with the first interpretation, it is worth recalling that, con-
trary to the accession of a Member State to the EU, its subsequent, non-
14 To take the example of IOUs, the implications of their issuance by a euro area Member 
State would depend on their particular features, with an emphasis on whether or not a 
particular IOU would qualify as legal tender. In the euro area, Article 128(1) TFEU lays 
down the legal tender status of euro banknotes, and Article 11 of Regulation EC/974/98 
on the introduction of the euro does likewise with regard to euro coins. The unilateral 
introduction of Any substitute payment scheme which, on account of its particular 
features, would qualify as legal tender or amount to a form of currency/quasi currency 
in competition with the euro, would contradict Article 16 of the Statute, for circum-
venting the ECB Governing Council authorisation required for the issuance of notes 
having the status of legal tender within the Union.
15 See Smits (op.cit., fn. 8), pp. 464-465; and H. Scott, ‘When the Euro Falls Apart’, 1-2 In-
ternational Finance (1998), p. 207, where the focus is on the danger of speculation against 
the common currency (p. 211), as well as J-V. Louis, ‘Monetary policy and central banking 
in the Constitution’, in ECB, Legal Aspects of the European System of Central Banks, Liber 
Amicorum Paolo Zamboni Garavelli (2005), p. 27, where concerns are expressed over the 
likelihood of the withdrawal clause leading to a multiplication of “disaster clauses” to deal 
with possible alterations in the composition of the Eurozone (p. 28). 
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time-bound accession to EMU constitutes a legal obligation,16 except for 
Member States with a permanent derogation from some of the provisions 
of Title VIII of TFEU17. Thus, while a Member State can, by virtue of 
Article 50 TEU, repudiate its rights and obligations under the Treaties in 
their entirety, and withdraw from the EU two years after submitting the 
relevant withdrawal request, no revocation of its decision to participate 
in EMU would appear to be legally possible, as this would automatically 
constitute a breach of its contractual (Treaty-based) obligation to accede 
to EMU. In conclusion, a Member State’s withdrawal from EMU without 
its simultaneous withdrawal from the EU would not appear legally fea-
sible. This legal objection is additional to reservations arising from the 
unilateral nature of the right to withdraw from the EU under the exit 
clause, which, in any event, renders the exit clause manifestly unsuit-
able as a means of dissolving the particularly complex bond between an 
EMU-participating Member State and its EMU partners.18 
Turning to the second, competing  interpretation (i.e. that EMU-par-
ticipating Member States cannot legitimately withdraw from it, on the 
basis of the exit clause), it is worth recalling that, whether read in isola-
tion or, a fortiori, in conjunction with one another, Article 3 TEU, Arti-
cles 119 and 140 (3) TFEU, Protocol 4 on the Statute of the European 
System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank, and Protocol 
24 to the Treaty of Maastricht on the Member States’ transition to the 
third stage of EMU, leave little room for doubt that the EU Member 
States’ EMU participation was intended to represent a legally irrevers-
ible development.19 Consequently, it is only by way of an agreement 
(and certainly not by invoking the unilateral right of withdrawal from 
the EU introduced by Article 50 TEU) that a Member State’s exit from 
EMU could, in theory, be possible.20 This interpretative approach is not 
16 See Articles 129 (1), 131, 140 (1) and (2) and 141-142 TFEU.
17 See Protocol 15 (United Kingdom) and Protocols 16 and 17 (Denmark).
18 Indeed, through the EMU, the ultimate purpose of the Founding Fathers of the Treaty 
of Rome, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet has been accomplished: that is, that the 
member states’ economies interlock to such degree that any reversion to the status quo 
ante would be legally and practically impossible.
19 By expressly referring to the establishment of EMU as an EU objective and to the ‘irrev-
ocable’ fixing of the conversion rates at which national currencies are to be exchanged 
for the euro, the foregoing provisions draw attention to the irreversibility of the process 
leading to a Member State’s adoption of the single currency and, thereafter, to its lasting 
character. Also see C. Proctor, ‘The Future of the Euro – What Happens if a Member 
State Leaves?’ 17 European Business Law Review (2006), p. 930.
20 Smits (op.cit., fn. 8), p. 465.
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devoid of problems. First, it runs against the common sense appeal of the 
a maiore ad minus argument that militates in favour of the first interpre-
tation.21 Second, accepting it is tantamount to accepting that there are no 
less than two withdrawal processes, one for EMU-participating Member 
States (whose withdrawal would only be possible subject to the achieve-
ment of an agreement, at least as far as the termination of their EMU 
participation is concerned) and another, less stringent one, for all other 
Member States (where unilateral withdrawal would – also – be feasible, 
under the exit clause). The better view – understood as the one that can 
best be reconciled with the legal irreversibility of a Member State’s acces-
sion to EMU - is that Article 50 TEU cannot serve as a valid legal basis 
for an EMU-participating Member State’s withdrawal from the euro area. 
However the above may be, the difficulty of choosing between these 
competing interpretations demonstrates the extent of the problem cre-
ated by the ill-considered introduction of an ill-defined right of unilateral 
withdrawal from the EU. It also illustrates the need for the resulting gap 
in the Treaties to be addressed, at the earliest available opportunity, so 
that the answers to the questions raised by the exit clause, especially with 
regard to its application, or otherwise, to EMU-participating Member 
States, can emerge directly from the text of the Treaties, without the need 
for its prior, authentic interpretation by the CJEU. 
3. What alternatives to Article 50 TEU for EMU-participating 
Member States?
Given that Article 50 TEU appears manifestly unsuitable as the basis for 
organising a Member State’s exit from EMU, the only de jure (EU primary 
law-sanctioned) alternative would be to rely on the flexibility clause of 
Article 352 TFEU. For the reasons explained below, this clause would 
only provide an imperfect legal basis, of questionable validity.
Article 352 TFEU allows the European Council to adopt measures 
where action by the EU proves necessary to attain one of the Treaty 
objectives, without the Treaties having provided the necessary powers. 
The Council would have to act unanimously, on a proposal from the 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 
The EU objective at stake would be the preservation of EMU, which is 
21 One could argue that, by accepting the possibility of termination of the Treaties in their 
entirety, the European legislator has also accepted the possibility of termination of a 
sub-set thereof, in this case, Title VIII TFEU.
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one of the Union objectives. To activate Article 352 TFEU, the Commis-
sion would need to prepare a draft Council Decision, in cooperation with 
the European Council Presidency, the ECB and the interested Member 
State, the aim of which would be to (i) authorise withdrawal from EMU, 
and (ii) lay down the details of such withdrawal. What would precede the 
adoption of the Council Decision is the conclusion of an ‘exit agreement’, 
the terms of which would presumably be part of the Decision. The con-
sent of the European Parliament for the activation of Article 352 TFEU 
would be necessary, and the same is true of the consent of national par-
liaments, where such consent is required under the relevant national legal 
and constitutional order. By suspending the application to the departing 
Member State of all EMU-related Articles, the Council Decision would 
relegate that Member State to the status of a Member State with a dero-
gation, with the Governor of its NCB only sitting at the General Council.
Recourse to Article 352 TFEU would not be legally unproblematic, 
for two fundamental reasons no less. The first is that the Treaty appears 
to have exhausted the matter of euro introduction under Articles 139-
144 TFEU, meaning that there is no residual scope for further regulation 
on the basis of Article 352 TFEU. The second is that, as it can readily be 
inferred from several provisions of the TEU, the TFEU and secondary EU 
law (see above, Section 2), the introduction of the euro was intended to 
be irrevocable and irreversibe. For the above reasons, reliance on Article 
352 TFEU would not appear to represent a viable option. 
In light of the above, the conclusion to which we come is that there 
is, de lege lata, no obvious legal formula through which to accommodate 
a euro area exit, and certainly not if this were to take the form of a uni-
lateral, non-negotiated withdrawal, on the basis of Article 50 TEU. The 
remainder of this study examines the extent to which Article 50 TEU or 
the concept of EU citizenship could be generative of an automatic right 
to EU accession or serve as a source of rights that individuals could draw 
on, in an EU exit or secession scenario.
4. EU secession and exit – application of Article 50 TEU and the 
relevance of the concept of EU citizenship
  
A few words are apposite on a distinct scenario, also with an impact on 
the composition of the EU and/or EMU, that of secession of part of the 
territory of an EU Member State. ‘Secession’ is, needless to say, not the 
same as ‘withdrawal’, within the meaning of Article 50 TEU, which only 
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contemplates the wholesale departure of a Member State from the EU. 
Hence, Article 50 TEU cannot directly be applied in a secession scenario. 
Secession is, however, a germane concept: if EU law allows Member 
States to withdraw from the EU in toto, what would it have to say about 
the legal consequences of the separation from a Member State of part of 
its territory? In particular, would EU law recognize an automatic right of 
accession to the EU for the benefit of newly created (‘seceding’) state enti-
ties (leading, per force, to an ‘internal enlargement’ of the EU) or would 
it resist any attempt at ‘accession from within’? 
Unlike in the case of a Member State’s withdrawal in toto from the 
EU, secession is not addressed in primary EU law. Outside Article 49 
TEU, there is no dedicated Treaty provision specifically on the situation 
of newly created state entities and/or on their EU accession (or (re-)
accession) rights. This is hardly surprising: the general principles of EU 
law, including those of equal treatment, legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations, require that the uniformly applicable enlargement condi-
tions in place apply erga omnes, to ensure that one can objectively ascer-
tain whether or not the terms, conditions and procedure applicable to 
EU accessions have been complied with in any given case. In the case 
of the EU Treaties, the terms and conditions in question are to be found 
in Article 49 TEU.22 Besides, following the introduction by the Treaty 
of Lisbon of an exit clause, even a former Member State would need 
to comply with the procedure set out in Article 49 TEU if it wished to 
re-join the EU.23 There is no indication, in EU primary law, that a more 
lenient regime could apply to a seceding state entity, nor is there anything 
in the Treaties to suggest the existence of any obligation for the rump 
Member State to withdraw from the EU24 or to otherwise re-negotiate 
its relationship with its partners merely because of incidents of secession 
affecting its territory and population.25 
22 Post-Lisbon, eligibility is also subject to a candidate’s compliance with the values re-
ferred to in Art. 2 TEU, which candidate countries must ‘commit’ to ‘promote’.
23 See Art. 50 (5) TEU.
24 See J. Crawford and A. Boyle, ‘Annex A - Opinion: Referendum on the Independence of 
Scotland – International Law Aspects’ in ‘Scotland analysis: devolution and the impli-
cations of Scottish independence’, 12 February 2013, available at https://www.gov.Uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/79408/Annex_A.pdf, last 
accessed on 28. 04. 2016, at pp. 68 and 99 (arguing that the Uk’s EU membership would 
not ‘lapse’ in the event that Scotland would attain its independence).
25 For the extent to which such adjustments to the rump Member State would need to be 
reflected in the EU Treaties, see K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the 
EU (Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 356. 
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Despite the fact that Article 50 TEU is of no direct relevance to a 
secession scenario, it seems difficult to argue that what applies to the 
whole should not apply to its parts: it is, in other words, difficult to argue 
that a former Member State should be treated less favorably than a newly 
created state entity resulting from secession that was never part of the 
European family as a sovereign state. Far from enjoying any right of 
automatic accession, a new state entity resulting from secession should 
therefore be expected to comply with the Treaties’ enlargement condi-
tionality policy as a condition precedent to its EU accession26. Absent any 
dedicated primary law provision, and lacking any indication that, in a 
secession scenario, EU law would treat the seceding state entity as a suc-
cessor state, newly created state entities wishing to join the ranks of the 
EU would need to forge their own relationship with it. Compliance with 
the Copenhagen criteria would be the foundation of that relationship.27  
In short, newly created state entities would need to comply with the 
normal EU accession conditions and procedure before they can join the 
EU: they would, in other words, need to ‘join the queue’ of accession 
countries,28 provided they have been granted the status of a candidate 
country,29 and fulfill the admission criteria.30 As regards EMU partici-
pation, although this is mandatory for all EU Member States (except for 
those that have negotiated a permanent derogation), it does not derive 
automatically from EU membership: it is, instead, subject to condition-
26 See for instance C. Hillion, ‘Enlargement of the EU: the discrepancy between acces-
sion conditionality and membership obligations’ (2004) 27 Fordham International Law 
Journal, p. 715; M. Cremona, ‘Enlargement and external policy’ in M. Cremona (ed.), 
The enlargement of the EU (OUP, Oxford, 2003); P-C Müller-Graff, ‘Legal framework 
for EU-CEEC relations’ in M. Maresceau (ed.), Enlarging the EU (Longman, London, 
1997).
27 These criteria were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and 
strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995 (see http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm, last accessed on 
28.04.2016). 
28 See M. Weller ‘A foregone conclusion?’ (2012) New Law Journal, Vol. 162, Issue 7537, 
available at http://www.newlawjournal.co.Uk/nlj/content/foregone-conclusion, last ac-
cessed on 28. 04. 2016, p. 1. 
29 On the determination and application of the political criteria of enlargement, condi-
tionality and the procedure for membership see, for instance, A. Tatham, ‘“Don’t men-
tion divorce at the wedding, darling!”: EU accession and withdrawal after Lisbon’ in A. 
Biondi et al (eds.), EU law after Lisbon (OUP, Oxford, 2012), pp. 131-134.
30 The above conclusion is without prejudice to the factual possibility of a speedier acces-
sion in the case of a newly created state entity or, in extremis, of a ‘simplified’ accession 
procedure to reflect the fact that the newly created state entity is the product of separa-
tion from an existing Member State. 
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ality outside the enlargement process, in the form of compliance with the 
so-called Maastricht economic and legal convergence criteria.31 Thus, 
unless the Treaty were to be amended, state entities created through 
secession from EMU-participating Member States would also have 
to follow the same path to EMU accession as their precursors, despite 
having formerly been part of an EMU-participating Member State. There 
is, therefore, no compelling legal argument in favour of an automatic (or 
‘accelerated’) succession to EU membership for the benefit of seceding 
state entities. 
The above is without prejudice to an assessment of the extent to 
which the concept of EU citizenship, even if not per se generative of EU 
accession in an EU secession scenario, could provide the basis, for indi-
vidual claims for its preservation in an EU exit or secession scenario. The 
remainder of this paper addressed this question.
Whilst a priori legally permissible, under Article 50 TEU, failure to 
negotiate a withdrawal agreement would risk leaving unregulated the 
future relations between the EU and the withdrawing Member State, 
inter alia with regard to the status and rights of at least some of the with-
drawing Member State’s nationals as EU citizens (as well as those of 
other EU Member State nationals living within its borders). If there is a 
common thread running through the CJEU’s jurisprudence on EU citi-
zenship, this is that the Court will exercise its powers of judicial review to 
protect Member State nationals as EU citizens whenever a Member State 
purports to deploy its normative sovereignty in matters of nationality and 
residence law in a manner that either runs counter to established EU law 
principles (non-discrimination-equal treatment, proportionality or the 
rule of law)32 or deprives EU citizens of their Treaty freedoms (rights of 
free movement and establishment) or exposes Member State nationals to 
the disproportionate risk of the loss of any of their fundamental rights 
(protection against statelessness or the right to family life). What is also 
clear is that the Court has over the years challenged Member State sov-
ereignty in matters of nationality law through its EU citizenship-related 
jurisprudence: contrary to earlier scholarly opinion, which was generally 
31 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/who_can_join/index_
en.htm, last accessed on 28.04.2016.
32 With respect to the protection of the rule of law in the EU, it has been argued that the 
‘right to live under EU law’ could be included in the substance of Union Citizenship 
(see A. von Bogdandy and M. Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What 
It Is, What Has Been Done, What Can Be Done’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 
p. 59, at p. 76). 
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dismissive of the concept of EU citizenship,33 contemporary literature has 
hailed the emancipatory potential of the Court’s more recent jurispru-
dence and its potential to superimpose the concept of EU citizenship over 
that of Member State nationality,34 meaning that EU citizenship need not 
be automatically lost through the loss of Member State citizenship.35
In an EU exit scenario the eventual loss of EU citizenship would 
not be the consequence of unilateral administrative action taken by the 
departing Member State, the consequence of which would be to restrict 
the enjoyment by private individuals of the substance of their EU cit-
izenship rights: the decision to exit would be a conscious and deeply 
political choice of the people of the withdrawing Member State and/or 
its democratically elected government to sever their hitherto ties with 
the EU. Arguably, such decisions are not by their very nature amenable 
to judicial review. Furthermore, the risk of statelessness that weighed so 
heavily in one of the Court’s more famous EU-citizenship-related rul-
ings (Rottmann) would not be present in an exit scenario: the inhabitants 
of the withdrawing Member State would not become stateless, meaning 
33 For instance, it has been argued that, ‘the national citizenship is the primary and orig-
inal status, whereas the European citizenship which derives from it, is a secondary 
citizenship’ (see V. Lippolis, ‘European Citizenship: What It Is and What It Could Be’, in 
M. la Torre (ed.), European Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1998), p. 318); and that EU citizenship is ‘little more than a cynical 
exercise in public relations on the part of the High Contracting Parties’ (J. H. Weiler, 
‘Citizenship and Human Rights’, in J. Winter et al. (eds.), Reforming the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 65). 
34 See, for instance, D. Kenealy and S. Mac Lennan, ‘Sincere Cooperation, Respect for 
Democracy and EU Citizenship: Sufficient to Guarantee Scotland’s Future in the Eu-
ropean Union?’ (2014) ELJ, Vol. 20, Issue 5, p. 591 (‘[I]t appears […] that the ECJ does 
not consider EU citizenship as being dependent upon Member State nationality’); D. 
Kostakopoulou, ‘When Citizens Become Foreigners’ (2014) 20 European Law Jour-
nal p. 447 at p. 449 (‘EU citizenship is neither a reflection of national citizenships nor 
a nominal citizenship corollary to the fully fledged or ‘real’ national citizenships’); 
and D. Kochenov, ‘The Citizenship Paradigm’ (2012) 15 Cambridge Yearbook of Eu-
ropean Legal Studies, p. 196 (‘There is an independent – albeit a ius tractum-based 
– status of EU citizenship’).
35 See Y. Gounin, ‘Les dynamiques d’éclatement d’États dans l’Union européenne: casse-
tête juridique, défi politique’ (2013) 78 Politique Étrangère p. 11 at p. 21.
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that the proportionality test should be easier to fulfil.36 It could, therefore, 
be argued, that in an EU withdrawal scenario, neither the right to equal 
treatment and non-discrimination nor any of the Treaty freedoms would 
import a positive law obligation on the withdrawing Member State to take 
action to legally protect the enjoyment by individuals of their former EU 
citizenship rights, notwithstanding the act of withdrawal.37 
Different considerations would apply in a secession scenario. Here, 
any decision by the rump Member State to deprive the inhabitants of the 
seceding state entity of their nationality (and through it, EU citizenship) 
could be subject to judicial review by the Court. Indeed, what is clear 
from the case-law of the CJEU is that the revocation (and, by implica-
tion, also the withdrawal) of EU Citizenship are matters of interest to 
EU law, given their impact on the affected individuals’ ability to continue 
enjoying the rights attaching to their status as EU citizens (inter alia, the 
rights to free movement, establishment and equal treatment). What the 
actual outcome of such judicial review would be is an altogether different 
matter, and much would depend on the application of the CJEU’s propor-
tionality test, and whether the decisions referred to above would satisfy 
that test. Because of its knock-on effect on the ability of the seceding state 
entity’s inhabitants to exercise their EU citizenship rights, the wholesale 
withdrawal, in a secession scenario, of Member State nationality from the 
seceding state entity’s inhabitants would clearly have consequences anal-
ogous to their exclusion not only from the territory of the Member State 
of which they were, pre-secession, nationals, but also from the territory 
36 Referring to the Court’s ruling in Rottmann, a commentator has stated that, ‘if a with-
drawal of nationality that may even lead to statelessness might be justified, wouldn’t 
that be also the case when the loss of nationality is the consequence of a voluntary 
acquisition of another nationality? A measure entailing the ex lege loss of national-
ity in this case would also be validated in international law, and the proportionality 
would be easier to justify than when the adverse consequence is statelessness’ (see P. 
G. Andrade, ‘State Succession and EU Citizenship’, in C. Brölmann and T. Vandamme 
(eds.), Secession Within the Union. Intersection Points of International and European 
Law (Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance and Amsterdam Center 
for International Law, 2014)).
37 Compare Rieder, who, drawing on the German Constitutional Court’s ruling in the 
Maastricht Case, and on Rottmann, argues that there is a distinction to be made be-
tween the attribution of Member State nationality (which is a matter for the Member 
States) and its loss (which may transcend the boundaries of the member States), and 
that ‘none of the Member States were forced to confer the status of EU citizenship on 
their citizens but, once they have, […], they cannot simply withdraw this status’ (C. M. 
Rieder, ‘The Withdrawal Clause of the Lisbon Treaty in the Light of EU Citizenship: 
Between Disintegration and Integration’ (2013) 37 Fordham International Law Journal 
p. 147, at p. 172).
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of the Union as a whole. 
Whatever the case may be, it is undisputed that the nationals of both 
withdrawing Member States and seceding State entities deserve protec-
tion to avert the personal hardship and great inconvenience they would 
be exposed to in the event of secession or withdrawal. This would remain 
true even if we were to exclude, arguendo, the existence of any justiciable 
claim to the continuing protection of EU citizenship rights post-exit or 
secession.38 In such a case, other practical solutions would need to be 
explored, by way of negotiations, to mitigate the obvious negative conse-
quences of secession or withdrawal for the citizens of the seceding state 
entity or the withdrawing Member State, in terms of the loss of their cit-
izenship rights. 
Concluding remarks
The silence of Article 50 TEU on its application, or otherwise, to 
EMU-participating Member States, combined with the unilateral char-
acter of the right of withdrawal enshrined by it, are the source of legit-
imate legal concerns. As the exit clause only allows Member States to 
terminate the Treaties in their entirety, and to withdraw from the EU two 
years after the submission of their withdrawal request even if no agree-
ment has been achieved, the mere revocation of their decision to par-
ticipate in the EMU would be a legal impossibility, as, on the one hand, 
it would constitute a breach of their contractual (Treaty) obligation to 
accede thereto and, on the other, it would be contrary to the irreversible 
character of the participation of a Member State in the Third Stage of 
the EMU. Consequently, a Euro area Member State’s withdrawal from 
the Euroarea would not be possible without its simultaneous withdrawal 
from the EU. Recourse to Article 352 TFEU, as a an alternative route 
through which to organise the withdrawal of a Euroarea Member State, 
could be open to legal challenges, given, that first the Treaty would appear 
to have exhausted the matter of euro introduction under Articles 139-144 
38 Referring to Scotland, it has been argued that, ‘whatever may be the desirability of 
preserving and protecting citizenship rights and whatever may be the force of the duty 
of sincere cooperation, these cannot, it is suggested, serve to defeat the rights of other 
interested and affected parties from vetoing Scottish membership of the EU, if they 
believe that it is in their interests so to do’ (K. A. Armstrong, ‘After “Ever Closer Union”: 
Negotiating Withdrawal, Secession, and Accession’, (2014) 37 Fordham International 
Law Journal Online p. 119 at p. 125). Also see J. Shaw, ‘Citizenship in an Independent 
Scotland: Legal Status and Political Implications’ (2013) CITSEE Working Paper Series 
No. 2013/34. 
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TFEU, and second it can be readily inferred from several provisions of 
the TEU, the TFEU and secondary EU law that the introduction of the 
euro was intended to be irrevocable. Besides, as a matter of EU law, no 
automatic right to EU accession in a genuine secession scenario, for the 
benefit of a newly-created state entity, can be extrapolated on the basis of 
Article 50 TEU. Finally, while in an exit scenario Member States would 
not be bound to take action to preserve the status or rights attaching 
to EU citizenship post-exit, in a secession scenario, any decision by 
the rump Member State authorities to deprive the seceding state entity 
inhabitants of their nationality could be subject to judicial review by the 
ECJ, on the basis of its EU citizenship-related jurisprudence. 
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INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS?  
FILLING THE GOVERNANCE GAP IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION: NICCOLÒ IS 
BACK!
Ramon Marimon 
          
I had been riding for a while since daybreak, far into the Chianti. Thirsty, 
I stopped at a remote house to ask for water and there he was… at work, 
as if time had never passed, surrounded by old manuscripts and new 
books, dressed as in the paintings I had seen. No need to play the actor, 
alone at dawn in a remote house, it had to be him. So, I asked him: ‘Nic-
colò is that you?’ He simply said:
In my previous life I reduced my knowledge of the actions of great men to 
a small volume and sent it to the Magnificent Lorenzo de’ Medici. I cannot 
say it was my best writing but now I see “The Prince” has become the most 
popular piece and I am remembered by it.
Now that, five hundred years later, I am back, I see I have more to learn, 
since this is no longer a world of kingdoms and principalities but of interde-
pendent peoples, where a prince is also a partner and, therefore, must act as 
a prince of his people and as a partner in the partnerships of the dominions 
of Europe, being the European Union or the Euro Area. Not a simple task, 
even if these partnerships have secured peace for a long time. 
I am very thankful for having been given this second chance and I am 
exiling myself again from my beloved Florence to study, reflect and write 
about how men – and women, I must add – should behave as partners, not 
just princes, and how they should develop their partnerships, not only to 
secure peace but also to bring prosperity to their people. 
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Then he looked at me and asked: and who are you, dressed like that with 
these strange shoes and funny hat? [I had on my usual colourful cycling 
outfit and helmet]. I said, ‘well I am a professor of economics at a place 
called the European University Institute, just under the hills of Fiesole, 
where we celebrated the 500th anniversary of your “Il Principe” three 
years ago with a conference.’
I could not tell from his face whether he was simply unimpressed by my 
answer or annoyed by my interruption, when he added,
Yes, I can give you some water and even bread, but since you said you work 
in a European something place, up in Fiesole, let me ask you a few ques-
tions…
What is this European stuff that you are working on? I am reading about 
what you call the European Union and there are many things I still don’t 
understand.
It really caught me by surprise, but what else could I expect on that 
strange morning, so I just said what I had had in mind while cycling 
along: ‘I was just thinking what to say at a conference where I am sup-
posed to talk about “Incomplete Contracts? Filling the Governance Gap 
in the European Union,” perhaps you can help me…’
Do you mean that people should be governed by complete contracts? What 
a bad idea! What would be left to govern if everything had been already 
contracted? Furthermore… and then he took an old manuscript from the 
table and read:
“The prince can gain the people to himself in many modes, for which 
one cannot give certain rule because modes vary according to circum-
stances, and so they will be left out. I will conclude only that for a prince 
it is necessary to have the people friendly; otherwise he has no remedy 
in adversity.1” 
I said, ‘well no, I was thinking more about the “Filling the Governance 
Gap in the European Union”’
That’s a good idea! Since as I said there are many things I don’t understand 
of this European Union, is this what you mean by ‘gaps’? and he took the 
1 Obviously we were talking in Italian, although sometimes I had a hard time under-
standing his archaic sentences and I think he also had a hard time understanding my 
Spanish-Catalan accent. In any case, later in my office I took my English copy of Nic-
colo Machiaveli’s The Prince, U. of Chicago Press, 1985, and I recognized what he read 
on p.40, as I now transcribe.
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book up again and read:
“As it happens with this as the physicians say of consumption, that in the 
beginning of the illness it is easy to cure and difficult to recognize, but 
in the progress of time, when it has not been recognized and treated in 
the beginning, it becomes easy to recognize and difficult to cure. So it 
happens in affairs of state, because when one recognizes from afar the 
evils that arise in a state (which is not given but to one who is prudent), 
they are soon healed; but when they are left to grow because they are not 
recognized, to the point that everyone recognizes them, there is no longer 
any remedy for them.2” 
You see, it seems to me as if you have had bad physicians in this European 
Union, what is all this talk about exits? 
I was going to say something, when he said, almost shouting
Grexit, Catxit and Brexit... 
these are dead ends! 
and, therefore, empty threats, if coming from a prince.
‘You mean Grexit from the euro area?’ I said, and he quickly replied   
 with the same tone
Who breaks a partnership, the strong or the weak partner?
‘The strong…’
 so?  
And I inquired: ‘but then, shouldn’t the strong expel the weak if it   
 misbehaves?’ 
not if the partnership is to endure...
draw the lines without false promises    
and, most of the time,
use the carrot not the stick! 
again, with the book in hand: 
“For injuries must be done all together, so that, being tasted less, they 
offend less; and benefits should be done little by little so that they may be 
2  (idem) p. 12.
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tasted better3.”
‘What about Catexit from Spain? Should the partnership accept 
internal fragmentation?’
No, since any group of people can find their prince and postulate him, or 
her, as a partner… The partnership will dilute, unless it becomes a higher 
principality with a strong prince, no longer a partnership.
‘What if there is Catexit and they behave properly, as they claim they 
will?’
The same, if the partnership is to endure.
‘And Brexit from the European Union?’
Is Britain a weak or a strong partner?
‘Well’, I said, ‘she is not a weak one and could be a strong one, 
 but she refrains from being so.’
What prevents her?  What limits her within the EU partnership?
What might the exit gain be?
I was not fully convinced and insisted: ‘Grexit, Catxit and Brexit...
what if it comes from the people?’
The same, these are dead ends! 
although they may happen, since people often forget how   
interdependent they are with other people and they may trade losses   
 for – religiously perceived – self-esteem;
and princes – or those who would like  to be such – can turn this to their 
advantage.   
But, remember, for the partnership and the partner-prince it is necessary to 
have the people friendly! 
And, in a low voice, he added:
That’s why it seems to me that you may have had bad physicians in this 
European Union...That’s why I think the illnesses will remain even if there 
are no exits to regret.
Not giving up, I insisted: ‘What about security, migration and other global 
problem gaps?’ He looked at me, as if I was not getting the point, and said
3  (ibid) p.38.  
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is it not always the same?
 if the partnership is to endure...
 draw the lines without false promises 
and, most of the time,  
use the carrot not the stick! 
...
but, remember, the partnership 
cannot beg for carrots from the princes!
I decided to change topic. ‘What about the European Union and euro 
area institutional gaps?’ 
Tell me about it, I want to learn.
It was getting late (I was sure my wife would be thinking that I had got 
lost yet again on my ride, but I didn’t dare take out my smartphone and 
send a WhatsApp) and actually he had still not even given me any water, 
but I explained…
‘We have an unusual  governance with a good number of formal 
bodies of the European Union: the European Council, the European Par-
liament, the European Commission, etc.4, but when we had our main 
crisis it was a euro crisis, not a European Union crisis, and the main gov-
erning bodies, which have had many meetings, sometimes deep into the 
night,  have been informal bodies – the Eurogroup and the Euro Council 
– together with the euro body ‘par-excellence’: the European Central 
Bank. And, while this may seem a weak arrangement to you, it is said 
‘Europe grows out of its crises’ and this one has not been an exception….’
Before I could go on, he interrupted me,
yes, I have read this claim – wasn’t it Jean Monnet who said it first?—and I 
always thought it was an odd claim, didn’t you Europeans have two major 
wars last century which also grew out of  crises? 
And he let me continue my description: ‘Besides the ECB, since 2010 we 
also have: the Fiscal Compact (FC), through which countries exercise 
fiscal restraint to avoid another debt crisis; the Macroeconomic Imbal-
ance Procedure (MIP), to coordinate and oversee structural reforms, fiscal 
policies and prevent macroeconomic imbalances; the European Stability 
4 The Council of the European Union (ministers), the European Economic and Social 
Committee, the Committee of Regions, the European Investment Bank and the Euro-
pean Investment Fund.
Incomplete Contracts? Filling the Governance Gap in the European Union: Niccolò is back!   
-  Ramon Marimon
112
Mechanism (ESM) a crisis mechanism, which has already helped Cyprus 
and the banking sectors in Spain and Greece, and lastly, in a very short 
period of time, there have been great advancesmade towards the crea-
tion of a European Banking Union (EBU), which should provide greater 
financial stability and help to break the pernicious private–sovereign debt 
link. Furthermore, we also have “The Five Presidents’ Report” which sets 
a roadmap for “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union”.’ 
I may have gone too far since he abruptly interrupted me.
I appreciate your explanations, but let me ask you three things: 
First of all, MIP, ESM, EBU, EMU, ECB… In my times I used names
of people – like Francesco Sforza, Cesare Borgia – of countries – 
Germany, France – etc. but I never confused readers with acronyms,
why am I haunted by them as soon as I start reading about the 
European Union?
I said nothing. 
These ‘Five Presidents,’ where they chosen with the favour of the people or 
with the favour of the great? Since, as you know from my book [showing it 
to me], it made a difference in how princes should behave and I presume it 
would also make a difference for partner-princes nowadays.
‘Partly, a combination of the two’, I said.––
This is dangerous, you know - serving several masters one may end up 
serving none. Furthermore, first, when I say ‘people’ I refer to all the people 
of the European Union – or maybe it would be better to say here, of the 
euro area – but it seems that when you say ‘some princes are chosen with 
the favour of the people’, you mean their own country people, not the euro 
area people. Second, even if I learned, and appreciated, the virtues of having 
an independent prince of the ECB, a master of reference seems necessary: 
the formal European Parliament, the informal Eurocouncil, who? Third, it 
seems that the ‘great’ today are the same countries that I was already refer-
ring to five hundred years ago!
But back to your description of the progress being made with all these new 
acronyms: 
Isn’t this a little too complex, since, in order to trust, people must under-
stand? 
Is it working?
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I started saying, ‘well it’s not so easy…’, when I noticed something on one 
side of his table: an iPad!, ‘… but you still dress in Renaissance clothes 
and you have an iPad?’ 
He asked me: How long have you been in Florence? ‘Fifteen years or so’ I 
replied. Not even if you were a second or third generation here would you 
be considered a Florentine. The true Florentine families of my time are still 
here and since some of them owed me favours, it didn’t take me too long to 
find their progenitors (they still keep their names) and, in return, a young 
man came to visit me with this iPad and installed in this old house some-
thing he called WiFi (what is happening with the Italian, language?5). In 
any case, I really like it! I would have written ‘Il Principe’ in two weeks if I 
had had one then.
‘So, let me show you something…’ and I opened the “europeansnapshot.
com” of Thomas Cooley and Peter Rupert. ‘If we normalize the real yearly 
Growth Domestic Product of all the countries at 1 in 2008 at the start of 
the financial crisis, then we can see the recession and recovery for most, 
but not equally for all.’
‘For example, in the aftermath of the euro crisis we still have an unsolved 
Greece gap and, even if the other euro-crisis countries are growing, with 
the exception of Ireland, we still have a euro area divide gap. That is what 
makes it difficult for it to function.’ 
5  Speaking in Italian, he said “WeeFee”.
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In the case of Greece, were the lines ever drawn? I have seen no lines, while 
huge new debts and detailed ‘adjustment programmes’ have been thrown at 
them… with most Greeks falling into despair and their banks in disarray. Is 
this how your partnership manages the stick and the carrot?
I certainly didn’t want to argue this one, so I just said: ‘I really like chat-
ting with you Niccolò, but I just came in for a glass of water…’ Sorry, I am 
not used to talking and I got carried away, here is the water and the bread, 
but let me ask you a few last questions (at that point I sent a WhatsApp to 
my wife, without mentioning Niccolò…).
This Fiscal Compact and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, I can 
see some rationality in partners making a commitment to the former, and 
some good partnership intentions with the latter, but is it working? Are 
these credible mechanisms? Would they be enough to prevent other crises?
‘I understand your concerns. Let me show you another couple of things 
on your iPad. Look at these numbers for the United Kingdom and Spain. 
Both countries had relatively high deficits in 2014 and both have grown 
more than the EU average in the last two years. However the Uk, which 
has not signed the Fiscal Compact, has reduced its deficit, while Spain, 
who rushed to have it in its constitution, has not. I am sure that the part-
nership, as you call it, will verbally – perhaps also in writing - admonish 
Spain, and the current Spanish prince will make promises of fiscal 
restraint to his European partners, while promising tax reductions to his 
people-voters and, in the U.K., people will make fun of the hypocrisy of 
the European partnership.’
GDP 
growth 
2014
GDP 
growth 
2015
Surplus/
GDP 
2014
Surplus/
GDP 
2015
Surplus/
GDP 2015 
(rev.)
Debt/
GDP
2015
U.K. 2.9 2.3 -5.6 -4.4 -3.9 89.2
Spain 1.4 3.2 -5.9 -5.1 -5.0 99.2
‘I have just downloaded a Voxeu piece in your iPad for you, with a ref-
erence to an interesting article6 comparing the U.S., Canada and Europe. 
The authors, Arellano et al., show (see Figures 1 and 2 from their article) 
6 Cristina Arellano, Andy Atkeson, Mark L. J. Wright. 2015. “External and Public Debt 
Crises”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual. http://voxeu.org/article/public-debt-crises-
us-vs-eu-private-borrower-impact
PART I I  -  Incomplete Contracts? Filling the Governance Gap in the European Union
115
how in the last decade, states in Canada have large liabilities, with respect 
to their GDP, as European countries do also, in contrast with U.S. states, 
who do not have large liabilities. Yet, in contrast to European countries 
and U.S. states, Canada’s states have been perceived as financially safe in 
this decade of crises. They argue, and document somewhat convincingly, 
that there are two causes behind these facts. In Canada and in the U.S., 
and in contrast with Europe, the government does not interfere with the 
private financial sector. Canadian states, in addition, have more fiscal flex-
ibility than do U.S. states or European countries. The European Banking 
Union and a more integrated – less national – capital market (called the 
European Capital Union) should prevent governments from interfering, 
however, it is not clear whether the current more flexible interpretation of 
the Fiscal Compact will provide European countries with the fiscal flexi-
bility that Canadian states have or, in your language, princes who do not 
know how to behave as princes-partners will still need a straightjacket to 
prevent them from generating a new crisis.’
Figure 2 : Net and Pension/Health care Liabilities to GDP
You also mentioned that there is a European institution for crises, which 
is not the church, as it was in my times, you said the ESM? But I see in 
your colourful picture that some countries are more prone to severe crises 
than others. How can some countries always give to others, if it is not for a 
religious mandate, and if they do, wouldn’t the receivers get used to it and 
make no effort to prevent new crises?
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Figure 1: Government Spreads in Europe, U.S., and Canadian 
Provinces
‘Well, you certainly have a point and you are not the first one to make 
it. Yes, it is the ESM and it is designed to act, using your words, when 
“it becomes easy to recognize but difficult to cure.” But we can do better 
than that and, as the Five Presidents have said, we should: we can design 
a proper risk-sharing mechanism, which accounts for both of your con-
cerns. As a matter of fact, I am working on this, with some co-authors, 
and I can tell you more about it some other day’7. 
Now it was starting to get late, but he insisted,
And you also mentioned a European Banking Union, can you tell me more 
about it?
‘As you may recall, in your times a Florin was not worth the same in a 
Florence bank as in a Paris bank, and something a little like this still hap-
pens: one euro deposited in a bank is not the same in Athens as in Rome. 
7 Árpad Ábrahám, Eva Cárceles-Poveda, Yan Liu, and Ramon Marimon. 2016. “On the 
optimal design of a Financial Stability Fund,” manuscript, European University Insti-
tute.
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Also we would like to break the existing tight connection between private 
and public borrowing. It is quite amazing that in just four years the SSM 
and the SRM have been put in place.’
What?
‘Oh sorry, I meant the Single Supervisory Mechanism, hosted by the 
European Central Bank, and the Single Resolution Mechanism. Now 
we only need a properly funded Resolution Fund and European Deposit 
Insurance, to have a European Banking Union.’
Isn’t this a little too complex, and how will  be properly funded if not by the 
taxes of the people? Our pioneer banking system (not a union) was much 
simpler and we knew who would fund it – the Medici, for example – and we 
didn’t bother to distinguish between public and private debts. By the way, I 
read something about ‘Limited-Purpose Banking’, as a way to revamp the 
existing banking system, so prone to bank-runs and other crises, making it 
simpler, more transparent and stable, by simply restricting banks to be only 
financial intermediaries, as funds are between investors and savers. Less 
creative, but maybe we should leave the creativity in the hands of the artists, 
not of the bankers.
This reminds me that I know an acronym that you haven’t mentioned. 
When the young man came with the iPad, I asked him what he was doing, 
and he said he was in banking, as his family has been for the last five hun-
dred years. So I asked him what was new in banking and he replied: QE, 
the QE of the BCE!
So, I was wondering, with this not-properly-funded European Banking 
Union, the new mechanisms to solve crises and share risks, the BCE doing 
QE, which, for what I understood from the young man, may also involve 
taking risks by the BCE, don’t you think that with all this stuff the euro area 
will need some financial facility? That we have a missing body in all this 
design? Say, something like the Treasury that I see they have in the U.S. and 
in the U.K.?
‘You have a point again, and again you are not the first one to mention it, 
even the Five Presidents say something like that in their report. Unfor-
tunately, they don’t say any more than you do. Well, I think that I had 
better get going. But let me ask you one thing, before I leave: after all your 
readings and our talk, what would you say about “Filling the Governance 
Gap in the European Area?”’ In a clear voice, he replied:
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is it not always the same?
 if the partnership is to endure...
 draw the lines without false promises
 and, most of the time,  
 use the carrot not the stick! 
but remember,
 carrots (& sticks) must be credible
 (and no begging princes for carrots),
 in order to be credible, partnership policies and institutions 
 need to be understood (so keep them simple)
 endurance is far-sighted, while it is easy to make 
 people friendly by being short-sighted, 
most of all, remember that 
 there is no room for just princes 
 in this interdependent world, 
 a prince must also be a partner
 and be trusted by the people as partner & prince,    
 and what I said for The Prince applies to The Partnership:
(and he read for the last time)
“So let a Prince win and maintain his state: 
the means will always be judged honourable,
and will be praised by everyone8.”
(and with this I left, I left him with his manuscripts, his books, his iPad 
and his solitude).
8  (ibid) p. 71.
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EXIT RULES FOR REGIONS OF  
EU MEMBER STATES 
Roland Vaubel 
There are three countries in the world which have established legal pro-
cedures for the potential secession of their regions: Switzerland (1979), 
Canada (1998) and the Uk (2015). In all three countries secession 
requires a referendum in the region. In Switzerland the referendum may 
be triggered by a regional popular initiative. In Canada and the Uk a vote 
by the regional parliament is required. In the Uk the national parliament 
respects the result of the regional referendum. In Canada each province 
has the right to hold a referendum on secession but the procedure also 
requires the assent of the other provinces and the Canadian government 
because the constitution has to be amended.1 In Switzerland the citizens 
of a region may vote to secede from a canton (province) but the rest of the 
canton has to agree as well, and there has to be a nationwide referendum 
because any change in the number of cantons requires a constitutional 
amendment. This is how the new Canton Jura seceded from Canton 
Berne in 19792. To summarize, the regional referendum is binding in the 
Uk but not in Canada and Switzerland. However, even non-binding ref-
erenda can be very effective.
Three countries is a very small number. There seems to be a gap in 
governance. Several authors – e.g. Lee Bucheit3– have suggested that it 
may have to be filled by an international organisation (e.g., the European 
1 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, Au-
gust 2000, and the Canadian Clarity Act S.C. 2000, c.26, June 29, 2000.
2 For more details see C. Dominicé, “The Secession of the Canton Jura in Switzerland”, 
in: M.G. Kohen (ed.), Secession: International Law Perspectives, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge 2006.
3 Lee C. Bucheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination, Yale University Press: 
New Haven CT 1978, p. 245.
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Union). An international organisation is less biased against secession 
than the national majority is. However, there are vested interests which 
also bias international organisations against regional secession from a 
member state. The representatives of the member states in the interna-
tional organisation are representatives of the national majorities. More-
over, the bureaucrats, parliamentarians and judges of the international 
organisation aim to expand their power and prestige by advocating polit-
ical centralisation.
This may explain why neither the United Nations nor the European 
Union recognize the right of secession. The Council of Europe has even 
adopted a resolution stating that it aims to “prevent secession” (2011, No. 
1832). The following quotations from leading politicians of the European 
Union may serve as examples:
• Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament: “I am very 
worried about divisive tendencies due to separatists movements in 
the Member States - especially at a time of crisis”.4
• Elmar Brok, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
European Parliament: “Regional disintegration is poison to Europe”.5
• Herman van Rompuy, former President of the European Council: 
“Breaking up countries is contrary to the growth of the European 
Union … We support unity of the members”.6 “Nobody has anything 
to gain from separatism in the world of today … How can separatism 
help? The word of the future is ‘union’.”7
Since national governments as well as international organisations are 
biased against secession of a region, almost all secessions in history have 
been unconstitutional. There are 22 European countries which owe their 
existence to secessions: Switzerland (1291), Sweden (1523), the Nether-
lands (1579), Portugal (1640), Greece (1827), Belgium (1831), Norway 
(1905), Finland (1917), Ireland (1921), Iceland (1944), the three Baltic 
states (1990), Belarus (1990), Ukraine (1991), Russia (1991), Slovenia 
(1991), Croatia (1991), Macedonia (1991), Bosnia Herzegovina (1992), 
4 See V. Capodici, „Das Gespenst des Separatismus geht um in Europa“, Basler Zeitung, 
October 18, 2012 (translation by the author).
5 Ibid.
6 Belgian TV channel VRT, September 21, 2014.
7 In D. Boffey, “European Chief Pours Scorn on Scottish Independence”, Observer (Lon-
don), November 4, 2012.
PART I I  -  Incomplete Contracts? Filling the Governance Gap in the European Union
123
Slovakia (1992) and Montenegro (2006). With the exception of Norway’s 
breakaway from Sweden, all of these secessions have been unconstitu-
tional.8 
A governance gap also exists with respect to an important special 
issue: it is not clear whether seceding regions retain their membership 
in international organisations, for example, in the European Union. The 
European Commission claims that they lose their membership. Here are 
some quotations:
• Romano Prodi, former President of the European Commis-
sion: “When a part of the territory of a Member State ceases to 
be part of that state, e.g., because the territory becomes an inde-
pendent state, the treaties will no longer apply to that territory.”9 
• José Manuel Barroso, another former President of the European 
Commission: “A region which secedes from a Member State, auto-
matically ceases to be part of the European Union”.10 “Of course, it 
will be extremely difficult to get approval of all the Member States 
to have a new member coming from another Member State.”11 
• Jean-Claude Juncker, the current President of the European Com-
mission: “… Mr. Barroso has already answered the question about 
EU membership. I have nothing to add.”12
8 The constitution of Yugoslavia, it is true, recognized the right of secession. But the 
procedure was not specified, and the Yugoslav government waged war to prevent the 
secessions. 
 The secession of Slovakia from Czechoslovakia was final-
ly agreed in November 1992 but it started with a unilater-
al declaration of independence in July 1992, which was unconstitutional. 
Ukraine and Russia left the USSR on December 8, 1991 – two weeks before the Soviet 
Union was dissolved by the remaining members.
9 R. Prodi, “Answer Given by Mr. Prodi on Behalf of the Commission”, Official Journal of 
the European Union, 2004, C 84/E, 422.
10 J.M. Barroso, Letter from José Manuel Barroso to Lord Tugendhat, December 10, 2012. 
Available at http://www.parliament.Uk/documents/lords-committees/economic-af-
fairs/ScottishIndependence/EA68_Scotland_and_the_EU_Barroso%27s_reply_to_
Lord_Tugendhat_101212.pdf
11 Die Presse (Vienna), „Barroso: Unabhängiges Katalonien muss aus EU austreten“, No-
vember 17, 2012. (translation by the author)
12 Talk with MEPs, BBC News, “Scottish independence: ‘I will respect referendum re-
sult’, says Juncker”, July 10, 2014 (available at www.bbc.com/news/Uk-scotland-scot-
land-politics-28231347).
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• Viviane Reding, former Commissioner of Justice and Vice-President 
of the Commission: “Catalonia, if it seceded from Spain, could not 
remain in the European Union as a separate member.”13
However, this issue is not to be decided by the Commission. It has to be 
decided by the member states (as the Comission admits14)..
The legal position taken by the European Commission has no basis 
in the EU treaties, nor is there a precedent.15 There is no such rule in the 
UN Charter nor in any other UN agreement. The Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties does not cover membership in 
international organisations.16 There are merely practices, and they vary 
considerably among international organisations. I give a few examples17:
• The UN, it is true, usually refuses to automatically keep a seceding 
region as a Member State but it retains the rump state. How-
ever, there are exceptions. When Syria seceded from the United 
Arab Republic with Egypt in 1961 the UN kept Syria uncon-
ditionally as a member. When Montenegro seceded from 
Serbia in 2006, both had to reapply for membership in the UN. 
• The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank kept the 
Yugoslav successor states as well as Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
as members under certain conditions which happened to be satis-
fied. 
• The World Meteorological Organization, the Universal 
13 El Pais (Madrid), „La Comisión Europea assume las tesis de Rajoy sobre una Cataluῆa 
fuera de la UE“, October 30, 2012 translation by the author).
14 Commission Spokeswoman Pia Ahrenkilde-Hansen, May 14, 2014, as quoted in: 
G.M.D. Duerr, Secessionism and the European Union, Lexington Books: Lanham 
2015, p. 163.
15 The independence of Algeria (1962) and the autonomy of Greenland (1979) cannot 
serve as precedents because these countries did not wish to stay in the EEC/EC. Indeed, 
Greenland wanted autonomy precisely because it did not wish to be part of the EC.
16 According to Art 4, the Convention is “without prejudice to the rules concerning ac-
quisition of membership”. Apparently, the UN did not want to limit its discretion and 
bargaining power with regard to new members.
17 See A. Zimmermann, Staatennachfolge in völkerrechtlichen Verträgen, Springer: 
Berlin 2000. K.G. Bühler, State Succession and Membership in International Organ-
isations, Kluwer: The Hague 2001. J. Crawford and A. Boyle, “Opinion: Referendum 
on the Independence of Scotland – International Law Aspects”, in HM Government, 
Scotland Analysis: Devolution and Implications of Scottish Independence (Cm 8554, 
February), Annex A, The Stationary Office: Norwich 2013.
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Postal Union and the International Atomic Energy Orga-
nization kept these countries without any conditions. 
• The Council of Europe asked both Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
to reapply. 
• The World Intellectual Property Organization wanted the 
seceding Soviet Republics of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gystan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan merely to confirm their membership in the organisation. 
These examples should suffice to show that a uniform practice does not 
exist.
In the literature, we find three major objections to the Commission’s 
view that a seceding region automatically ceases to be part of the EU.
First, Sir David Edward, a former British judge at the European Court 
of Justice, has argued that since Art 50 TEU provides for negotiations 
prior to the departure of a Member State of the EU, there must also be 
negotiations prior to the departure of a region of a Member State of the 
EU: “The EU institutions and all the Member States (including the Uk 
as existing) would be obliged to enter into negotiations [with Scotland], 
before separation took place, to determine the future relationship within 
the EU of separate parts of the former Uk and the other Member States.”18
Second, Matas I Dalmases and three co-authors19, all legal scholars 
from Catalonia, have suggested that automatic exclusion is incompatible 
with the values of the European Union as stated in the Treaties, notably 
with respect for democracy, the regions, cultural diversity and the right 
of minorities. Like Edward, they suggest that notification of secession of 
a region has to be followed by negotiations within the European Union 
and ultimately treaty amendment.
Third, Yves Gounin, chief of staff at the French Ministry of European 
Affairs until 2012, has pointed out that since the European Court of Jus-
tice has declared citizenship of the European Union to be separate from, 
and additional to, citizenship of the Member State, EU citizenship cannot 
18 D. Edward, “Scotland and the European Union”, Scottish Constitutional Futures Fo-
rum, December 17, 2012 (available in the internet).
19 J. Matas I Dalmases, A. Gonzales Bondia, J. Jaria I Manzano and L. Roman I Martin, 
The Internal Enlargement of the European Union, Centre Maurits Coppieters: Brussels 
2011.
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automatically be lost by giving up national citizenship.20
I view this issue from a social contract perspective. There are two 
internally consistent solutions for succession when a part of a state uni-
laterally secedes from the rest or when parts of a state agree to separate: 
• Either none of the parts keep the international rights and obliga-
tions of the predecessor state because the people of each part are no 
longer identical with the people of the predecessor state who have 
agreed to those rights and obligations. (As mentioned this was the 
UN position with regard to Montenegro and Serbia and the Council 
of Europe position with regard to Slovakia and the Czech Republic.) 
• Or, in the interest of maintaining stability and predictability, each 
of the parts initially succeeds in the rights and obligations of the 
predecessor state but is subsequently free to withdraw. (This is the 
general principle of succession enshrined in Art 34 of the Vienna 
Convention – without prejudice to membership in international 
organisations.) If the parts do not meet their joint obligations to the 
international organisation, they may be challenged in its court or 
be expelled. If they cannot agree on how to share their rights, they 
cannot exercise them. Of course, they may subsequently renegotiate 
their rights and obligations with the other members of the interna-
tional organisation.
Whichever of these consistent solutions is preferred, the UN tendency to 
recognize one of the parts – the larger or passive one – is unsatisfactory 
from a contractarian point of view. However, it can easily be explained by 
vested interest: the UN Assembly contains representatives of the national 
majorities, and the UN staff wants to unite – not to decentralise. For the 
same reasons, the EU threat to expel Catalonia but keep Spain is both 
unacceptable and due to vested interest. The EU has become an inter-
national policy cartel of national majorities that prevents the national 
minorities from seceding and forces them into submission.
20 Y. Gounin, «Les dynamiques d’éclatement d’États dans l’Union européenne: casse-tête 
juridique, défi politique», Politique Etrangère, vol. 4, 2014, pp. 11-22.
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CAN GREECE BE EXPELLED FROM THE 
EUROZONE? TOWARD A DEFAULT  
RULE ON EXPULSION FROM  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Joseph Blocher, Mitu Gulati & Laurence R. Helfer 1
Abstract
The ongoing European crisis has raised uncomfortable questions about 
the conditions under which treaty-based unions of nations like the EU 
or the EMU can legally expel a member—Greece being the most obvious 
candidate. The EU, for example, has rules governing the voluntary with-
drawal of members, but says nothing about whether a member can be 
expelled. As a matter of international law, what does the silence mean? 
Put differently: What is the default rule regarding expulsions when a 
treaty says nothing about forced withdrawals? Is there an absolute bar on 
expulsion, as some have suggested? Conversely, is there an implicit right 
to expel?  Or can material breaches of a treaty justify expulsion? And if 
fault is not required, must the expelled member state be compensated in 
some way?
1 Faculty, DUke Law School. For conversations about this topic, thanks to Patrick Bol-
ton, Lee Buchheit, Paul Stephan and Roland Vaubel.
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Introduction
The Greek sovereign debt crisis has resulted in three bailout packages, 
a dramatic restructuring of Greek debt, and multiple sets of Greek gov-
ernments.2 The saga is wearing the patience of the other members of the 
Euro area. In moments of frustration, some have argued that Greece 
should be expelled from the Eurozone, either because it has violated the 
sacrosanct “no bailout” clause by seeking relief from its EMU lenders or 
because it gained admittance to the Eurozone in the first place based on 
fraudulent numbers.3 But many Greeks do not wish to leave, especially if 
they would have to also leave the EU as a result.4 
The political struggle in turn raises a legal question about whether 
and under what circumstances international law permits a supranational 
or international organization (IO) to expel a member state.5 The Lisbon 
Treaty is—like many other such treaties—silent on the matter of expulsion 
(although it does follow the general trend of permitting withdrawal6), so 
the crucial issue is what default rule applies in to these treaties or IOs.7 
Many commentators have a strong response: In the absence of an 
2 Greece’s Debt Crisis Explained, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2015/business/international/greece-debt-crisis-euro.html.
3 The question of expulsion in the EU context had come up earlier, in the context of the 
Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008.  See Vincent Browne, Truth About the EU 
and Ireland After Lisbon, Politico, July 31, 2008. On the Greek matter, see, e.g., Leo 
Cendrowicz, Greek Debt Crisis: Alexis Tsipras Given Ultimatum – Push Through Cuts 
This Week Or Leave Euro, The Independent, July 12, 2015 (reporting the threat made 
to Greece that either it take on more austerity in July 2015 or take a “time out” from 
the Euro); Dalia Fahmy & Elisabeth Behrmann, Germans Tired of Greek Demands 
Want Country to Exit Euro, Bloomberg, March 15, 2015 (reporting that 52% of Ger-
mans polled wanted Greece to exit the Euro; with 80% of Germans polled taking the 
view that Greece “isn’t behaving seriously towards its European partners”); Germans 
Call For Greece to Leave the Euro, After “No” Referandum Vote, Fortune, July 5, 2015; 
Jochen Bittner, It’s Time for Greece to Leave the Euro, N.Y. Times, July 7, 2015. 
4 E.g., Aggelos Skordas, New Opinion Polls Show that Greeks Want SYRIZA, Samaras, 
and the Euro, Greek Reporter, Jan 4, 2015. 
5 Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and EMU: Some Re-
flections, European Central Bank Working Paper Series No. 10 (Dec. 2009) 35.
6 Article 50 provides that “[a]ny Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union 
in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
7 On the withdrawal option that was put into place in 2009, under Article 50 of the TEU, 
see Phaedon Nicolaides, Withdrawal From the European Union: A Typology of Effects, 
20 MJ: Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 2 (2013). Jacque Delors himself has argued that 
the relevant treaties should be revised, and that “[t]he new treaty should make it possi-
ble to kick a country out of the euro zone if a majority of 75 percent are in favour.” Vicky 
Buffery, Delors Urges Giving EU Power to Eject Nations from Euro, Reuters (Oct. 18, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/eurozone-delors-idUSL5E7LI2KF20111018.
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explicit agreement to the contrary, nothing can legally justify the expul-
sion of a member state from an IO. To do so, they say, would violate the 
sovereignty of the expelled nation or the relevant treaty.  This appears to 
be the conventional wisdom about the prospect of expelling Greece from 
the Eurozone.
In a 2009 ECB Working Paper, Phoebus Athanassiou considered the 
possibility of expelling a member state from the EMU and concluded:
[N]ot only is a collective right of expulsion not provided for in the 
text of the treaties, but, what is more, the legitimacy of its assertion 
or introduction would be highly questionable, both legally and con-
ceptually.8 
Echoing that sentiment, Annie Lowrey wrote in Foreign Policy: 
[The EU bylaws] provide no option for kicking a country out, no 
matter how much other member countries might want to. Even if 
Greece invaded France — and it would take as much for Brussels to 
contemplate expulsion — the European Commission, a body of min-
isters that initiates EU laws, would have to craft new legislation to do 
it.9
Similarly, Steve Peers, University of Essex Professor of EU Law and 
Human Rights, wrote:
There’s no reference in the Treaties to any power of a Member State 
to leave EMU once it joins, or of the EU institutions to remove that 
Member State from EMU, whether it agrees to that or not. A Member 
State can leave EMU by leaving the EU, but there’s no Treaty power to 
throw a Member State out of the EU, or to suggest that any Member 
State might ever be under the obligation to leave. . . . The argument 
for a forced Grexit does not even have a fig leaf to hide its illegality.10
We disagree. The Lisbon Treaty does not specifically provide for expul-
sion, but nor does it prohibit it. And while a general presumption against 
expulsion may be sensible as a matter of law and policy, it is a mistake—
legally and otherwise—to conclude that the default rule for IOs and trea-
ties should be a flat prohibition on expulsion. The question, we argue, is 
8 Athanassiou, supra note 5.
9 Annie Lowrey, Could Greece Get Kicked Out of the European Union? No, FP Explain-
er (Mar. 23, 2010), http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/23/could-greece-get-kicked-out-
of-the-european-union/. 
10 Steve Peers, Is Temporary Grexit Possible? EMU as Hotel California, July 11, 2015,  EU 
Law Analysis Blog, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.Uk/2015/07/is-temporary-grex-
it-legally-possible.html.
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not whether expulsion should be permitted at all, but under what cir-
cumstances. 
To admit the possibility of expulsion even when a treaty does not pro-
vide that option raises a host of other difficult questions. What about de 
facto versus de jure expulsion? Some IOs have, instead of expelling mem-
bers, effectively excluded them from the organization by, for example, 
refusing to accept their representatives’ credentials.11 Analogous means 
might be available in the Greek context. Could, for example, Germany 
and the other Euro area nations essentially force a buy out by either “for-
giving” the Greek debt or treating it like a gift conditioned on Greece’s 
“voluntary” exit from the monetary union? Or could the ECB effectively 
force Greece to exit the EMU by denying it access to its facilties because 
of some action that Greece was taking that it deemed inappropriate (e.g., 
a debt restructuring)? 
If de facto or de jure expulsion is possible in at least some circum-
stances, the key question is what conditions trigger its availability. Must 
the expelled party be at fault? If a fault-based inquiry is to be conducted, 
who would do this? The other member states? An international court, 
such as the ECJ? Some other international review body? Finally, there is 
enforcement. If IO members as a group want to push out a recalcitrant 
nation, there are likely to be few remedies available to the aggrieved state. 
Our goal in this paper is not to offer definitive answers to these ques-
tions, but to suggest that considerations of both law and policy should 
permit expulsion in certain circumstances,12 and to sketch out some of 
the considerations that might guide the use of such an extreme measure. 
The specific question of whether Greece could legally be expelled from 
the EMU is beyond the scope of our paper, nor do we have much to say 
about whether doing so would be a good policy decision. 
I. Why Expulsion Should Be an Option
A. Inducing Cooperation in a World of Limited Sanctions
International organizations such as the United Nations, the IMF, or the 
EMU provide a mechanism for states to generate collective benefits—
11 South Africa Again Denied Seat by General Assembly, N.Y. Times, March 3, 1981.
12 Cf. Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Exclusion from Participation in International Organi-
sations: The Theory and Practice Behind Member States’ Expulsion and Suspension of 
Membership 259 (1999) (“Suspension and expulsion should be viewed as eventualities 
inherent in membership.”).
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such as security, financial stability, and the like—for their members and 
often for the wider world.13  But the members states have individual inter-
ests that will on occasion differ from that of the collective.  Members 
usually act cooperatively even when their self-interest differs from that 
of the group, whether because they fear reciprocal defections by other 
states, a breakdown of future cooperation, harm to their reputations as 
good global citizens, or simply because is the right thing to do. 
Yet history demonstrates that members sometimes act in ways that 
violate cooperative commitments or even undermine the organization.14 
And since the members in question are sovereign, there are relatively 
few sanctioning mechanisms that other members can use to discipline 
them.  One of the few sanctions available is denial of the benefits of the 
membership in the organization.15  Under these circumstances, the threat 
of expulsion can provide three benefits: first, it penalizes (or preferably, 
deters) misbehavior; second, it allows the organization to start func-
tioning again;16 and third, it incentivizes the organization to create value 
for its members, making the loss of those benefits a more significant 
threat to a state being considered for expulsion.
Scholars have long been interested in the question of how members 
can and should respond to unsatisfactory performance by an organ-
ization.17 We ask the opposite question: How can an organization—a 
collaborative enterprise—respond to unsatisfactory performance by a 
member? Members who believe that an IO is undeserving their inter-
ests—or that another member has breached its treaty obligations—often 
have an option to terminate the relationship by withdrawal.18 Expulsion, 
in many ways, raises mirror image issues. The crisis in the EMU makes 
13 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act through Formal International 
Organizations, 42 J. Conflict Res. 3 (1998). 
14 An analogy here is to clubs, that generate benefits to their members.  See Alessandra 
Cassella & Bruno Frey, Federalism and Clubs, 36 Eur. Econ. Rev. 639 (1992).
15 Cf. Christopher F. Brummer, Soft Law and the Global System: Rule Making in the 21st 
Century 159-161 (2015).
16 C.W. Jenks, Expulsion from the League of Nations, 16 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 155, 156 (1935) 
(“The [expulsion] clause was introduced . . . because it was thought that a state in 
breach of covenant might attempt to block systematically all League business by voting 
against every proposal under consideration.”).  
17 See, e.g., Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States (1970).
18 See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 Va. L. Rev. 157 (2005).
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those questions particularly pressing.19  
Like withdrawal, expulsion is an extreme remedy. So it makes sense 
to consider the kinds of extraordinary circumstances that might justify 
its use, including those in which a member is inflicting serious harms on 
the other members or their populations. In those extraordinary cases, 
expulsion may be the best way out of a terrible union.
There is no intuitive reason that such malfunctioning unions must 
continue. Indeed, some recent trends in international law seek to facili-
tate their break up by permitting regions or states to quit the relationship 
in extreme circumstances.20 Such exits can improve overall welfare in the 
short run by ending the painful relationship, while deterring nations and 
organizations from inflicting harms on their regions and members in the 
first instance.
The same logic applies in the opposite direction. Holding aside the 
question of fault, the costs of a harmful political union are reciprocal—
the union and its units all suffer from conflict. In the case of exit, those 
costs are thought to be the fault of the nation or organization, which is 
why the unit (region or member state) gets the withdrawal option. But 
that will not always be the case. Sometimes the harm is inflicted by a 
malefactor member (consider the USSR’s invasion of Finland, when both 
were members of the League of Nations), and the organization should 
be the one with the option to terminate the relationship. It is not enough 
to say that doing so would violate the sovereignty or treaty rights of the 
expelled nation, when that nation has inflicted significant harms on other 
sovereigns. In such cases, we think, expulsion can be an appropriate 
remedy.
The right to expel misbehaving members gives the organization a key 
tool of influence and negotiation.  This tool becomes all the more impor-
tant if other tools are off the table or of limited utility, as is often the case 
when the sanctioned party is a sovereign state.21 Just as the threat of exit 
19 Boyko Blagoev, Expulsion of a Member State from the EU after Lisbon: Political Threat 
or Legal Reality?, 16 Tilburg L. Rev. 191, 192 (2011) (“[T]he glue may no longer be 
strong enough to hold all these countries together.”).
20 See infra Section II.
21 In the EU and Euro contexts, Athanassiou recognizes this argument, but counters that 
the system contains adequate sanction mechanisms to discipline misbehaving mem-
bers.  See Athanassiou, supra note 4, at 36.  The empirical question is whether the sac-
tioning mechanisms already present in the EU/Euro contexts are so effective and tough 
that one can conclude that the implicit agreement was that there was no possibility of 
expulsion.  We suspect not.
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gives members a particular kind of bargaining chip vis-à-vis their organ-
izations, the threat of expulsion does likewise for organizations vis-à-vis 
individual members—particularly when membership brings benefits and 
expulsion sends a negative signal to potential future partners of the mis-
behaving state.22 
The expelling and expelled parties are not the only ones whose 
interests are at stake—it is also important to consider externalities and 
systemic costs. One might argue that the possibility of expulsion could 
reduce incentives for cooperation by reducing the value of forming an 
organization in the first place.23 Organizations might also use the threat 
of abandonment to strike coercive or unfair bargains with members per-
ceived to be underperforming.24 Even contemplating the possibility of 
expulsion might corrode the commitment needed to make nations and 
organizations function properly.25 
In practice, however, we suspect that political disincentives and repu-
tational costs will be strong enough to prevent profligate use of expulsion, 
just as they often dissuade nations from withdrawing from treaties even 
where they have an unequivocal right to do so.26 In fact, IOs that do have 
a treaty-based power to expel a breaching member have rarely chosen to 
22 Cf. Helfer, Exiting, supra note 17, at 1583-84 (noting that sometimes “states pursue 
exit (and threats of exit) not to dissociate themselves from future cooperation with 
other nations, but … as a strategy to increase their voice within an intergovernmental 
organization or treaty-based negotiating forum”); Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, 
and Renegotiation in International Law, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 379, 382 (2010) (“A credible 
threat to exit an international agreement confers power on a state by allowing the state 
to demand a greater share of the gains from cooperation in exchange for participat-
ing.”).
23 Carlos Vázquez, Withdrawing from International Custom: Terrible Food, Small Por-
tions, 120 Yale L.J. Online 269, 270 (2011) (arguing, in the context of customary in-
ternational law, that “[e]ach state’s compliance is thus an investment . . . . the option of 
unilateral withdrawal would reduce the expected long-term payoff, which . . . would 
make states less likely to make the investment”).
24 Cf. Meyer, supra note 21 (noting that in reaching international agreements, “ascend-
ant” states will typically negotiate either for a higher share of benefits or easier exit). 
25 Jerzy Makarczyk, Legal Basis for Suspension and Expulsion of a State from an Interna-
tional Organization, 25 German Yearbook Int’l L. 476,  477 (1982)  (“[E]xpulsion of a 
member may cause damage to the organization as well, and even to the whole concept 
of organized international cooperation ….”).
26 Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 Harv. Int’l L.J. 231 (2009); Meyer, 
supra note 21, at 394 (“Retaliation and reputational sanctions, though, remain availa-
ble to curb unauthorized exit. In particular, unauthorized exit is a violation of a legal 
obligation that can result in a reduction of a state’s reputation for complying with legal 
rules.”).
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exercise it.27 In the vast majority of cases, the organization will prefer a 
negotiated solution or a lesser penalty over expulsion. 
Consider the IMF, which needs to induce a high level of coopera-
tion among members in order to function effectively, and explicitly 
has the power to expel members. Despite having to occasionally strong 
arm member nations into behaving appropriately, it has only once ever 
expelled a member—Czechoslavakia in 1954.28  Yet the fact that expul-
sion has been used so rarely does not mean that it lacks value; the IMF’s 
General Counsel explained in a recent speech that the power to threaten 
expulsion has been invaluable in inducing good behavior and avoiding 
the need to expel members more often.29  
From the organization’s perspective, the reasons for not over-using 
the power of expulsion are easy enough to perceive. Just as the expelled 
party would bear a reputational cost, so too would the organization,30 
thereby diminishing future opportunities for collaboration.31 We saw 
this with Greece and the EMU in 2015 where many member countries, 
including some that wanted Greece to adopt the path of austerity, were 
worried that the use of threats of expulsion would impair the future of the 
Euro.32 Another disincentive is the possibility that expulsion would free 
the expelled party from its preexisting legal obligations—an argument 
that Sohn has advanced against expelling breaching members from IOs.33
27 See Blagoev, supra note 18, at 192; Brummer, supra note 14.
28 Argentina provides a recent example of this, where its systematic misreporting of data 
brought forth a censure from the Board of the Fund, which in turn gave the country a 
certain period of time within which to remedy the problem or face further action, the 
end point of which would be expulsion.  Argentina subsequently came into line.  See 
Motion of Censure: The Fund Blows the Whistle, The Economist, Feb 9, 2013. 
29 See Speech by IMF General Counsel, Sean Hagan, at UNC Chapel Hill Law School, Feb 
2016, at https://vimeo.com/155031668.
30 Helfer, Exiting, supra note 17, at 1622 (“Three variables . . . stand out in assessing exits’ 
distinctive reputational effects: (1) the frequency of denunciation and withdrawal; (2) 
the relationship between entering and exiting treaties; and (3) the risks of opportunism 
in light of the pervasive uncertainty of international affairs.”).
31 Other disincentives to the overuse of expulsion include the desire to attract new treaty 
ratifications or IO members or to engage in collaborate with other IOs.
32 See, e.g., Stacy Meichtry & Anton Troianovski, Greek Crisis Puts French-German Ties 
to the Test, Wall St. J.,  July 14, 2015;  Melissa Eddy, Germany’s Tone Grows Sharper in 
Greek Crisis, N.Y. Times, July 16, 2015.
33 Louis B. Sohn, Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization, 
77 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1388 (1964) (in the context of USSR invasion of Finland, “Co-
lombia made what was to become a stock argument against expulsion—that to expel 
the U.S.S.R. would release it from the obligations imposed by the Covenant and thus 
make it easer for the Soviet Government to achieve its aims”).
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In general, however, we do not expect that occasional use of the 
expulsion power would deter the formation of IOs or the collaboration 
they make possible. In fact, the possibility of expulsion could incen-
tivize the generation of new alliances and combinations by reducing the 
perceived costs of joining them in the first place, while increasing the 
value of agreements by providing a last-resort sanctioning mechanism.34 
If expulsion is not an option, then one bad actor could undermine the 
organization and its objectives, with the result that some highly produc-
tive collaborative relationships would never materialize.35 
There is, however, at least one scenario in which expulsion might be 
off the table, and that is where the IO has specified as much. Explicit 
agreements regarding the availability or processes of expulsion should 
generally be followed. Our argument here is that the possibility to expel 
in exteme circumstances should be considered a default rule, not a 
mandatory one. In any event, many treaties and IOs say nothing about 
expulsion. In those cases, we think that the lack of an explicit expulsion 
provision should not preclude the option, any more than the lack of a 
prenuptial agreement precludes the possibility of divorce. 
As a default rule, therefore, the key question is what rules should 
govern and limit its use. Just as we reject a bright line default rule against 
expulsion, so too we reject a regime in which it is an unrestricted option. 
Fortunately, we are not writing on a blank slate—international law and 
practice provide some relevant guidance.
B. Incomplete Treaties and De Facto Expulsions
It is tempting to think, especially in the context of a weak member of a 
treaty organization that is being threatened with expulsion, that a bright 
line rule against expulsion protects the interests of the weak nation. We 
34 This point is made particularly effectively in Christian Fahrholz & Cezary Wójcik, 
The Eurozone Needs Exit Rules, CESIFO Working Paper No. 3845, 19-20 (June 2012) 
(“Paradoxically, ‘exit rules’ would decrease (and not increase!) the probability of an exit, 
or the breakup of the Eurozone. This is because, as suggested above, spelling out the 
‘exit rules’ would give the EZ what it needs, i.e. enhanced market discipline, stronger 
enforcement power over the Eurozone, more internal discipline in the profligate coun-
tries and reduce market uncertainty.”).
35 This same phenomenon has been observed in the context of treaties, where the ex-
istence of withdrawal rights may encourage agreement. Meyer, supra note 21, at 383 
(“High exit costs therefore narrow the set of substantive rules that make an agreement 
today worth foregoing tomorrow’s bargaining power. In extreme situations, high exit 
costs may preclude an agreement altogether.”); see also Barbara Koremenos & Allison 
Nau, Exit, No Exit, 21 DUke J. of Comp. & Int’l L. 81 (2010).
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do not think this is necessarily true, either in the case of Greece or in 
general, especially in the context of a incomplete treaty organization 
such as the EMU. In such scenarios, the alternative to transparent de jure 
expulsion may well be a de facto expulsion that may be surreptitious and 
comparatively more costly.36
IOs and treaties involving multiple parties and complex functions 
(managing the monetary policy of the Euro area, for example) are nec-
essarily “incomplete,”  because it is impossible, ex ante, to envision and 
specify all of the actions that have to be taken by international bodies and 
their members. Incomplete agreements are not limited to international 
law—they arise, for example, in the context of firms seeking vertical or 
lateral integration. Scholars of incomplete agreements have shown that 
the parties delegate residual decision making authority to one side, to a 
subset of members, or to a third party—in this context, the ECB, which 
is itself controlled by some subset of the treaty members.37  That third 
party, in turn, may have the means to deny the benefits and privileges of 
membership, resulting in an expulsion in all but name. 
The alternative to de jure expulsion of a member is therefore not 
an open-armed embrace by the organization. A dissatisfied IO can do 
many things to deny organizational benefits or make life miserable for 
the unwanted partner.38 Often an organization’s rules permit it to impose 
such pain. At other times, pressure may be contrary to the letter or 
spirit of the IO—actions that could have serious reputational costs for 
the organization, but might also induce the targeted member to with-
draw. Cumulatively, such actions can amount to something like a de facto 
expulsion, one for which the member state may have little or no remedy. 
We have already seen something like this in the case of Greece.  On 
multiple occasions in its sovereign debt crisis, Greece has considered the 
possibility of restructuring its debt long before the ECB and the more 
powerful members of the Euro area were willing to contemplate that pos-
sibility.   Both in the early years of the crisis (2010-11, vis-à-vis Greece’s 
36 See Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 17.
37 Among the classic works on this topic are Sandy Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Cost 
and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. 
Econ. 691 (1986) and Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An “Incomplete Contracts” 
Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 473 (1992).
38 Sohn, supra note 32, at 1419-20 (“[I]t would now seem that a regional organization, 
even in the absence of a provision on exclusion, can expel a member without Security 
Council authorization, at least if the decision is properly camouflaged [as merely a 
membership question].”).
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private sector debt) and in the latter portion (2015, vis-à-vis Greece’s offi-
cial sector debt), Greece was told that an attempt to restructure would 
result in denial of access to the ECB’s support.39  And denial of ECB sup-
port for the banking system would have forced Greece to exit the Euro 
and go back to the drachma.  In effect, Greece was told it must either 
comply with the dictates of the ECB or face de facto expulsion. 
Jean Claude Trichet, the head of the ECB in April 2011, suggested as 
much in his response to the prospect of extending the maturities of some 
of the Greek debt:
The central bank’s president inform[ed] the Greek prime minister in 
no uncertain terms that a decision to extend maturities would lead 
to the ECB pulling the plug on the support mechanism keeping the 
Greek banking system alive. The immediate effect of such a move 
would be to force Greece to leave the euro and print its own money to 
avoid the sudden death of its banks.40
The German finance minister’s plan to induce Grexit in July 2015, at least 
as reported by Der Spiegel, was of the same basic form:
The ministers agreed to formulate such strict conditions for a third 
aid package that the Greek government would never be able to accept 
them. As a means to push Greece out of the euro, Schäuble had 
devised a so-called trust fund, into which all revenues from the sale 
of Greek assets would flow. For Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, 
that would have been impertinent enough. But the conservative min-
isters wanted to go even further and demand that the fund be located 
in Luxembourg, a stipulation Tsipras could not possibly accept.41
In both cases, Greece capitulated to the threats of expulsion. 
39 On the 2010-11 events, Paul Blustein has written:
 Much blame [for the failure to restructure the debt early] belongs with Trichet and his 
ECB colleagues, who threatened to cut off emergency aid to Greek banks if Athens 
tampered in the least with its debt obligations. The ECB’s rigid stance stifled discussion 
of more far-reaching debt restructuring proposals, even though German officials were 
by then eager to make private lenders share some of the burden of the Greek rescue.
 Paul Blustein, The Greek Crisis: Human Errors and Divine Forgiveness, Longtitude, 
Feb 20, 2015. 
 As for 2015, see Ian Traynor & Larry Elliott, Greece Given Days to Agree to Bailout 
Deal or Face Banking Collapse and Grexit, The Guardian, July 7, 2015.
40 See Yannis Palailogos, How Trichet Threatened to Cut Greece Off, Ekathimerini, Nov 
3, 2014.
41 See A Government Divided: Schauble’s Push for Grexit Puts Merkel on the Defensive, 
Spiegel Online, July 17, 2015.
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European institutions have used similar measures to threaten expul-
sions in other contexts. The recent secession movements in Catalonia 
and Scotland provide ready examples.  In both cases, high level European 
officials made statements to the effect that if these regions seceded, they 
would be expelled from the EU.42  And, once expelled, reentry was not 
by any means assured; Spain, in particular, was expected to block Scot-
tish reentry.43 If expulsion from the EU was not permitted, one would 
not have thought that there would have been any value to making these 
threats. As Roland Vaubel has pointed out, however, there is nothing in 
the EU treaties that addresses the context of a regional secession (and in 
effect the question of whether the right to membership of the EU belongs 
to the people in a divisible fashion or to the government in an indivisible 
form).44  
To reiterate our core claim—in the context of a highly incomplete 
treaty, where the right of residual decision making has to be delegated or 
allocated to a third party, formal de jure expulsion is not the only possi-
bility.  The de facto power to expel may well already exist, which means 
that an unwanted member may be largely shut out of participating in the 
organization and enjoying its benefits. The question is not whether expul-
sion is possible, but when it should be permitted and subject to what 
restrictions. In the following section, we begin to identify, in broad terms, 
the existing legal rules. 
II. Background Principles of International Law
A. Expulsion from Treaty Organizations
Expulsion from treaties and IOs, both temporarily and permanently, has 
long been recognized as a remedy that can be imposed against a member 
state that materially breaches its obligations.45 Sometimes expulsion 
is explicitly contemplated in an IO’s constitutive documents; in other 
instances it can be inferred from background principles of international 
law.  
42 See Roland Vaubel, Secession in the European Union, 33 Econ. Affairs 288 (2013); see 
also Government of Catalonia, Report: Paths for Catalonia’s Integration Into the Euro-
pean Union (October 2014).
43 See Severin Carrell & Ashifa Kassam, Scottish Independence: Spain Blocks Alex Sal-
mond’s Hopes For EU Transition, The Guardian, Nov. 27, 2013.
44 Vaubel, supra note 41.. 
45 See generally Magliveras, supra note 11; Nagendra Singh, Termination of Membership 
of International Organizations (1958).
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1. Expulsion Clauses
To a greater degree than national constitutions, treaty-based organiza-
tions—including institutions that aspire to universal membership—such 
as  the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the IMF—have made 
explicit provision for the expulsion of member states.46
Given the awkwardness of making provision for exit at the forma-
tion stage and the difficulty of specifying ahead of time the conditions 
under which expulsion may occur, the fact that expulsion clauses are ever 
included in constitutive documents is somewhat striking.47 The aversion 
to acknowledging exit and expulsion is evident in the views of Woodrow 
Wilson, architect of the League of Nations:
[T]here can be no special, selfish economic combinations within 
the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott or 
exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from 
the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations as a 
means of discipline and control.48
And yet the Covenant adopted by the League of the Nations in 1919 
did ultimately contain an explicit provision, Article 16(4), which pro-
vided that a member could be “declared to be no longer a Member of 
the League” if it were to violate the League’s covenants.49 Wilson himself 
described Article 16(4) as permitting “expulsion from the League in cer-
tain extraordinary circumstances.”50
In keeping with Wilson’s discomfort with the prospect of expulsion, 
46 Makarczyk, supra note 24, at 477 (“In a number of organizations the right to suspend or 
expel a member has been more or less precisely defined in the statutory provisions.”).
47 Magliveras, supra note 11, ,at 65 (“The history of the international community after 
World War II has shown that states are usually disinclined to introduce expulsion 
clauses in constitutive instruments. However, at the same time, they have acknowl-
edged the importance of expulsion as a means of ‘punishing’ those Members pursu-
ing[] what is being perceived as[] unacceptable policies, even though the latter might 
not necessarily conflict with the constitutions.”)..
48 Quoted in Magliveras, Magliveras, supra note 11, at 7. 
49 Hans Kelsen, Sanctions in International Law under the Charter of the United Nations, 
31 Iowa L.R. 499, 508 (1946).
50 Sohn, supra note 32, at 1381. 
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Article 16(4) seems to have been treated as a live provision,51 but one to 
be used sparingly.52 In 1927, the Council issued a report confirming that 
the League could invoke 16(4) to expel a Member state for failing to pay 
its contributions and failing to show a willingness to remedy that failure 
in the immediate future.53 But to our knowledge, 16(4) was applied only 
once, in 1939, when the USSR was expelled for the obviously serious 
offense of invading Finland.54 
The League of Nations would itself be replaced by the United Nations 
following the war, but expulsion remained an explicit part of the organ-
ization’s constitutive document. Article 6 of the U.N. Charter provides:
A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the 
Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the 
Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of 
the Security Council.
This Article was met with hesitation,55 and has never officially been 
used,56 though temporary expulsion was essentially accomplished when 
South Africa’s credentials were rejected as a way of excluding it from the 
51 Id. at 1393 (noting that “the expulsion provision was raised also in connection with the 
obligation to contribute to the expenses of the League of Nations, and the obligation 
‘to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories’ under the control of a 
member of the League.”).
52 Id. at 1386 (“Neither in the Japanese aggression against China, nor in the case of the 
Italian aggression against China, nor in the case of the Italian aggression against Ethio-
pia, was there a formal attempt at expulsion.”)
53 Magliveras, supra note 11,, at 15 (citing Doc.C.128.1927.V, 1927 LNOJ 381). 
54 Id. at 22. Interestingly, the official Decision actually described the situation as if it were 
a withdrawal, saying that the USSR had “placed itself outside the League of Nations.” 
Id. at 25 (quoting 1939 LNOJ 506). See also Leo Gross, Was the Soviet Union Expelled 
from the League of Nations?, 39 Am. J. Int’l L. 35, 42 (1945) (“Having regard to the cir-
cumstances attending the vote of the Council, it seems necessary to conclude that the 
Council’s resolution of December 14, 1939, did not have the legal effect of terminating 
the membership of the USSR in the League of Nations.”).
55 Inter-American Juridical Comm., Recommendation and Reports: Official Documents, 
1942-1944, at 144 (1945) (“Provision should, no doubt, be made for the possibility of a 
state violating its obligations. But in such case the particular state should be disciplined, 
not expelled. Expulsion would only tend to create factions in the international commu-
nity.”).
56 This does not mean that nations have never invoked it. Magliveras, supra note 11, at 
46 n.101 (noting that “it was Syria that on 22 December 1955 introduced a draft SC 
Resolution which, inter alia, called upon all Members to decide to expel Israel, UN-
Doc.S/3519, 1955 YBUN 35; no vote was taken on it.”).
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General Assembly during the apartheid era.57 (The rejection of creden-
tials is one procedural way to achieve the a de facto exclusion without 
actually going through with a formal expulsion.58)
The League of Nations and United Nations are the most signifi-
cant examples of organizations with explicit expulsion clauses, because 
of their prominence and the fact that they were largely designed to be 
inclusive, universal, and dependent on a high degree of consensus for 
decisionmaking. But the constitutive instruments of various regional and 
subject-specific organizations contain expulsion clauses,59 which have 
occasionally been exercised.60 Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of 
Europe, for example, says that “[a]ny member which has seriously vio-
lated” the “principles of the rule of law and the enjoyment by all persons 
within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms” may 
be declared to not be a Member as from such date as the Committee of 
Ministers may determine.61 Interestingly, given the identity of the players 
in the current crisis, the closest that the Council ever came to suspending 
or expelling a member was Greece, whose 1967-74 military regime was 
alleged to have committed serious human rights abuses.62
As noted above, one organization for which the ability to expel a mis-
behaving member has been seen as important is the IMF, whose Articles 
of Amendment explicitly provide for compelling a member to withdraw.63 
The IMF was put in place after World War II, in large part to protect 
against the “beggar thy neighbor” policies with respect to exchange rates 
and trade policy that many countries had followed in the prior era.64  To 
perform that policing task—ensuring that the global exchange rate system 
worked in a fair and efficient manner—it was crucial that the IMF’s teams 
57 See generally Alden Abbott et al., The General Assembly, 29th Session: The Decreden-
tialization of South Africa, 16 Harv. Int’l. L.J. 576 (1975); see also Magliveras, supra 
note 11, at 45-46 (noting that “the political balances in the Council prevented a recom-
mendation for South Africa’s expulsion”). 
58 Sohn, supra note 32, at 1422.
59 Magliveras, supra note 11, at 88-93 (describing suspension and expulsion from Com-
mon Market for Eastern and Southern Africa); Pact of the League of Arab States, March 
22, 1945, art. 18, para. 2, 70 U.N.T.S. 259 (1950); Convention for European Economic 
Cooperation, April 16, 1948, art. 26, Cmd. No. 7796 (B.T.S. No. 59), at 18.
60 Makarczyk, supra note 24, at 485 (noting expulsion Czechoslovakia from the IMF).
61 Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, art. 3 & 7, 87 U.N.T.S. 106, 108 (1951).
62 Magliveras, supra note 11, at 80-83.
63 Brummer, supra note 14, at 159 (categorizing the Fund as a “hard law” institution).
64 E.g. Morris Goldstein, The IMF as Global Umpire for Exchange Rate Policies, in C. 
Fred Bergsten and the World Economy 314 (date) 
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be able to obtain accurate information about individual nations to pre-
vent cheating.65 The IMF’s primary tool to ensure cooperation was the 
threat of denying misbehaving members the benefits of membership.66 
2. Default Rules: The Analogy to Withdrawal
Not all treaties or IOs explicitly provide for expulsion.67 Some 
commentators read these silences as precluding expulsion, based on 
what they see as the “well-established principle of international law that 
where a constituent instrument is silent in respect of [expulsion], there 
is no inherent right vested in the organization [to expel].”68 We think, 
to the contrary, that background rules of treaty interpretation provide 
support for a default rule that a member state can be expelled from an IO 
or treaty, at least in case of a material breach.69
To illustrate, we begin with an extreme but real historical example. If 
Article 16(4) had never been written, would the League of Nations have 
been legally required to keep the USSR as a member in 1939, despite 
having concluded that it had breached the Covenant by invading another 
member state? It seems implausible to argue that it would.  Magliveras, 
in his treatise on the law of suspension and expulsion from interna-
tional organizations, concludes that the Covenant’s express expulsion 
clause “was not creating any new special regime but was declaratory of 
the majority view which, if applied by analogy, meant that breach of any 
Covenant provision entitled the other signatory parties to terminate it 
vis-à-vis the delinquent party, i.e. exclude it from the continuous opera-
tion of the Covenant.”70
The ability to effectively expel a state that has materially breached an 
65 See Hagan speech, supra note 28. 
66  See id. Expulsion from the IMF occurs only after a couple of initial steps. First, the 
member’s voting rights are suspended and then the ability to use the fund’s resources is 
removed.  See id.  Over the years, these penalties have been applied to Sudan, Somalia 
and Zimbabwe.  Only one member has been expelled, Czechoslavakia in 1954, for fail-
ing to adequately give the Fund information.
67 See, e.g., Brummer, supra note 14, at 159; Sohn, supra note 32, at 1417-19.
68 Singh, supra note 44, at 79. Singh was writing nearly 60 years ago, before even the 
Vienna Convention.  Athanassiou, senior counsel at the ECB, has taken essentially the 
same position.  See Athanassiou, supra note 4, at 31-36.
69 Makarczyk, supra note 24, at 487 (“The problem to be studied now can be formulated 
as follows: can the right to suspend or expel a member, in case the statute is silent, be 
implied in emergency situations? I do not think it possible to give a general answer to 
this question.”).
70 Magliveras, supra note 11, at 17.
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international law obligation was codified the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.71 Under Article 60 of the VCLT, a “material breach” of 
a multilateral treaty by one party—defined as “(a) a repudiation of the 
treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or (b) the violation of a 
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the 
treaty”72—entitles “the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend 
the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either: 
(i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State, or (ii) as 
between all the parties.”73 
Unsurprisingly, it is difficult to say in the abstract what constitutes 
a “material” breach.74 An example is when the Soviets unlawfully shot 
down a Korean airliner in 1983. That was deemed to be a material breach 
of a number of air services treaties specifying that treaty parties would 
ensure the safety of the aircrafts of the other treaty members.75 But one 
can also imagine less extreme examples.  Some have argued that Greece 
requiring a bailout from the EMU in violation of the “no bailout” clause 
of Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty is a material breach, since that clause 
is deemed by many to be a core term.76
71 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Magliv-
eras notes that if an international organization’s “constitutive instrument contains sus-
pension or expulsion clauses, the organization has been delegated the power to proceed 
accordingly; if not, Article 60 of the Vienna Convention could be applied.” Magliveras, 
supra note 11, at 232-233; see also id. at 3 (“Since it is the minority of constitutive 
instruments which contain express suspension and/or expulsion clauses, this lacuna is 
addressed by arguing that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the rules 
on permitted countermeasures could be invoked and applied by analogy in appropriate 
cases.”); Chi Carmody, On Expelling Nigeria from the Commonwealth, 34 Canadian 
Y.B. Int’l L. 273, 284 (1996) (“The Vienna Convention has never been invoked to re-
solve a disputed expulsion, but a number of the convention’s articles apply to such a 
situation.”).
72 Vienna Convention, Article 60(3); see also Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public Interna-
tional Law 622 (7th ed. 2008).
73 Vienna Convention, Article 60(2)(a).
74 See Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law 96 (2d ed. 2007) (pointing to UN-
SCR 1441 (2002)); see also Carmody, supra note 70, at 285 (describing wrongdoing 
sufficient to justify expulsion as “a material breach of a tenet that is central to the asso-
ciation’s aims”).
75 See Ghislaine Richard, KAL 007: The Legal Fallout, Annals of Air & Space L. 146, 150 
(1983); Kevin Chamberlain, Collective Suspencion of Air Services, Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 
616, 630 (1983).
76 For a discussion of the articulation of this view by Germany’s finance minister, Wolf-
gang Schauble, and others, see Karl Whelan, “Alice in Schauble Land: Where Rules 
Mean What Wolfgang Schauble Says They Mean,” July 17, 2015, at https://medium.
com/bull-market/alice-in-sch%C3%A4uble-land-where-rules-mean-what-wolfgang-
says-they-mean-f0f327fa8a6d#.yuqfjru8p
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A material breach of IO constitutive instrument, Magliveras explains, 
“would lead either to the suspension of the malefactor state’s membership 
rights or to its expulsion, or to the suspension of operations of the organ-
isation in question or even to its dissolution.”77 In other words, expulsion 
of the recalcitrant member can be effectuated by the (admittedly cum-
bersome) process of a mass withdrawal followed immediately by recon-
stituting the organization without the breaching state.78 
The VCLT and state practice also recognize exit rights without a prior 
material breach.  For example, Article 56 specifies that states may with-
draw if a right of withdrawal is implicit in the nature of the treaty or 
intended by the parties (although not codified in the text itself).79 And 
Article 62 provides that a fundamental change of circumstances may 
trigger a withdrawal, even without a material breach by either party.80
When states negotiate treaties, they often include explicit exit provi-
sions. As one of us has previously written, “[m]ost multilateral treaties 
contain broad and permissive withdrawal clauses that do not condition 
exit upon the consent of other state parties or review by international 
tribunals.”81 Because exit and expulsion are closely related, these clauses 
arguably provide further evidence that treaty law and practice support 
a norm of expulsion in cases of serious misbehavior—even if a treaty 
does not expressly provide for expulsion. The fact that exit provisions 
77  Id. at 235.
78 Many of the discussions of how the Euro area should move to a “two-speed” system 
where northern European nations and southern ones would be operating under dif-
ferent rules are effectively this—expulsion by withdrawal and reconstitution. E.g., IESE 
Staff Discussion, Is a 2-Speed Euro the Solution for the Eurozone, 9/3/2015, http://
blog.iese.edu/economics/2015/03/09/quick-question-is-a-2-speed-euro-the-solution-
for-the-eurozone/ (quoting Professor Alfredo Pastor: “One imagines that a two-speed 
euro is a polite name for a eurozone without Greece. That is economically possible, and 
may even be good for Greece and the others. But how could one erase the feeling of 
failure in Greece and the bad feeling that will result from it?”).
79 For a discussion of these provisions, see Phedon Nicolaides, Withdrawal From the Eu-
ropean Union: A Typology of Effects, 20 MJ 2 (2013).
80 VCLT art. 62, para 1; For a discussion of these provisions, see Phedon Nicolaides, 
Withdrawal From the European Union: A Typology of Effects, 20 MJ 2 (2013).
81 Helfer, Exiting, supra note 17, at 67. See also Aust, supra note 73, at 279 (“Most multi-
lateral treaties of unlimited duration will allow a party an unconditional right to with-
draw.”).
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are rarely invoked82 suggests that expulsion will similarly arise only in 
extreme circumstances.83
A critic might argue that the commonality of withdrawal positions 
suggests exactly the opposite: That expulsion provisions were considered 
and rejected and that means that expulsion is not permitted under any 
circumstances.   The point is a fair one, and we have three preliminary 
responses.
First, while we concede that silence in a treaty’s text likely means that 
the parties were not able to agree on the rules under which expulsion 
would be permitted, this also implies that they did not agree on a flat 
ban on expulsion.  Failure to agree ahead of time on the specific condi-
tions under which expulsion could occur might simply mean that this 
was a matter on which agreement could not be reached and on which the 
failure to agree was not a deal breaker.84  Put differently, it may have been 
one of the matters on which the agreement was in effect to allow parties 
to work their differences out without predetermined rules and, if things 
could not be worked out, to refer any disputes to a third party such as a 
court.
Again, the analogy to incomplete contracts or collaborative contracts 
is helpful.  As Gilson, Sabel and Scott (“GSS”) have shown, it is difficult in 
collaborative ventures to specify all contingencies in a contract ahead of 
time.85  What this means is that the parties have in effect agreed to work 
82 Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 Yale 
L.J. 202, 246 (2010) (“Commentators have evinced few concerns … about excessive 
withdrawals from multilateral treaties.”); Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 93. Neb. L. Rev. 313, 342 (2014) (“At least 180 states 
have executed BITs, and of those states, a small number appear to have embarked on 
the long and open road towards full, formal club resignation.”)..
83 Helfer, Exiting, supra note 17, at 1601 (“[F]ew treaties—at least outside the trade con-
text—can credibly threaten to impose monetary penalties or other sanctions.”); Egon 
Schwelb, Withdrawal from the United Nations: The Indonesian Intermezzo, 61 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 661, 672 (1967) (“[T]he United Nations has no legal remedy to enforce its claims 
for continued membership of the state purporting to withdraw.”); Rosendorff & Milner, 
at 834-35 (arguing that a nation exercising the escape clause of GATT is constrained 
by the fact that the escaping state compensate adversely affected members or else face 
retaliation).
84 For a discussion of the situations where parties have effectively “agreed to disagree”, see 
Omri Ben-Shahar, Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2 Wisc. L. Rev. 
389 (2005). Ben-Shahar’s solution (a pro defendant default), while attractive, probably 
would not work in circumstances where the agreements in question give residual con-
trol rights to one side or the other (thereby making de jure and de facto expulsion much 
the same).
85 E.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Charles Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of 
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice and Doctrine, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 
1377 (2010). 
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out their differences without the need of formal rules—in the manner 
in which collaborators in cooperative venture would be expected to. But 
this does not rule out the possibility that some types of behavior could be 
determined at a later date to justify expulsion.86 
Second, if the goal is to give parties the rules that they would have 
agreed to had they been able to foresee the circumstances at hand, it is 
worth considering the fact that we have not come across a single treaty 
that contains an explicit and categorical prohibition on expulsion.  By 
contrast, empirical work that one of us has done on exiting treaties shows 
that there are many that explicitly allow for withdrawal under certain sets 
of conditions.  Those two facts suggest that the default rule, in the case 
of silence, should not be a ban on all expulsions. No one, in the circum-
stances where they are able to come to agreement, ever seems to choose 
that rule. 
Third, there are good reasons not to ban expulsion in perpetuity. Even 
if negotiators are willing to enter into agreements that preclude explu-
sion or exit forever, no matter what the changes in circumstances or what 
kinds of misbehavior the other parties engage in, such agreements should 
be treated with somewhat more suspicion when they purport to bind 
future actors who face problems unforeseeable at the time of the agree-
ment’s creation.87 Along those lines, note that older treaties are subject to 
withdrawal at higher rates.88
What, then, explains the lack of expulsion provisions? Perhaps the 
issue is simply that treaty partners to not wish to make provision in their 
constitutive documents for the same reason that couples do not like to 
discuss divorce on their wedding day. In either scenario, the failure to 
specify an exit option does not preclude exit. 
III. Toward a Three Part Framework 
Having argued that expulsion is sometimes desirable, and then that it is 
not always illegal, we now sketch—in general terms—a framework with 
which to evaluate it. Our thoughts are tentative. Every IO is unique in its 
legal arrangements, history, and political incentives. Nevertheless, it is 
86 Id. at 1416-17 (discussing the Eli Lilly case).
87 We argue elsewhere that such agreements should be defeasible even within the nation-
al context. See Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Expulsion, __ L. & Contemp. Prob. __ 
(2016, forthcoming).
88 Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 17.
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possible to imagine three broad categories of cases that apply where an 
IO-creating treaty is silent on explusion.
First, take the well-behaving member state. The default rule for trea-
ties that have no explicit provisions on explusion should be that such a 
state may not be expelled. We derive this from the premise that nations 
enter into collaborative relationships with the assumption that problems 
will almost always be worked out cooperatively.  Expulsion is a last resort 
solution when it is clear that one or more of the parties are consistently 
undermining the cooperative venture. This perspective is also consistent 
with existing international law. As explained above,89 members typi-
cally cannot be expelled from IOs unless they have engaged in material 
breaches of basic commitments or there has been a fundamental change 
in the core understandings underlying the organization.90 Well-behaved 
members, even if they are otherwise undesirable, cannot be kicked out 
absent a radical change in the foundational understandings underlying 
the organization. 
This does not, however, mean that treaty and IO memberships are 
frozen in place, only that the IO and the member state would have to 
agree on any changes. If an organization wanted to expel a well-behaved 
but undesirable member, it would have to do so by negotiating with the 
member. The member could hold out—its right to remain in the nation 
would be protected by a “property right” in the Calabresi/Melamed 
sense91—but a deal might be reached in some cases, particularly since 
the other states likely have the power to make membership undesirable. 
As discussed at the outset, some elite German intellectuals have wanted 
the EMU to extend similar treatment to Greece.92 Such agreements would 
have to be monitored for fraud, threats of force and the like, the existence 
of which—in keeping with existing treaty law—would void the agree-
ment. But in general, if a member state is not at fault for the deteriorating 
relationship, then it cannot be expelled against its will. 
Second, on the opposite end of the spectrum, members that are mis-
behaving in the extreme—for example by declaring war on other mem-
89 See supra Section II.C.
90 Sohn, supra note 32, at 1400 (quoting 7 U.N. Conf. Int’l Org. Docs. 330-31 (1945)). 
91 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inal-
ienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
92 The obvious references here are to the “time out” and “gift” proposals of Wolfgang 
Schauble and Hans Werner Sinn in 2015 vis-à-vis Greece.  See note 97, infra & 75, 
supra.
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bers or actively working to undermine an IO—can be expelled at the 
option of remaining members. Such an extreme remedy is, we argue, 
implicit in all interstate cooperative ventures that involve establishing an 
organization to achieve shared objectives.93
Most of the time, in an association of nations with repeated dealings, 
nations will have sufficient built in incentives to cooperate.  However, 
there will be rare cases where a particular member is undermining the 
organization’s raison d’etre. It is in this narrow set of circumstances—
where the minority member is essentially “oppressing” the organization 
as a whole—that the threat of expulsion—and, if need be, the removal of 
the offending state by the remaining members—can play an important 
role.  It may be necessary, however, to provide the minority member with 
notice and an opportunity to cure its misconduct and access to a third-
party decisionmaker to ensure that the process is not abusive or prextual. 
Exactly what circumstances justify remedial expulsion will inevi-
tably be dependent on context, subject to dispute, and near impossible 
to specify ex ante.  But  this is not an unfamiliar scenario in complex or 
relational contracting contexts where a full set of future contingencies 
cannot be specified ahead of time and vague concepts such as “good faith” 
and “reasonable efforts” are used ex post as gap fillers. 
Harder questions arise in scenarios where the members arguably bar-
gained for a perpetual union. As noted at the outset, some have argued 
that Greece cannot be expelled from the EU no matter what it does—
even if it were to invade a fellow member.94 But even if it were clear that 
expulsion were expressly forbidden by the terms of a constitutive treaty—
and, to reiterate, we are aware of no such example— remedial expulsion 
might still be justifiable in extreme circumstances. 
In the end, such arguments are probably unnecessary—in a situation 
that demanded it, a nation would simply engage in remedial expulsion, 
regardless of what the legal authorities say on the matter.95 For example, 
93 As the U.S. argued in defending the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS—an IO without 
an express exclusion clause—“no regional body can be forced to accept or maintain the 
presence of a government which the members of that regional body determine to be 
violating the very terms of the charter of that body.” 46 Dep’t St. Bull. 657, 689 (1962).
94 Lowrey, supra note 8 (rejecting possibility of EU expulsion “even if Greece invaded 
France”).
95 Joseph H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 2403, 2412 (1991) (“It 
takes no particular insight to suggest that should a Member State consider withdrawing 
from the [European Coal and Steel] Community, the legal argument will not be the 
critical or determining consideration.”).
PART I I  -  Incomplete Contracts? Filling the Governance Gap in the European Union
149
we suspect that Greece would be expelled if its domestic Central Bank 
were to start printing excessive amounts of Euros, in contravention of 
the clear constraints imposed by the ECB.  At this point, expulsion would 
be regarded as a valid exercise of political—if not legal—power. We have 
tried to show that it would be both, and that the power to expel (like the 
power to withdraw) should be thought of as a remedy and not necessarily 
as something the parties must bargain for ex ante.  In the language of 
relational or incomplete contracts, because the standard for expulsion 
is necessarily going to be a function of circumstances—whether or not 
an action constitutes misbehavior worthy of expulsion or an excusable 
action because of unforeseeable events—it may not be easy to specify in 
advance. 
Third and finally, there is a middle category—one in which members 
are not actively undermining the organization, but are nonetheless falling 
significantly short of their obligations. In those scenarios, we suggest 
(even more tentatively) that the member can be expelled against its will, 
but that it is owed compensation as a result. 
These scenarios could in principle be included in our broad default 
rule against involuntary expulsion of well-behaved members. But it is still 
worth considering the possibility of expulsion in situations short of the 
horrific malefactor regions above. After all, forbidding expulsion does 
not mean that the situation will necessarily be resolved peacefully within 
the existing union. Eliminating the exit or expulsion options should 
increase voice, but that does not mean that it will. 
Once again, the Greek debt crisis provides a useful illustration. As 
noted, some have argued that a Greek default on its ECB debt or that debt 
owed to the other Eurozone nations would constitute a bailout, violating 
the sacrosanct “no bailout” clause of the Lisbon treaty, and that expulsion 
should be on the table as a remedy.96 Others have argued that Greece 
can be expelled because the numbers it used to gain admittance into the 
Eurozone in the first place were fraudulent.97 Implicit in both sets of argu-
ments is a notion of fault, which, if sufficiently extreme, could push it into 
our category of remedial expulsion.
But not all of those urging Grexit have invoked fault-based arguments. 
A few commentators have suggested the equivalent of a forced buy out. 
96 See supra note 2 and sources cited therein.
97 See, e.g., Steve Peers, The Law of Grexit: What Does EU Law Say About Leaving Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union, 28 June 2015, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/06/
the-law-of-grexit-what-does-eu-law-say.html.
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The suggestion is that Germany and the other Euro area nations either 
“forgive” the Greek debt or treat it like a gift conditioned on Greece’s “vol-
untary” exit from the monetary union.98 Would this kind of compensa-
tion be permissible? Could it be given as an incentive for a “voluntary” 
Greek exit? If so, what kind of approval would Greece have to give? Could 
the sitting government make the decision on its own or would there need 
to be a referendum? What about approval from the populations of the 
other Euro area national governments, their legislatures and so on?  And 
what if there were certain regions in Greece that did not wish to take the 
buyout and were willing to pay back their share of the Greek sovereign 
debt owed to the other Euro member states?  
These are uncomfortable questions, and we do not have ready 
answers. But refusing to acknowledge them does not avoid the under-
lying problem. Our goal in this paper is far more modest—to describe 
a general proposition without fleshing out all of the details.  But we are 
mindful of the latter’s importance or difficulty. Rules would have to be 
developed regarding how serious or persistent an offense must be in 
order to trigger the right of remedial expulsion. In exercising it, nations 
and organizations should presumably be subject to a requirement of 
good faith vis-à-vis each other,99 which would also need to be elaborated. 
It may be that a forum or a review process would have to be established to 
deter pretextual or abusive expulsions.100 These are the kinds of challenges 
scholars and practitioners can and must confront, rather than dismissing 
expulsion as an option altogether.
98 Hans-Werner Sinn, Why Greece Should Leave the Eurozone, N.Y. Times, July 24, 2015, 
Hans-Werner Sinn, Why Grexit Could be Good For Greece, CNN Money, July 7, 2015. 
99 Vienna Convention, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.”); GabcČíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 142 (Sept. 25) (noting that this provision “obliges the Parties 
to apply [the treaty] in a reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be 
realized”).
100 Magliveras, supra note 11, at 2 (suggesting ICJ in the context of the UN, noting that 
“the majority of organizations lack juridicial mechanisms for settling such disputes in 
an authoritative, final, and binding manner”); id. at 39 (“The question which should be 
the proper organ to decide (a) whether a Member had breached the Principles and (b) 
whether the breach was perpetrated in a persistent fashion has not been addressed in 
the Charter. Indeed, with only a limited number of exceptions, constitutions of inter-
national organizations do not deal with this issue.”).
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GOVERNANCE GAPS &  
ASYMMETRIC CONVERGENCE 
Piers Haben1
“No human face is exactly the same in its lines on each side, no 
branch in its symmetry. All admit irregularity as they imply change; 
and to banish imperfection is to destroy expression…All things are 
literally better, lovelier, and more beloved for the imperfections …..” 
John Ruskin
Introduction
The title of this conference is governance gaps and the session in which 
I have been asked to intervene is titled governance gaps in the banking 
union.  I intend to approach this issue from the EBA’s perspective, which 
is firmly entrenched down in the roots of the micro prudential world. 
Other panelists are better placed to draw attention to some of the high 
level current gaps in governance in the Banking Union as the project 
unfolds.  In fact it is miraculous that the BU project has moved forward 
so fast and unsurprising that there are steps still outstanding, such as 
completing the Deposit Guarantee Scheme. But these are acknowledged 
and consideration on how to address them is underway. And so from the 
micro prudential perspective, rather than identifying the big picture gaps 
per-se, I intend to reflect on some of the asymmetries in governance that 
affect our day to day work, These asymmetries are a choice and by design, 
1 Director of Oversight at European Banking Authority. This text is the edited transcrip-
tion of my speech at the conference conference “Filling The Gaps In Governance: The 
Case Of Europe “ organised by the European University Institute in Florence on 28 
April 2016. The views expressed in the text are the private views of the author and may 
not, under any circumstances, be interpreted as stating an official position of the Euro-
pean Banking Authority.
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but such asymmetries may anyway look rather like gaps depending on 
your perspective. 
I will nonetheless, start by offering some constrained remarks on the 
big picture governance asymmetries. In particular, identifying two ways 
in which some existing asymmetries between governance of the micro 
prudential level and the fiscal level have impacted the life of the EBA 
to date: the stress test, particularly in 2011; and dealing with Non Per-
forming Loans in the current juncture.   
Then I will look at two more micro focused areas where there are, by 
design, governance asymmetries which have been left in place in order to 
respect the democratic wishes of the Co-legislators when establishing the 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs).   
i) The first area relates to supervisory convergence- by which I mean 
comparability of supervisory approach and consistency of supervi-
sory outcomes, across the single market. This has become more, not 
less, pressing in the face of de facto convergence in the Eurozone with 
questions over comparability of approaches and consistency in out-
comes across the rest of the single market,  
ii) The second area is the asymmetry between a single micro pruden-
tial rule book for the single market, and macro prudential decision 
making at a national level.  
The text below attempts to demonstrate how these are relevant for effec-
tive functioning of the single market and in particular from the stand 
point of avoiding the prevention of cross-border activity, distorting com-
petitioncompetition and impeding free movement of capital2.
Constrained remarks on high level governance asymmetries
Two incidents in the EBA’s early life shine a light on high level governance 
issues.  In particular, whilst rules are set at the EU level, fiscal responsi-
bility remains clearly at the national level3 and the absence of clear coor-
2  http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital/index_en.htm
3  See, for instance, A. Enria (2013), “Often EU authorities are criticised for not having 
acted swiftly and decisively enough in addressing the weaknesses of the banking sector. 
I acknowledge that the absence of a common fiscal capacity and the complexity of 
our decision making mechanisms have made the management of the crisis particularly 
challenging, causing delays and uncertainties in the policies for the banking sector. 
Nonetheless, we made significant progress.
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dination and cooperation between fiscal authorities has been criticised 
in some quarters as having arguably influenced the recovery of the EU 
banking sector in a different direction from that which was available in 
e.g. the US4. Of course, issues around fiscal cooperation and coordina-
tion are most directly relevant for the Eurozone. However, they resonate, 
at least in terms of communications, in the process of repair of the EU 
banking system as a whole. 
The first incident relates to the 2011 stress test. In the first months 
of the EBA’s existence, in 2011, the handful of staff we had in place were 
occupied not only with the establishment of the new authority – we spent 
the Christmas break of 2010/2011 getting IT contracts signed whilst 
working on recruitment plans and worrying about office space - but also 
preparing the ground for the highly anticipated EU wide stress test.  In 
our small authority a group of around six people, ably support in the 
latter stages by volunteers from national authorities who camped out in 
our London offices, coordinated this exercise.  The EBA mandate is to ini-
tiate and coordinate an EU wide stress test5. This limited mandate meant 
that responsibility for receiving the results from banks, and challenging 
them, rests with competent supervisory authorities, before sending final 
results to the EBA to publish them as an EU data hub. 
The 2011 EU wide stress test was analytically sound with a sce-
nario provided by the ESRB and a robust methodology that effectively 
prohibited any bank mitigating action as a result of the static balance 
sheet assumption.  The stress showed provisions of around EUR 200bn 
in each of the two years, equivalent to the loss rates of 2009 repeated in 
two consecutive years6.  Many analysts judged the July stress tests too 
mild, mainly because they did not explicitly consider the default of Greek 
sovereign debt. “But this misses the point. The EBA stress tests were a 
great step forward from the point of view of disclosure. For the first time, 
markets could see full information on each bank’s exposures, by country, 
debtor type, and maturity. Moreover, sovereign exposure and funding 
costs of individual institutions were disclosed, both historical and in the 
4 http://www.niesr.ac.Uk/sites/default/files/publications/dp374.pdf, https://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13178.pdf
5 http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing
6 https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/15935/EBA_ST_2011_Summary_Re-
port_v6.pdf/54a9ec8e-3a44-449f-9a5f-e820cc2c2f0a
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adverse scenario”7.
The exercise has nonetheless, been unfavourably compared to the 
US stress tests, in particular the crisis stress test of 2009.  Critics argue 
that a major difference is that in the US there was a single pot of money 
with which to announce a big bang type recapitalisation of the banking 
sector at a time of crisis when uncertainty about the baking sector as a 
whole necessitated some drastic action. Some have argued that without 
such a clear incentive structure, supervisors follow the rules of the exer-
cise without pushing the boundaries to exercise conservative judgement 
needed to identify ever larger holes8. I am not sure this is the case but it 
certainly influenced the communication around the exercise as outsiders 
looked for a big bang type approach to raecpitalisation, which anyway 
occurred both before and after the stress test.  Before the stress test there 
were significant pre-emptive actions by banks to raise capital.  In a coor-
dinated exercise, in which the stress test is run on a bottom up basis 
banks run the test themselves and are then challenged by supervisors. 
The incentive then is for banks to front run the exercise by strengthening 
their capital base in advance of the exercise in order to demonstrate resil-
ience in the results as happened in 20119.  After the stress test, the EBA 
followed up with a recapitalization exercise10 which saw further signifi-
cant capital raised by banks. Nonetheless, our communication challenge 
remained without a single message at one point in time that banks should 
recap or the state(s) would do so. 
The second example relates to supervisory efforts to deal with 
non-performing loans The EBA, alongside many others, has been making 
the case that the high and persistent levels of NPLs across the EU has 
been a key driver of sluggish profitability and restricted new lending into 
the real economy for some years11. 
7 M. Onado and A. Resti (2011), “European Banking Authority and the capital of Euro-
pean banks: Don’t shoot the messenger”, VoXEU.
8 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13178.pdf
9 https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/15935/EBA_ST_2011_Summary_Re-
port_v6.pdf/54a9ec8e-3a44-449f-9a5f-e820cc2c2f0a “ Based on end 2010 information 
only, the EBA exercise shows that 20 banks would fall below the 5% CT1 threshold 
However, the EBA allowed specific capital actions ….to be considered in the results. 
Banks were therefore incentivised to strengthen their capital positions ahead of the 
stress test” 
10 https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-publishes-final-report-on-the-recapitalisation-of-
european-banks-and-paves-the-way-for-the-transition-to-the-crdiv-framework
11 http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1315397/EBA+RISK+ASSESS-
MENT+REPORT.pdf/46d91b9a-f393-4b54-96eb-df06ca01bec5
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Weighted average NPL ratio per country of the bank.
Source: EBA Risk Dashboard (Q4 2015 data).
The EBA has done its bit by providing supervisors with a common defini-
tion for the first time that facilitated measurement not only of actual NPLs 
but also forced banks to measure and assess loans that were forborne12. 
But recognition is one step. Action to resolve NPLs is another, more 
important step. Supervisors are currently pushing banks to strengthen 
provisions, improve arrears management practices, and consider how to 
write off and sell NPLs. However, effective action on NPLs requires also 
effective opportunities to remove NPLs from the balance sheet. Partly 
this can be facilitated by transparency. But evidence globally13 suggests 
additional measures are needed including effective secondary markets 
and at times the creation of Asset Management Companies. At present 
this can only be handled nationally leading to varying approaches across 
the EU, with various trials at legislative frameworks and always cognisant 
of the DG Comp imperatives to avoid state aid. So whilst supervisory 
action is coordinated at the EU level, and taken uniformly within the 
banking union, there are important steps needed to address NPLs that 
remain, by design, at national level.  Investors remain confused and spend 
time in each case trying to figure out the details.  Some common Euro-
pean thinking and communication around coordinated mechanisms for 
legal frameworks and support for AMCs, could make a difference at this 
12 https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/449802/EBA-Rec-2013-04+Recom-
mendations+on+asset+quality+reviews.pdf
13 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1519.pdf
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crucial time to enhance price discovery on NPLs, promote a secondary 
market and set EU banks back on course to recovery and productive 
lending into the real economy.
Micro level governance symmetries
Now to the two more micro focused issues.  These may seem somewhat 
trivial compared to the big picture issues discussed elsewhere in this con-
ference. However, I would like to demonstrate why these are important 
and can have a significant impact on both capital movement and com-
petition.  
To say these asymmetries in governance have been put in place by 
design is to recognise the legitimate process that was used to establish 
both the EBA and the SSM. That is for the single market as a whole super-
vision remains at the level of the competent authority which means, now, 
the SSM for Euro area countries and national level for other countries 
until such time as they join the Euro or voluntarily sign a close coop-
eration agreement with the SSM.  At the same time, in recognition of 
the potential impact that divergence in supervisory approaches and out-
comes,  sticking plaster solutions have been put in place recognising the 
dangers for competition and free movement of capital if there is super-
visory divergence, i.e. incomparable approaches and inconsistent out-
comes. 
Similarly, one of the great lessons of the financial and sovereign crisis 
that has beset the EU since 2008, has been the need for more effective 
macro prudential policy designed to address macro imbalances, in par-
ticular excessive credit growth in an economy. The ESRB was estab-
lished to draw coherence between macro prudential policies but primary 
responsibility for major prudential policy rests with national authorities 
across the EU. The coordinated solution to this democratic decision has 
been the role of the ESRB, and to some extent, the EBA, in being aware of 
national macro prudential decisions and in rare cases to offer an opinion 
on it.  The text below will attempt to draw out the risks that, inadvertently, 
uncoordinated use of macro prudential policies could stifle competition 
and hinder free movement of capital across the single market. 
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Governance of micro prudential supervision across the single 
market.
It is crystal clear, and widely accepted, that we need a single rule book 
in the single market, The single rule book is accepted as necessary and 
governance for the single rule book is in place from the highest level of 
the co-legislatures right down to the rather complex voting mechanisms 
at the EBA’s Board of Supervisors. The latter includes Qualified majority 
voting with special double simple majority safeguards for non SSM 
authorities at the EBA table.
Supervisory implementation of the single rule book, and all its asso-
ciated decisions on additional capital and liquidity a bank must hold, is 
clearly the domain of competent authorities. That is the SSM for Euro-
zone countries in the Banking Union and national supervisors elsewhere. 
The welcome advent of the Banking Union means de facto supervi-
sory convergence within the Banking Union but throws into sharp relief 
the potential for divergence of supervisory approaches and inconsistency 
in supervisory outcomes between the SSM and non-SSM countries and 
the associated risks to the single market in terms of competition and free 
movement of capital.
The current governance arrangements thus raise legitimate questions 
about the degree of proscription, or even oversight, that’s relevant for the 
various supervisory approaches across the EU and consideration what 
these decisions mean for free movement of capital and a level playing 
field from a competitive perspective.  
The impact of supervisory decisions ranges from choices over 
“national discretion items” that provide some interpretations of the 
rule book, to choices over how supervisors apply additional capital and 
liquidity requirements on banks and other supervisory measures such 
as dividend restrictions and limits on coupon payments on some type of 
bonds. 
The answer to how these questions over convergence of supervisory 
decision making are currently addressed is reflected in the rather open 
ended mandate for the EBA in terms of supervisory convergence which 
requires us to actively foster supervisory convergence across the Union 
with the aim of establishing a common supervisory culture. This man-
date does not, however, specify what outcomes it seeks to achieve or 
what enforcement powers the EBA has if there is a material divergence in 
supervisory activity.  
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What mechanisms does the EBA have?
The desired outcomes are more clear for specific decisions on cross 
border groups than for the banking sector as a whole. 
Relatively strong governance mechanisms are in place to ensure that 
decision making for cross border banking groups, those that operate 
across the boundaries of the SSM and other competent authorities in the 
EU14. In particular, supervisors of cross border groups have to establish 
colleges of supervisors for cross border EU banks that are legally man-
dated to undertake joint risk assessments based on common methodol-
ogies, set by the EBA, and reach joint decisions on any additional capital 
or liquidity required as well as on recovery plans. The EBA monitors such 
interactions and can offer advice on guidance to improve the process. 
Substantively there are set timelines for reaching joint decisions and if 
there is no agreement on substance then the EBA can work to assist the 
various authorities find agreement and the EBA regulation provides a 
provision for “binding mediation”.  This mechanism is however, reason-
ably restricted. It relates only to specific decisions and only then if one CA 
or more approaches the EBA for assistance. Whilst the EBA has been able 
to assist in mediating disputes informally during its five year history the 
EBA has not activated its formal mediation process.   In any case this pro-
cess governs decisions for individual banking groups but does not speak 
to comparability of approach and consistency of outcomes across banks. 
Nor does it speak to general supervisory convergence. In both cases the 
mechanisms for ensuring comparability of approaches and consistency of 
outcomes remains somewhat open ended as below. 
For more general supervisory convergence the EBA has three main 
tools: 
1. Policy products. The EBA has a specific mandate to produce stand-
ards, guidelines and other tools to promote a common supervisory 
culture and supervisory convergence. The EBA has a limited man-
date to produce binding standards for cross border joint decision 
making.  There is more scope for comply or explain guidelines 
and the most prominent of these is the 200 pages of SREP guide-
lines which determine how supervisory reviews are conducted and 
which came into force in 2016. (https://www.eba.europa.eu/doc-
14  http://www.eba.europa.eu/supervisory-convergence/supervisory-colleges
PART III  -  Gaps in Governance: The Banking Union
161
uments/10180/935249/EBA-GL-2014-13+%28Guidelines+on+S-
REP+methodologies+and+processes%29.pdf). The EBA can also 
provide own initiative guidelines if there appears to be a need such as 
for IRRBB (https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1084098/
EBA-GL-2015-08_EN_GL+on+IRRBB.pdf).  And the EBA can add 
material to a non-mandatory supervisory handbook which is not 
public.  
2. Training: The provision of common training for EU supervisors is a 
key component in forging a common supervisory culture and with 
limited resources the EBA endeavours to provide common training 
on key areas such as the SREP guidelines, or assessments of recovery 
plans. 
3. Assessments. The EBA has a number of tools to assess convergence, 
report on them and recommend changes and additional policy 
products. These include formal peer reviews (insert reference) and 
the EBA staffs reports on convergence report and on college func-
tioning. 
The text below aims to demonstrate how supervisory decisions can 
impact on capital resources in particular with a material impact the level 
playing field for banks operating in the single market and for efficiency of 
capital and liquidity allocation. 
Pillar 2 decisions
A look at supervisory decisions on capital and the subsequent restrictions 
on dividends in 2016 illustrate the potential cost of long term divergence 
in supervisory approaches and inconsistency in outcomes. Of course, the 
welcome creation of the SSM means, de facto, supervisory convergence 
for banks under the SSM’s direct supervision15.  However, convergence in 
a large part of the single market accentuates the potential for supervisory 
divergence between the SSM and non SSM CAs unless conscious atten-
tion is paid to effective coordination.  
During 2015 a number of questions were raised about how some key 
components of the Pillar 2 decisions were being arrived at and articu-
lated.  Market participants raised these issues and the EBA itself identi-
fied some areas that needed to be clearly communicated from a supervi-
15 Even within the SSM some national discretions remain, although these are being 
phased out.  And macro prudential decisions including on the combined buffer remain 
at national level as explained below.  
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sory convergence perspective16. 
In the first instance there was uncertainty about the stacking order 
of Pillar 1 capital, Pillar 2 capital requirements and the combined capital 
buffer and the associated trigger for restrictions on dividends17.  To help 
explain this simply please see the diagram below.
Source: EBA Opinion November 2015. https://www.eba.europa.eu/
documents/10180/983359/EBA-Op-2015-24+Opinion+on+MDA.pdf
This diagram illustrates the Pillar 1 minimum which is set according 
to the single rule book, and in which any differences across the EU are 
driven primarily by residual national discretion items18. The additional 
Pillar 2 requirement is set by supervisors on an idiosyncratic basis but 
based on common guidelines from the EBA. The combined buffer con-
tains some mandatory elements and some elements that are decided by 
a mixture of national authorities and competent authorities.  Questions 
were raised in 2016 about the appropriate stacking order and whether 
Pillar 2 requirements were binding as different practices were observed in 
different jurisdictions. Furthermore questions were asked about whether 
16 https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/950548/Supervisory+convergence+re-
port.pdf/9f49ddf9-232f-4062-b34e-ff671d440081
17 https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/983359/EBA-Op-2015-24+Opin-
ion+on+MDA.pdf
18 Some argue that differences in the way that supervisors authoritise banks’ risk models 
to determine risk weights. This is an issue the EBA is addressing. https://www.eba.eu-
ropa.eu/documents/10180/1359456/EBA-Op-2016-01+Opinion+on+IRB+implemen-
tation.pdf
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Pillar 2 should contain elements of the combined buffer, if not set by 
macro prudential authorities, and whether in all cases the outcomes of 
stress tests should be included in the Pillar 2 minimum. Such questions 
create uncertainty for investors in banks and for banks in their capital 
planning.  Moreover, in some cases differing supervisory practices can 
have a material impact on the level at which restrictions on distributions 
were triggered and calculated. This difference amounted to hundreds of 
basis in capital for some banks and has an associated impact on the level 
playing field for banks as issuers and for movement of capital for inves-
tors. 
As noted above, the EBA does have tools to respond to potential dif-
ferences and so far is making headway.  Training on agreed supervisory 
approaches; assessment of their implementation and producing addi-
tional policy guidance if needed are all vital, and seem to work, but they 
do have limitations.  For example, EBA guidelines are comply or explain 
for competent authorities. Our recommendations are not legally binding, 
even if they do signal a clear message to the outside world.   In this sense 
the asymmetries between rule making and decision making are recog-
nised, and tools are in place to address them. But those tools eventually 
could fail without goodwill and conscious attention on all sides. 
Governance of the interplay between micro and macro 
prudential supervision
The second area of relevance from a governance perspective is the inter-
play between macro and micro prudential regulation.  The  micro and 
macro prudential frameworks have been designed in different ways with 
the micro prudential framework inherently EU-oriented to avoid imped-
iments to competition and the free movement of capital. The macro pru-
dential framework has been designed to be national, with some coor-
dination. This has been done since macroprudential problems tend to 
be “country” specific and require national measures. But this raises the 
theoretical possibility that macro prudential measures can inadvertently, 
or deliberately, impede the free flow of capital. There is thus by design 
an asymmetry between rules and decision making on individual banks 
and decisions on broader macro economic policy tools.  Once again this 
asymmetry is clearly recognised as a challenge for the integrity of the 
single market, and the integrity of the micro prudential framework. To 
that end the co legislators put in place a coordination mechanism. In this 
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case the coordination mechanism rests primarily with the European Sys-
temic Risk Board (ESRB) but also with the EBA to whom some, but not 
all, macro prudential measures should be notified and in a few cases the 
EBA is asked to opine.19
This means that whilst there is a clear single rule book for micro pru-
dential measures, along with the safeguards outlined above, the setting 
is different for the range of macro prudential measures. Yet at the same 
time many of these macro prudential measures have a micro prudential 
implication as the table20 below illustrates. This table shows that around 
a quarter of the significant measures notified in 2014 used the Pillar 2 
mechanism that is largely within the remit of supervisory decision 
making.
The rationale for having asymmetric governance of macro and micro 
prudential measures rests with the concern that macro prudential imbal-
ances occur primarily within the national economy and are best dealt 
with at that level i.e. macro economic imbalances such as bubbles in real 
estate or an overheating economy are most identifiable and actioned 
upon at national level. Conversely, micro prudential decisions are made 
19 h t t p s : / / w w w. e b a . e u r o p a . e u / d o c u m e n t s / 1 0 1 8 0 / 9 5 0 5 4 8 / E B A + r e -
port+on+the+range+of+practices+regarding+macroprudential+policy+measures.pdf 
pages 10-11 shows the full range of measures. 
20 http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/150625_review_macroprudential_policy_
one_year_after_intro_crdcrr.en.pdf?df070310a7c696c1f77537da8994c294
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on individual banks, in a comparable and consistent way across the single 
market.  The challenge is when macro prudential decisions interact with 
both the integrity and consistency of both the micro prudential decisions 
on individual banks and on the functioning of the single market as a 
whole. 
Two examples illustrate these points. 
The first relates to the integrity of the micro prudential framework.  We 
can see from the chart above that many macro prudential decisions use 
the Pillar 2 framework. Often this is simply because it is the easiest and 
most flexible tool.  If for example a macro prudential authority is worried 
about excessive increase in house prices it can impose higher risk weights 
for all exposures by that country’s banks towards residential mortgages, 
via the P2 framework.   This makes sense from a macro prudential per-
spective as it has the effect of reducing banks’ appetite to lend ever more 
to this market. But it also interacts with the micro prudential framework 
and the functioning of the single market. In the first instance higher risk 
weights increase the amount of capital that a bank needs to hold under 
Pillar 1. Micro prudential supervisors will already have made an assess-
ment on the appropriate capital to hold, having approved the relevant 
risk weighting model for a bank and also then having assessed the rel-
evant capital and may have asked for additional capital resources to be 
held under Pillar 221. For example there could already be adjustments to 
Pillar 1 model validation rules to add additional conservativeness into 
the model outcomes or additional capital could be held under Pillar 2 for 
example for concentration risk to the housing market.  Or some capital 
guidance may be in place based on stress test outcomes for the hypothet-
ical event that house prices crash. To that end it is key that there is coordi-
nation and interaction between the relevant macro prudential and micro 
prudential authority. This can happen at the national level but becomes 
more complicated for cross border groups when the decisions on Pillar 
2 are made by colleges of supervisors that comprise both home and host 
authorities. Effective coordination, including appropriate timing and 
sequencing, are then key to ensure that macro prudential decisions work 
with the grain of the micro prudential framework and do not disrupt it. 
21 https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/935249/EBA-GL-2014-13+(Guide-
lines+on+SREP+methodologies+and+processes).pdf
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The second example relates to the integrity of the single market and 
has two components.  Simple macro prudential add-ons may be used to 
ensure capital or liquidity resources stay within a country. This can make 
sense from a country perspective but can also be costly for a banking 
group trying to operate across borders and maximise the efficiency of 
its capital and liquidity resources.  And if such measures are put in place 
at the last minute then it can also disrupt effective contingency plan-
ning.  The second component is the need for reciprocity across the single 
market of macro prudential measures. That is a national macro prudential 
authority can order additional capital for exposures to the home market 
on domestic banks (banking groups and subsidiaries based in that juris-
diction). However, this may or may not apply to branches of other banks 
that passport into the domestic market. This both risk effectively under-
mining the measure itself and provides an unequal competitive setting 
within the single market. Based on early surveys very few macro pruden-
tial measures were voluntarily reciprocated22.  This again requires coor-
dination between macro prudential authorities in the country setting the 
macro prudential measures and all relevant micro prudential authorities. 
As noted above the tools for effective coordination between macro 
and micro prudential regulation are in place. Notifications are being 
provided and the EU has a very positive record on transparency in this 
regard e.g. publications by the ESRB and the EBA are not found in other 
jurisdictions globally. From a governance perspective effective coordina-
tion relies on good cooperation and there is no easily identifiable manda-
tory method of restricting macro prudential measures if they may have 
an impact on the micro prudential regime or the single market23. This 
may not be a problem when cooperation and coordination are working 
effectively. But all participants should be aware of the risks if those mech-
anisms break down. 
22 h t t p s : / / w w w. e b a . e u r o p a . e u / d o c u m e n t s / 1 0 1 8 0 / 9 5 0 5 4 8 / E B A + r e -
port+on+the+range+of+practices+regarding+macroprudential+policy+measures.pdf 
page 15.  To note some measures are mandatorily reciprocated. 
23 In the most extreme cases, infringement proceedings are available for clear cases of 
impeding the key rights enshrined in the treaties. But experience suggests that most 
measures are not so extreme. 
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Conclusion
In conclusion, it is clear that, from a single market perspective, asym-
metries in governance within micro prudential supervision and between 
micro and macro prudential regulation exist by design. A single rule, 
and a mandate for supervisory convergence at the EU level, sit alongside 
supervisory responsibility for implementation and for all decisions at the 
level of the competent authority.  At the same time the single micro pru-
dential rule book and micro prudential decision making, sit alongside 
national level decisions on macro prudential policy.  The latter is par-
ticular pertinent within the banking union where micro prudential deci-
sions are taken at the level of the SSM but national authorities implement 
many of the macro prudential tools.
Such asymmetries in governance respect the will of the co-legisla-
tors but come with risks. These risks are recognized. They are currently 
addressed by coordination and cooperation mechanisms.  The argument 
is not that those arrangements should change. Rather, all participants 
should be profoundly aware of the impact that any slip in these coordi-
nation and cooperation arrangements may have. Recent events demon-
strate the potential cost of such differences for banks, and investors in 
banks, and thus the impact from the perspective of competition, and free 
movement of capital, across the single market. 
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BANKING UNION:  
AN INCOMPLETE BUILDING 
Rosa M. Lastra1
  
In contrast to the construct of European Monetary Union – a long and 
protracted journey that commenced with the establishment of the Euro-
pean Monetary System in 1978-9 and only became a reality when the 
Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 – European Banking Union (EBU) 
was a much quicker process. Though the intellectual foundations for cen-
tralized supervision were advocated by some from the very start of EMU, 
the urgency with which the actual banking union plan was conceived 
in 2012 and subsequently executed was made possible by the political 
consensus that surrounded the need to provide European supervision 
and crisis management of euro area credit institutions lest the euro area 
would disintegrate.  The advent of European Banking Union took place 
at a time in which the vicious link between bank debt and sovereign debt 
engulfed the euro area. 
However, like any project adopted under such tense and tight circum-
stances, there are gaps in the resulting governance structure. Banking 
union is an incomplete building. There are several gaps, inconsistencies 
and missing components. Some of these gaps predated the crisis. Some 
others were magnified as a consequence of the crisis. 
First, EMU suffers from a congenital flawed institutional design; in 
the words of Alexandre Lamfalussy, EMU rests upon a strong ‘M’ (the 
monetary pillar with the euro as the single currency and the European 
Central Bank as the monetary authority) and a weak ‘E’ (the economic 
pillar, where economic – fiscal - union is in a fact a misnomer, and what 
1 Professor of International Financial and Monetary Law, Centre for Commercial Law 
Studies, Queen Mary University of London, 67-69 Lincoln’s Inn Fields, London WC2A 
3JB, r.lastra@qmul.ac.Uk.
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we have is economic coordination). 2 The weakness of the ‘E’ and by 
extension the weakness of the supervisory pillar became apparent during 
the twin financial and sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone.
Second, there is divergence in the actual construction of the three 
pillars upon which banking union rests, given their different legal basis 
(Article 127.6 TFEU in the case of the SSM, Article 114 TFEU in the case 
of the SRM), their governance structure and the actual degree of central-
ization achieved so far. 
Third, as discussed in some detail in the ensuing sections, there is the 
‘missing pillar’, a fourth necessary pillar for a working banking union, 
namely lender of last resort. 
Fourth, in the absence of a true fiscal union, there is only a limited 
fiscal backstop in the form of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
Fifth, the ECB faces fundamental challenges in the pursuit of multiple 
goals (monetary stability and financial stability) and in the discharge of 
multiple responsibilities.  
Sixth, there are the problems of jurisdictional domain, with the single 
market on the one hand and the European banking union on the other 
hand, plus the related issues of complexity, coordination, legitimacy and 
accountability. 
Seventh, since the contours between supervision, early intervention, 
recovery and resolution are porous and since there area multiple author-
ities involved in what effectively is a seamless process, gaps in coordina-
tion can arise. Since time is of the essence in any crisis situation, this is a 
cause for concern.
Eighth, there is incompleteness in the pursuit of systemic risk con-
trol and financial stability, since banking union (and centralized super-
vision) only extends to credit institutions, while responsibility for the 
supervision of securities and insurance remains mostly at the national 
level. The European financial architecture for the single market, with 
EBA, ESMA and EIOPA, is an example of increasing federalization of 
financial supervision but does not constitute centralization of super-
visory responsibilities. The ‘financial trilemma’ conceived by Niels 
Thygesen and developed by Dirk Schoenmaker3 looms in the back-
ground: you cannot have financial stability, integrated markets and 
2 Alexandre Lamfalussy remarked in an interview with The Guardian on 16 August 
2003: ‘The great weakness of EMU is the E. The M part is institutionally well organized. 
We have a solid framework. We don’t have that for economic policy.’ 
3  http://personal.vu.nl/d.schoenmaker/Financial_Trilemma.pdf 
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national supervision. The latter has to go… And not just for banks… 
Ninth, gaps can arise from the exercise of macroprudential supervision, 
since responsibility for it is divided between the ECB, the ESRB and 
national authorities.
Finally, there is the question of what constitutes ‘adequate supervision’, 
given the need to adopt a comprehensive approach that assesses – like the 
acronym CAMEL indicates – the different elements that determine bank 
soundness. Attention is now finally turning to the asset side of banks’ 
balance sheets, where divergence in the measurement of Non Performing 
Loans (NPLs) has been a feature that hinders meaningful cross-country 
comparison and compromises the effectiveness and credibility of stress 
tests in different jurisdictions.4
The pillars of banking union 
Banking union is based upon three pillars.5 While the first pillar, ‘single 
supervision’ has already been completed with the establishment of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the second pillar, ‘single resolu-
tion’, with the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) - aligned with the EU 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)6 - and a Single Resolu-
tion Fund, is still in the process of being implemented. The third pillar, 
‘common deposit protection’,7 is yet to be constructed (though a proposal 
was published in November 2015). As indicated in the introduction, 
4 http://www.bankofengland.co.Uk/research/Pages/workingpapers/2016/swp594.aspx
5 Underpinning these three pillars is the concept of a common supervisory rule book, 
laying down uniform terms for the authorisation and withdrawal of credit institutions, 
for the conduct of micro-prudential supervision over credit institutions, for the res-
olution of non-viable credit institutions and for the operation of deposit guarantee 
schemes.
6 The BRRD was published in the OJ in June 2014. See Directive 2014/59/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending 
Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations 
(EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, OJ L 173, 12/06/2014, p. 190–348. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.173.01.0190.01.ENG
7 The rationale for a common deposit insurance scheme is clear: with perfect capital 
mobility, in order to prevent a flight of deposits from troubled countries to countries 
perceived to be ‘safe’, one needs to convince ordinary citizens that a euro in a bank 
account in one Euro area Member State is the worth the same and is as secure as a euro 
in a bank account in another Euro area Member State. This is a real challenge, as the 
experience in Cyprus evidenced.
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there is a missing pillar: a clear lender of last resort role for the European 
Central Bank.8
Challenges for the ECB with the advent of Banking Union9
The ECB is no longer just a price stability oriented monetary authority. 
Since November 2014, the ECB is also key micro supervisory authority 
for credit institutions in the eurozone. Furthermore, the ECB has also 
been granted some macro-prudential powers in the pursuit of financial 
stability. 
A price-stability-oriented independent central bank was a basic tenet 
in the early 1990s supported by economic theory and empirical evidence 
which became embedded in the Maastricht Treaty and widely accepted 
in the developed and developing World. This explains why price stability 
is unambiguously mentioned in Art 127(1) TFEU as the primary objec-
tive of the ESCB while the tenuous reference to financial stability in Art 
127(5) TFEU indicates the hesitant tone of the treaty drafters in giving 
this goal equal footing to the goal of price stability (“The ESCB shall 
contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent 
authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
and the stability of the financial system”). The enabling clause advocated 
by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa auspiciously found its way in the final text 
8 See Lastra, Rosa “Reflections on Banking Union, Lender of Last Resort an Supervisory 
Discretion”, in From Monetary Union to Banking Union, on the Way to Capital Mar-
kets Union – New Opportunities for European Integration, (ECB Legal Conference), 
European Central Bank, 2015, pp. 154-173 and “Lender of Last Resort and Banking 
Union” Chapter 6 in European Banking Union. Prospects and Challenges (ed. By Juan 
E. Castañeda, David, G. Mayes and Geoffrey Wood) Routledge, 2015, pp. 109 – 128. 
For a recent comparative analysis on lender of last resort in a number of jurisdictions 
see my forthcoming chapter entitled “Emergency Liquidity Assistance and Systemic 
Risk”  to be published as Chapter 7 in a book on Systemic Risk, Institutional Design, 
and the Regulation of Financial Markets (edited by Anita Anand) to be published by 
Oxford University Press, 2016-17.
9 This section draws heavily on the Report on “The Interaction between Monetary Policy 
and Bank Regulation” co-written by Charles Goodhart and myself for the European 
Parliament, available at at the dedicated section (Economic Policies) of ECON website: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/monetary-dialogue.Html (Tab 
Heading: 2015).
 Monetary policy has entered uncharted territory following the great financial crisis. 
While prior to the crisis it had broadly converged toward one with a price stability (in-
flation) target and a short term interest rate as a policy tool, there is now a 2nd variant 
of monetary policy, which involves varying both the size, and perhaps, the composition 
of a central bank’s balance sheet, with implications for monetary policy and also for 
financial stability. 
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of the Treaty - Art. 127(6), thus providing a Treaty basis for the SSM. 
Times have changed after the crisis and though in practice the primary 
objective of central banking has become financial stability (also for the 
ECB) (Buiter, 2015),10 the Treaty remains unaltered. 
Functionally when it was created the ECB resembled the ‘Bundes-
bank model’ of one agency (the central bank), one primary objective 
(price stability) and one main instrument (monetary policy), in line with 
the Tinbergen rule. This relative simplicity (one goal, one instrument, 
one authority) in the pursuit of monetary stability contrasts with the 
multiplicity and complexity that characterize the pursuit of financial sta-
bility and the conduct of central banking in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. 
Financial stability co-exists with other goals (such as price stability, 
growth, employment, consumer protection); there are multiple instru-
ments to achieve this goal (supervision, regulation, lender of last resort/
ELA, resolution and crisis management, monetary policy, fiscal policy 
etc.) and the central bank shares responsibility for maintaining financial 
stability with other authorities at different levels of governance (national, 
European and international).11  Financial stability (systemic risk control) 
is a goal that transcends geographic boundaries and institutional man-
dates. But the very definition of financial stability remains a matter of 
controversy. 
The Dodd Frank Act 2010 in the USA reinforced the financial sta-
bility mandate of the Federal Reserve System (the overriding objective) 
and the law governing the Bank of England in the Uk has also been 
revised to reflect the twin mandate of monetary stability and financial 
stability.  At the EU level, while the hierarchy of objectives remains (price 
stability reigns supreme in the Treaty), the mandate of the ECB has been 
substantially expanded via secondary legislation (the SSM regulation and 
ensuing normative) into the field of prudential supervision.  
The ECB has also some macro-prudential powers, according to 
10 See Willem H. Buiter at http://willembuiter.com/sintra.pdf
11 The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in the US is a good example of the 
multiple authorities involved in the pursuit of financial stability. The FSOC is made up 
of ten voting members under the chairmanship of the Secretary of the Treasury (the 
other nine member are the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection, the Chair of the SEC, the Chair of the Commodity Future Trading 
Commission, the Chair of FDIC, the Chair of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the 
chair of the National Credit Union Administration, and an independent member with 
insurance expertise) and five nonvoting members. 
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Article 5 of the SSM Regulation. And the ECB is also involved in the 
pre-insolvency phase in resolution. Early intervention (in the context of 
the SSM regulation) comprises actions taken before the threshold con-
ditions for resolution are met, and before the institution is insolvent or 
likely to become insolvent. The boundaries between supervision at the 
‘end of the supervisory spectrum’, early intervention/PCA, recovery and 
resolution are not always clear. Given its role as micro-prudential super-
visor with powers for early intervention, the ECB is likely to play a major 
role in the commencement of resolution proceedings.12  This imposes an 
additional challenge.
Supervision and crisis management are part of a seamless process, 
which requires timely communication and coordination between the 
competent authorities, as well as judgment in the exercise of discretion. 
Supervision is also a thankless task, prone to litigation. Indeed, while 
judicial review of monetary policy measures might be limited, the same 
cannot be said with regard to the review of supervisory decisions (actions 
or omissions). The limits of the ECB’s authority in the pursuit of finan-
cial stability remain open, considering also the interconnection between 
banking markets and other markets (sovereign debt, derivative, etc.) and 
the designation of systemically important financial institutions. The role 
of law and judicial review in the demarcation of such limits also needs 
further clarification.
The financial architecture of Europe is now rather complex both juris-
dictionally and structurally. The jurisdictional domain of the ESAs and 
ESRB is the whole EU/single market, while the jurisdictional domain 
of the SSM is restricted to the eurozone and those countries that adopt 
close cooperation agreements with the ECB. The structure of supervision 
is now divided between centralized powers in banking and decentrali-
zation and segmentation in other areas of the financial sector. This will 
require the ECB/SSM to cooperate very closely with national securities 
and insurance regulators.
12  According to Art 4.1 (i) of the SSM Regulation the ECB is empowered: 
 “To carry out supervisory tasks in relation to recovery plans, and early intervention 
where a credit institution or group in relation to which the ECB is the consolidating 
supervisor, does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements, 
and, only in the cases explicitly stipulated by relevant Union law for competent author-
ities, structural changes required from credit institutions to prevent financial stress or 
failure, excluding any resolution powers.”
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The missing pillar of banking union: LOLR13
Though LOLR is not included as a pillar of the current banking union 
plan, in my opinion it is clearly the fourth ‘missing pillar’. LOLR is the 
first line of defence in a crisis. Central banks provide liquidity when no 
other sources of liquidity are readily available (or at least are not available 
at ‘reasonable market prices’). 
The decision to serve as lender of last resort can be taken either to 
support a single bank suffering from a liquidity crisis (individual bank 
liquidity) or to preserve the stability of the banking system as a whole, 
by supplying extra reserves to all banks suffering from large cash with-
drawals (market liquidity). An individual bank problem can, however, 
quickly convert into a system problem, if a sudden collapse of confidence 
in one bank spreads by contagion to other banks. 
LOLR therefore comes in two forms. The first form is the traditional 
Thornton-Bagehot14 ‘LOLR model’ of collateralised lines of credit to indi-
vidual illiquid but solvent15 banks;16 the second form is the provision of 
‘market liquidity assistance’ via ordinary open market operations and via 
extraordinary or unconventional measures. 
The ECB has clear competence – a competence which it has exercised 
widely – when it comes to the second form, while - due to its own restric-
13 This section draws heavily on the recent contributions to other books cited in footnote 
8.
14 The theoretical foundations of the lender of last resort doctrine were first set by Thorn-
ton in 1802 and then by Bagehot in 1873, who further elaborated and refined them. See 
Henry Thornton, An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great 
Britain (Fairfield, NJ: AM Kelley, 1991, originally published in 1802); Walter Bagehot, 
Lombard Street. A Description of the Money Market (New York: Wiley, 1999, origi-
nally published in 1873). Recent studies of the work of Thornton and Bagehot on the 
LOLR are found in Thomas M Humphrey, ‘The Classical Concept of the Lender of Last 
Resort’ (1975) 61(1) Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review 2; Michael 
D Bordo, ‘Alternative Views and Historical Experience’ (1990) 76(1) Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond Economic Review 18.
15 Though the issue of solvency is often inserted here, Geoffrey Wood reminded me in 
private correspondence that Hawtrey (The Art of Central Banking, Frank Cass & Co. 
1932, 1st edition) had pointed out it is not easy quickly to determine solvency, and not 
necessary either so long as acceptable collateral is offered. See also Geoffrey Wood, ‘The 
Lender of Last Resort Reconsidered’, Journal of Financial Services Research 18: 2/3 
2000, pp. 203-227 (Kluwer Academic Publishers).
16 See Rosa Lastra ‘Lender of Last Resort, an International Perspective’, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, ICLQ, Volume 48, 1999, April 1999, pp. 340-361; and Las-
tra and Andrew Campbell, ‘Revisiting the Lender of Last Resort’, Banking and Finance 
Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 3, June 2009.
Banking Union: an Incomplete Building  -  Rosa M. Lastra 
176
tive interpretation of the ESCB Statute - it does not have so far compe-
tence with regard to the first form. In 1998, the ECB adopted a restrictive 
reading of the ECB competences, concluding that the provision of lender 
of last resort assistance to specific illiquid individual institutions was a 
national task of the National Central Banks (NCBs) in line with Article 
14.4 of the ESCB Statute (a provision which allows NCBs to perform 
non-ESCB tasks on their own responsibility and liability).17 Therefore the 
classic collateralised lines of credit to individual institutions remain the 
responsibility of the national central banks, at their own cost, but with the 
fiat of the ECB. Thus, the risks and costs arising from such provision are 
incurred by the relevant National Central Bank (NCB), though a number 
of procedures ought to be followed.18 This awkward interpretation was 
17 Article 14.4 reads as follows: ‘National central banks may perform functions other than 
those specified in this Statute unless the Governing Council finds, by a majority of two 
thirds of the votes cast, that these interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB. 
Such functions shall be performed on the responsibility and liability of national central 
banks and shall not be regarded as being part of the functions of the ESCB’. The ECB 
can assess whether a given LOLR operation by a National Central Bank (NCB) inter-
feres with monetary policy and, if so, either prohibit it or subject it to conditions. To 
this effect, the ECB has some internal rules (MoU) requiring ex ante notification to the 
Governing Council of such LOLR operation (Article 14.4). I thank Antonio Sainz de 
Vicuña for observations on this point. The following is an excerpt from the ECB An-
nual Report 1999 (p. 98): ‘The institutional framework for financial stability in the EU 
and in the euro area is based on national competence and international cooperation…. 
Co-ordination mechanisms are primarily called for within the Eurosystem. This is the 
case for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), which embraces the support given by 
central banks in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis to temporar-
ily illiquid institutions and markets…. If and when appropriate, the necessary mech-
anisms to tackle a financial crisis are in place. The main guiding principle is that the 
competent NCB takes the decision concerning the provision of ELA to an institution 
operating in its jurisdiction. This would take place under the responsibility and at the 
cost of the NCB in question. (…) The agreement on ELA is internal to the Eurosystem 
and does not affect the existing arrangements between central banks and supervisors 
at the national level or bilateral or multilateral co-operation among supervisors and 
between the latter and the Eurosystem’.
18 This subject however has always triggered much controversy. See, inter alia, Charles 
Goodhart (ed), Which Lender of Last Resort for Europe (London: Central Banking 
Publications, 2000), Jeroen Kremers, Dirk Schoenmaker, and Peter J Wierts (eds), Fi-
nancial Supervision in Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001), chs 4 
and 5, Tommasso Padoa-Schioppa, Regulating Finance (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004) chs 7 and 8, and Xavier Freixas , ‘Crisis Management in Europe’ in Jeroen 
Kremer, Dirk Schoenmaker, and Peter Wierts (eds), Financial Supervision in Europe 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003) 110. For a critique of the ECB’s interpretation of its 
powers in respect of ELA , see René Smits, European supervisors in the credit crisis: 
issues of competence and competition, chapter 15 in Mario Giovanoli and Diego Devos 
(eds), International Monetary and Financial Law – The Global Crisis, Oxford 2010, at 
310-311.
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reaffirmed in a resolution of the Governing Council of 17 October 2013.19 
When prudential supervision was at the national level, it was perhaps 
logical to assume that the national authorities had the adequate expertise 
and information to assess the problems of banks within their jurisdic-
tions (assistance on a rainy day – supervision on a sunny day). But now 
that supervision is European, the ECB should be at all effects lender of 
last resort for all those institutions it now supervises. 
Granting the ECB a clear LOLR does not require a Treaty change. The 
ECB is already competent to provide liquidity assistance to ‘financially 
sound’ banks. ELA/LOLR links monetary policy and supervision [thus 
the complementarity between monetary policy, supervision and liquidity 
assistance]. All is needed is a reinterpretation of Art 14.4 in the light of 
new circumstances (Banking Union) and in accordance with Art. 18 and 
the principle of subsidiarity. At the very least such an interpretation is 
required for significant institutions.
Since the SSM became operational on 4 November 2014, the ECB 
should formally be the ultimate provider of liquidity in the euro area, 
both in cases of market liquidity and in cases of individual liquidity assis-
tance, is a necessary consequence of the transfer of supervisory powers 
from the national to the European level.20 The National Competent 
19 See ELA Decision by the ECB of 18 October 2013, at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/
pdf/other/201402_elaprocedures.en.pdf 
 ELA means the provision by a Eurosystem national central bank (NCB) of (a) central 
bank money and/or (b) any other assistance that may lead to an increase in central 
bank money to a solvent financial institution, or group of solvent financial institutions, 
that is facing temporary liquidity problems, without such operation being part of the 
single monetary policy, Responsibility for the provision of ELA lies with the NCB(s) 
concerned. This means that any costs of, and the risks arising from, the provision of 
ELA are incurred by the relevant NCB. 
 NCBs must inform the ECB within two days of a ELA operation, with details of the 
counterparties involved, the value of the operation, the haircuts and collateral applied 
and the rate of interest paid on the funds. A limit of € 500 million in ELA assistance can 
be provided to a given financial institution or group of institutions before the NCB(s) 
involved must inform the ECB as early as possible prior to the extension of the in-
tended assistance. If the overall volume of ELA operations passes €2 billion for a given 
central bank, the Governing Council considers whether there is a risk that the ELA in-
volved may interfere with the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem. Upon the request 
of the NCB(s) concerned, the Governing Council may then decide to set a threshold 
and not to object to intended ELA operations that are below that threshold and con-
ducted within a pre-specified short period of time.
20 Notwithstanding the ECB Decision of 18 October 2013 on ELA (Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance) at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/201402_elaprocedures.en.pdf 
which assigns ‘responsibility for the provision of ELA’ to the ‘NCB(s) concerned’, fur-
ther specifying that ‘This means that any cost of, and the risks arising from, the provi-
sion of ELA are incurred by the relevant NCB’.
Banking Union: an Incomplete Building  -  Rosa M. Lastra 
178
Authority (NCA) is neither the monetary policy authority nor the super-
visor. The only advantage of continuing with the current interpretation is 
that any eventual loss is not shared (but yet it would have an impact on 
the whole euro area). 
The ECB has been always competent to act as LOLR if the crisis orig-
inates in the payments system, according to Art 127(2) TFEU, which 
states that the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is entrusted 
with the ‘smooth operation of payment systems’. The ECB is also compe-
tent in the case of a general liquidity dry up to provide market liquidity 
according to Article 18 of the ESCB Statute, and the ECB has amply used 
this competence during the crisis, even leading to legal questioning of 
whether it has exceeded its mandate. Indeed, even before banking union, 
Article 18 provided a perfectly valid legal basis for the ECB to provide the 
two forms of ELA/LOLR. 
And according to Article 5.3 TEU (principle of subsidiarity): ‘In areas 
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act 
only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at 
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of 
the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.’
In a crisis action by the ECB is more effective than action by a national 
central bank or national authority. National supervisory authorities do 
not have the ability, authority, or inclination to deal effectively with exter-
nalities with cross-border effects. The ECB is able to better judge the risk 
of contagion.
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Further Reflections on Lender of last resort in the context of 
banking union21
As I wrote in an article with Luis Garicano in 201022: ‘The lender of last 
resort function can only be undertaken by a central bank. The involve-
ment of central banks in financial stability originates in their role as 
monopolist suppliers of fiat money and in their role as bankers’ bank. 
Only the ultimate supplier of money can provide the necessary stabilizing 
function in a nationwide scramble for liquidity, as the financial crisis has 
amply evidenced, with conventional and non-conventional monetary 
policy operations (quantitative easing and others). This is a clear lesson 
of the crisis in the Uk, where the problems of Northern Rock caught the 
Bank of England by surprise: having timely information is particularly 
crucial during financial crises and the best way to ensure access is to have 
daily supervision by the central bank, as the literature has noted’.23 
While the Fed and the Bank of England have emphasized the com-
plementarity24 between monetary policy, macro-prudential policy, 
lender of last resort and micro-prudential supervision, the ECB on the 
21 This section draws on Chapter 10 of Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law, 
second edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015. See also chapter 7 for the non 
conventional responses by the ECB to the Crisis and Lastra, ‘Banking Union and Single 
Market: Conflict or Companionship?’ Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 36, No. 
5, 2013, pp. 1189-1223, for a consideration of how banking union fits within the single 
market in financial services. See alos ‘European Banking Union’, by Rosa Lastra, Bernd 
Krauskopf, Christos Gortsos and René Smits, MOCOMILA report to the ILA meeting 
in Washington DC, April 2014, at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/
cid/22
22 Luis Garicano and Rosa Lastra, ‘Towards a new Architecture for Financial Stability: 
Seven Principles’, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 13, No. 3, September 
2010, pp. 597-621.
23 See Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker ‘Institutional Separation between Super-
visory and Monetary Agencies’ and Charles Goodhart, ‘Price Stability and Financial 
Fragility’ both in Charles Goodhart (ed), The Central Bank and the Financial System 
(Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1993). Joseph G. Haubrich, ‘Combining Bank Supervi-
sion and Monetary Policy’, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic Commentary, 
November 1996. Clive B. Briault and Richard K. Abrams and Michael W. Taylor. Joe 
Peek, Eric S. Rosengren, and Geoffrey M. B. Tootell ‘Is Bank Supervision Central to 
Central Banking?’, 114(2) Quarterly Journal of Economics (1999), at 629-53.
24 The Fed conceives of its monetary policy as having been largely grafted onto its stabi-
lization and supervisory functions, and regards such functions as a prerequisite and 
complement of its monetary policy responsibilities. In the Uk, the Bank of England 
launched its One Bank – One Mission strategic plan in March 2015 stressing the links 
between the 3Ms: Monetary policy, macro-prudential and micro-prudential supervi-
sion.
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other hand has highlighted the separation between monetary policy and 
banking supervision in a Decision of 17 September 2014, in accordance 
with Article 25(2) of the SSM Regulation.25 However, the reality of central 
banking is one of complementarity of functions, which explains why they 
are placed under the same roof; if one wants to have the functions truly 
separate, then assign them to different entities.26 
Conflicts of interest between monetary policy and banking supervi-
sion are of course possible, but there are ways to solve or mitigate them. 
The SSM Regulation establishes a mediation panel to deal with such con-
flicts.27
LOLR/ELA links monetary policy and supervision. Only the ultimate 
supplier of money can provide the necessary stabilizing function in a 
nationwide scramble for liquidity, as the financial crisis amply demon-
strated, with conventional and non-conventional monetary policy meas-
ures. 
Fiscal Assistance and State Aid Rules
The problem with having the ECB as LOLR is, of course, the ‘fiscal back-
stop’ if the institution receiving the assistance is no longer illiquid, but 
insolvent. The only way to deal with this effectively is to stick to the ‘true 
nature’ of lender of last resort (assisting illiquid but solvent institutions)28 
combined with a clear and strict application of the EU state aid rules. 
25 Article 25(2) SSM Regulation: “The ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred on it by 
this Regulation without prejudice to and separately from its tasks relating to monetary 
policy and any other tasks. The tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation shall 
neither interfere with, nor be determined by, its tasks relating to monetary policy. The 
tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation shall moreover not interfere with its 
tasks in relation to the ESRB or any other tasks.
26 On the subject of separation between monetary policy and supervision the seminal ar-
ticle by Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘Should the Functions of Monetary 
Policy and Banking Supervision be Separated?’ (1995) Oxford University Papers, Vol. 
47, No. 4, 539-560, summarizes the pros and cons.
27 Article 25(5) of the SSM Regulation: “With a view to ensuring separation between 
monetary policy and supervisory tasks, the ECB shall create a mediation panel. This 
panel shall resolve differences of views expressed by the competent authorities of par-
ticipating Member States concerned regarding an objection of the Governing Council 
to a draft decision by the Supervisory Board.” According to Article 32(1) of the SSM 
Regulation The European Commission is due to evaluate by the end of 2015 the effec-
tiveness of the separation between supervisory and monetary policy functions within 
the ECB.
28 Of course the difference between illiquidity and insolvency is not easy to access; in a 
crisis it is often a time line…
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Goodhart points out, ‘a central bank can create liquidity, but it cannot 
provide for new injections of equity capital. Only the fiscal authority can 
do that.’29 The central bank should not lend over an extended period of 
time, committing taxpayers’ money, without the explicit approval of the 
fiscal authority.30 Any extended lending becomes the responsibility of the 
fiscal authority. 
A limited fiscal backstop in Europe is provided via the European Sta-
bility Mechanism. 31 The ESM is modelled upon the IMF (but with more 
limited funding, with lending capacity of EUR 500 billion, backed up by 
an authorised capital of 700 billion32), though it also has a direct recapi-
talisation instrument.
In practice, the central bank and the Treasury/Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) need to work together in the case of a support operation. This 
can be arranged at the national level relatively easily. The problem at the 
EU level – as the recent financial crisis amply demonstrated - is that the 
relevant fiscal authorities are by definition national. Fiscal policy in the 
euroarea remains decentralized and the Member States are competent, 
albeit subject to increasing coordination, conditionality and stringent 
rules.  Thus, while the Bank of England is ultimately backed by the fiscal 
resources of the Uk Treasury (though it must comply with the EU rules 
on state aid and the prohibition of monetary financing) and the Fed-
eral Reserve System is ultimately backed by the fiscal resources of the 
US Treasury, the ECB does not have a European fiscal counterpart yet. 
In the US, while the Federal Reserve System provided ample liquidity 
29 See Charles Goodhart, Foreword to the book by Tommasso Padoa-Schioppa, Regulat-
ing Finance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) xvii.
30 In the EU the prohibition of monetisation of government debt, also known as ‘mone-
tary financing’ in accordance with the provisions of Article 123 TFEU applies.
31 The European Stability Mechanism Treaty, concluded in Brussels on 2 February 2012, 
entered into force on 27 September 2012. The ESM was inaugurated on 8 October 
2012 following the ratification by all the euro area Members. The Pringle ruling con-
firmed the legality of the ESM in 2012. See Case C370/12, REFERENCE for a pre-
liminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Supreme Court (Ireland), made by 
decision of 31 July 2012, received at the Court on 3 August 2012, in the proceedings 
Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/doc-
ument.jsf?text=&docid=130381&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&oc-
c=first&part=1&cid=37623 Pringle v. Ir., [2012] IESC 47, para. 5 (S.C.) (Ir.), at http://
www.courts.ie/__80256F2B00356A6B.nsf/0/E7504392B159245080257A4C00517D6A
?Open&Highlight=0,pringle,~language_en~.
32 The ESM raises funds by issuing money market instruments and medium and long-
term debt with maturities of up to 30 years, which are backed by a paid-in capital of 
EUR 80bn and the irrevocable and unconditional obligation of ESM Member States to 
provide their contribution to ESM’s authorised capital stock.
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assistance (both market liquidity and individual liquidity assistance), the 
Treasury provided the necessary capital with the TARP (Troubled Asset 
Relief Programme).
Another problem is that what constitutes ‘ordinary’ liquidity assis-
tance as opposed to ‘emergency’/LOLR liquidity assistance becomes 
blurred during a crisis, since the drying of the inter-bank market gives 
the central bank a primary role in the provision of liquidity.
A further twist is provided by the need to comply with the EU rules 
on state aid. Because an inherent subsidy exists whenever the central 
bank lends to an insolvent institution, under the EU rules on state aid, 
the granting of emergency aid to banking institutions can be considered 
illegal in some cases. The Luxembourg Court of Justice recognized in a 
ground-breaking decision, the Züchner case, that EU competition rules 
are also applicable to the banking sector.33 
On 5 December 2007, the EU Commission in its approval of the 
rescue aid package for Northern Rock concluded ‘that the emergency 
liquidity assistance provided by the Bank of England on 14th September 
2007, which was secured by sufficient collateral and was interest-bearing, 
did not constitute state aid’.34 The Commission Communication of 13 
October 2008 further reiterated this point:35 In establishing a single 
market in financial services, it is important that the Treaty’s state aid rules 
are applied consistently and equally to the banking sector, though with 
33 See Case 172/80 Züchner v Bayerische Vereinsbank [1981] ECR 2021.
34 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1859&for-
mat=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. ‘However, the guarantee on 
deposits granted by the Treasury on 17th September, as well as the measures granted 
on 9th October, which provided further liquidity and guarantees to Northern Rock 
and were secured by a Treasury indemnity, do constitute state aid.’ On 17 March 2008, 
six months after the first state aid measures (‘rescue aid’) took place, the Uk authorities 
submitted to the Commission a restructuring plan. The Commission then launched an 
in-depth investigation into this ‘restructuring aid’. See <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
ReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/489>.
35 Official Journal C 270, 25.10.2008, paragraph 51: ‘[T]he Commission considers for in-
stance that activities of central banks related to monetary policy, such as open market 
operations and standing facilities, are not caught by the State aid rules. Dedicated sup-
port to a specific financial institution may also be found not to constitute aid in specific 
circumstances. The Commission considers that the provision of central banks’ funds to 
the financial institution in such a case may be found not to constitute aid when a num-
ber of conditions are met, such as: the financial institution is solvent at the moment 
of the liquidity provision and the latter is not part of a larger aid package; the facility 
is fully secured by collateral to which haircuts are applied, in function of its quality 
and market value; the central bank charges a penal interest rate to the beneficiary; the 
measure is taken at the central bank’s own initiative, and in particular is not backed by 
any counter-guarantee of the State.’
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a regard to the peculiarities and sensitivities of the financial markets.36 
In August 2013 the Commission published another Communication 
extending the ‘crisis rules’ for banks.37 According to paragraph 53 of this 
August 2013 communication: ‘Liquidity support and guarantees on lia-
bilities temporarily stabilise the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet. 
Therefore, unlike recapitalisation or impaired asset measures which in 
principle must be preceded by the notification of a restructuring plan by 
the Member State concerned and approval by the Commission before 
they can be granted, the Commission can accept that Member States 
notify guarantees and liquidity support to be granted after approval on 
a temporary basis as rescue aid before a restructuring plan is approved.’ 
And paragraph 62 further clarifies: ‘The ordinary activities of central 
banks related to monetary policy, such as open market operations and 
standing facilities, do not fall within the scope of the State aid rules. Ded-
icated support to a specific credit institution (commonly referred to as 
‘emergency liquidity assistance’) may constitute aid unless the following 
cumulative conditions are met:
(a) the credit institutions is temporarily illiquid but solvent at the moment 
of the liquidity provision and is not part of a larger aid package;
(b) the facility is fully secured by collateral to which appropriate haircuts 
are applied, in function of its quality and market value;
(c) the central bank charges a penal interest rate to the beneficiary;
(d) the measure is taken at the central bank’s own initiative, and in partic-
ular is not backed by any counter-guarantee of the State’.
36 From the beginning of the global financial crisis in the autumn of 2008 to December 
2010, the Commission issued four communications which provided detailed guidance 
on the criteria for the compatibility of State support to financial institutions with the 
requirements of Article 107(3)(b) of TFEU: (1) Communication on the application of 
State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of 
the current global financial crisis (Banking Communication); (2) Communication on 
the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of 
aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition 
(Recapitalisation Communication); (3) Communication from the Commission on the 
treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector (Impaired Assets Com-
munication) and (4) Communication on the return to viability and the assessment of 
restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid 
rules (Restructuring Communication). See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/
legislation/temporary.html
37 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State 
aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis 
(‘Banking Communication’), 2013/C 216/01, at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52013XC0730(01)
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It is rather interesting that the Thornton-Bagehot doctrinal principles 
find their way into a legal text. Paragraph 63 of this 2013 Communication 
further specifies that: ‘interventions by deposit guarantee funds to reim-
burse depositors in accordance with Member States’ obligations under 
Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee scheme do not constitute state 
aid’.
Concluding observations
Much has been written during the crisis about the Treaty constraints 
within which the ECB operates, notably the prohibition of monetary 
financing of Article 123 TFEU and the no-bail out clause of Article 125 
TFEU. The Greek drama38 however reminds us that there are limits as to 
how much central banks can do with the tools at their disposal - mone-
tary policy and emergency liquidity assistance - to deal with the causes 
and effects of a crisis in the absence of fiscal and structural reforms.
This contribution considered several gaps in the governance of Euro-
pean Banking Union with emphasis on what I refer to as the missing pillar 
of banking union, namely lender of last resort or emergency liquidity 
assistance (ELA). ELA in all forms should be an ECB competence, in 
accordance with Article and 18 of the ESCB Statute, Article 127 of TFEU 
and the principle of subsidiarity. 
As regards market liquidity the ECB has provided ample support 
beyond normal operations in part because the politicians could not agree 
on anyone else doing it (eventually the ESM was established – limited 
fiscal backstop – following a number of temporary facilities), in part 
because the ECB committed to do everything it could within the limits of 
its mandate (often stretching it via creative interpretation albeit in con-
formity with the law/Treaty requirements) to avoid the collapse of the 
euro. 
In terms of individual liquidity assistance, the ECB’s own restrictive 
interpretation of Article 14.4 of the ESCB Statute (a provision which 
allows NCBs to perform non-ESCB tasks on their own responsibility 
38 The ‘extend and pretend policies’ when it comes to sovereign debt ‘management’ (re-
structuring) cannot hide a few uncomfortable truths. The ECB may have to take losses. 
Memories of the LDC crisis in the 1980s and the lost decade in Latin America cast a 
long shadow on the current situation in some euro area Member States -- it took years 
for the Brady plan to replace the misguided Baker Plan. Where you draw the dividing 
line for loss sharing arrangements and who provides what sort of support are key issues 
yet to be solved.
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and liability) is a stumbling block in the road to the fourth pillar of 
banking union. Such interpretation of Article 14.4 is somewhat awkward 
and clouded with uncertainty, since the ECB can provide some forms 
of ELA (open market operations and discount policies for example) but 
not others (classic collateralised lines to individual institutions, which 
remain the responsibility of the national central banks, at their own cost, 
but with the fiat of the ECB). The case for a more expansive interpretation 
of Article 14.4 has been reinforced with banking union: assistance in a 
rainy day, supervision on a sunny day, …
In the USA, federalisation of liquidity assistance and supervision took 
place in 1913 with the establishment of the Federal Reserve System.39 
With the advent of banking union, the ECB should be the ultimate pro-
vider of liquidity in the euro area, both in cases of market liquidity and in 
cases of individual liquidity assistance. This is a necessary consequence of 
the transfer of supervisory powers to the ECB.
39 In the US, federalisation of bank insolvency (today resolution) and deposit insurance 
took place in 1933 with the establishment of FDIC. In the same way as in supervision 
we went from Lamfalussy to De Larosiere to SSM (the Single Supervisory Mechanism), 
when it comes to resolution, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is only a first step 
in the way towards the design of an adequate resolution framework.
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BANKING UNION AND THE ECB AS 
LENDER OF LAST RESORT
Karl Whelan
1. Introduction
The idea of a euro area “banking union” is often discussed but the reality 
is that the euro area is still a very long way from having a fully integrated 
and coherent banking system. I’m not sure if a formal definition of a 
well-functioning banking union exists but one could imagine it having 
a number of key features.  These would include a common set of regula-
tions, a single supervisory body, a common source of funding for bank 
resolution and a common deposit insurance scheme. The euro area now 
has the first and second item on this list, is moving slowly towards the 
third item (a resolution fund) and is thinking about someday having 
the final item (common deposit insurance) in the sense that the Euro-
pean Commission has a proposal for common deposit insurance but it is 
unclear whether this will get broad political backing.  
These features are not, on their own, sufficient to have a stable and 
well-functioning unified banking system. Another important element is 
free movement of capital – depositors should be always free to move their 
money between banks in different geographical areas and should feel that 
their deposits are equally safe in all parts of the system.  A final crucial 
part of a well-functioning banking union is a clear and reliable lender 
of last resort.  Maturity transformation is a key aspect of why fractional 
reserve banking systems are useful but it is also accounts for why these 
systems are prone to periods of instability.  Without a clear guarantee that 
solvent institutions will always have access to liquidity from the central 
bank, financial crises will be a recurring feature.
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In this paper, I focus on how the lender of last resort function works 
in the euro area. I will argue that the Eurosystem does not provide a clear 
and transparent lender of last resort facility and discuss how this has 
promoted financial instability and has critically undermined free move-
ment of capital in the euro area.  Until this weakness in the euro area’s 
policy infrastructure is fixed, it will be difficult to have a truly successful 
banking union.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the role 
played in the banking system by central banks as lender of last resort 
and then outlines how the Eurosystem approaches lending to banks, 
including its Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) procedures.  Section 
3 provides an in-depth discussion of three different cases in which the 
ELA was provided – in Ireland, in Cyprus and in Greece.  Section 4 puts 
forward some new proposals for the Eurosystem’s emergency lending 
procedures.
2. The Eurosystem’s Lending Procedures
In modern times, monetary policy – open market operations designed 
to regulate the supply and cost of liquidity – is seen as the principal task 
of central banks. However, up until the mid-twentieth century, the key 
function of central banks was their role as a lender of last resort in times 
of crisis.  Perhaps the most famous discussion of lender of last resort 
policy is Walter Bagehot’s (1873) Lombard Street. Bagehot’s recommen-
dation are summarised by former Bank of England Deputy Governor 
Paul Tucker (2009) as 
to avert panic, central banks should lend early and freely (i.e. without 
limit), to solvent firms, against good collateral, and at “high rates”.
Tucker’s speech noted that Bagehot was concerned that 
the Bank of England should acknowledge its role in stemming panics, 
and set out its principles for doing so: “The Bank has never laid down 
any clear or sound policy on the subject.”
Somewhat incredibly, this is exactly the situation the European Central 
Bank is in today.  It has no clear or sound policy on how to stem panics. 
Here I will describe the Eurosystem’s procedures for lending to banks. 
The description comes in two parts, first covering the Eurosystem’s 
standard monetary policy operations and then discussing what is known 
as Emergency Liquidity Assistance.
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2.1 Collateral in the ECB’s Standard Monetary Policy Operations
Textbook descriptions of monetary policy operations tend to focus on 
open market operations in which securities are permanently bought 
or sold.  The ECB’s approach to monetary policy, however, has been to 
influence liquidity conditions and the terms of credit via loans to banks 
through its so-called refinancing operations.  
An important aspect of the ECB’s refinancing operations is a set of 
explicit collateral requirements describing the assets that banks must 
pledge to obtain loans.  These collateral requirements reflect the impor-
tant potential opportunity cost associated with creating money to pro-
vide loans to banks. Money creation can, under some conditions, create 
inflation, thus passing on indirect costs to the public.  Even in the absence 
of an impact on inflation, it is important to consider the risk that is taken 
on by a central bank when creating money to purchase assets: If an asset 
purchase goes badly, there is an opportunity cost arising from the fact 
that the central bank could have purchased a different asset that could 
have generated positive returns which could then have been remitted 
back to central governments.  In particular, the provision of credit to 
weak banks that are then unable to repay the loans provides a potentially 
unfair publicly-funded boost to the creditors of these banks.
Since its inception, the ECB has had a comprehensive risk assessment 
framework based on the requirement that banks must submit collateral 
from a specified list of eligible assets in order to obtain a standard loan 
from the Eurosystem.  Lending to banks in the euro area is a decentralised 
operation with the loans being provided by the national central banks 
(NCBs). If a bank defaults on a loan provided by a NCB, this collateral is 
then taken by the NCB.  If the acquired collateral fails to cover the value 
of the original loan, the agreed procedure is that the losses incurred will 
be shared across all of the members of the Eurosystem.
The Eurosystem has always had a broad collateral framework, incor-
porating a large amount of assets of different types.  The framework 
involves a risk assessment of each eligible asset with a “haircut” set so 
that, for example, if an asset has a 10 percent haircut, a bank that pledges 
a face value of €100 million of this asset as collateral will be entitled to a 
loan of €90 million.  
While the availability of a public list of eligible collateral makes the 
terms of standard Eurosystem loans that prevail at any point in time 
clear to the public, that is not the same thing as saying the rules are fixed. 
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Indeed, the ECB Governing Council regularly makes decisions to adjust 
the framework by adding and subtracting various items from its eligible 
collateral list or by adjusting the appropriate haircuts.
For example, to facilitate its move to a “full allotment” policy in 2008 
as well as subsequent monetary policy measures such as Long Term 
Refinancing Operations (LTROs), ensuring they were not undermined 
a shortage of collateral, the ECB has made a number of technical changes 
to its collateral framework in recent years. The number of specific changes 
is too long to list here – ECB (2013) contains a detailed description – but 
a few are worth noting.  The credit threshold required for most assets to 
qualify as eligible collateral was has been lowered from A- to BBB-.  Var-
ious adjustments have been made to make it easier for asset-backed secu-
rities (ABS) to become eligible and new criteria were drawn up to allow 
NCBs to accept nonmarketable bank loans (additional credit claims) as 
collateral.
Perhaps the more important example to illustrate the discretionary 
and judgemental nature of the ECB’s eligible collateral list has been the 
treatment in recent years of various assets either issued by or backed by the 
Greek government.  At various different times in recent years, depending 
on how negotiations were going between Greece and the troika, the ECB 
Governing Council has taken various types of Greek assets off the eligible 
list, with the assets often returning to the list at a later stage.
2.2. Emergency Liquidity Assistance
One might imagine that the ECB’s eligible collateral list and its accompa-
nying set of haircuts together define its policy as a lender of last resort to 
banks.  However, this is not the case. The experience of recent years has 
shown that in many of the cases where euro area banks have come under 
severe financial strain, the banks have used up all of their eligible collat-
eral to obtain funds via refinancing operations but still need to borrow 
more from the Eurosystem.
It turns out banks can still receive credit from the Eurosystem using 
non-eligible collateral. These loans are called Emergency Liquidity Assis-
tance (ELA).  In many cases, the legal basis for provision of ELA pre-dates 
the euro.  The national central banks in the Euro area were founded prior 
to the start of EMU and thus each have pre-existing legal powers and 
obligations.  Some are given various regulatory and supervisory powers 
while some are not. More importantly, it is common for national central 
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banks to be given an explicit set of powers related to financial stability.  
Despite the existence of numerous ELA programmes in the 
Eurosystem since 2008, the ECB Governing Council has been extremely 
tight-lipped in its discussions of these programmes.  Only in October 
2013 did the Governing Council provide an official description of how 
ELA programmes work and this description is quite terse.1  
Based on this description and other sources, my understanding is that 
ELA programmes operate as follows.
• ELA is not a Eurosystem programme. It can be issued by any NCB 
without consulting the ECB Governing Council.
• However, procedures exist that require any NCB issuing ELA to 
inform the ECB within two business days after the operation is carried 
out and provide detailed information on the nature of the lending, 
including the collateral pledged.
• The ECB Governing Council can decide via a two-thirds majority 
vote – consistent with Article 14.4 of the “Protocol on the Statute of 
the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank – that ELA operations interfere with the objectives and tasks of 
the Eurosystem. After such a vote, the Governing Council can order 
the NCB to restrict its ELA programme.
• Unlike regular Eurosystem liquidity-providing operations, all risk 
associated with ELA falls on the NCB that grants the loans.
These rules are pretty vague. They don’t describe the circumstances under 
which the ECB considers ELA to be appropriate nor do they make clear 
the criteria by which the ECB arrives at a decision that an ELA pro-
gramme “interferes with the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem.” 
Vague rules have the potential to lead to confusion and controversy and 
this is exactly what has happened in recent years.
3. The Eurosystem’s Experience with ELA
Despite its clear (though adjustable) policies on eligible collateral for 
monetary policy operations, the ECB has no clear procedures for dealing 
with banks that have used all of their eligible collateral but that still wish 
to borrow from the Eurosystem.  This position is unsatisfactory and has 
1 This document can be found at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/201402_
elaprocedures.en.pdf?e716d1d560392b10142724f50c6bf66a 
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been very damaging to the reputation of the ECB. In this section, I dis-
cuss three examples of where ELA has been used and point to a number 
of questions these examples raise.
3.1 Ireland
From the beginning of Ireland’s banking crisis in late 2008, it was clear 
that Anglo Irish Bank, which had specialised in commercial property 
lending, was in serious trouble.  The bank was nationalised in early 2009 
and was suffering from substantial deposit withdrawals when the Central 
Bank of Ireland agreed in March 2009 to provide it with €11.5 billion in 
ELA.  As the sovereign debt crisis intensified through 2010, the pace of 
deposit withdrawals from Anglo Irish intensified and its ELA borrowings 
moved up sharply. See Figure 3 for a graph of regular Eurosystem lending 
as well as ELA to the six Irish banks that had been provided with a near-
blanket liability guarantee by the Irish government in September 2008.
Over the course of 2010, the other main Irish banks also came under 
pressure from deposit outflows. The September 2008 guarantee had 
been put in place for two years and the covered banks had issued a large 
amount of bonds that matured prior to September 2010.  As September 
2010 came and went, they failed to find new sources of private sector 
funding.  Thus, these banks increased their reliance on ECB funding and 
eventually also applied for ELA.2
ECB officials had spent much of 2010 publicly discussing their plans 
to implement an “exit strategy” from their fixed-rate full allotment 
policy.  The developments at Ireland’s banks were clearly working against 
this plan.  In September 2010, ECB officials including Jean-Claude 
Trichet began making public statements about their unhappiness with 
(unnamed) “addict banks” that were reliant on Eurosystem funding.3   
Based on the recent release of letters by the ECB, we know now that 
Jean-Claude Trichet sent a letter to Ireland’s Finance minister, Brian 
Lenihan, on October 15, 2010 which warned4
I would like to re-emphasize that the current large provision of liquidity 
by the Eurosystem and the Central Bank of Ireland to entities such as Anglo 
2  See Whelan (2014) for a more detailed discussion of Ireland’s banking crisis.
3  See for example, the Financial Times article from Spetember 13, 2010 “Fears grow over 
banks addicted to ECB funding” 
 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/580109dc-bf43-11df-a789-00144feab49a.html
4  This letter is available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/shared/pdf/2010-10-15_
Letter_ECB_President_to_IE_FinMin.pdf?05f2367e74897b4aa2641f31d639d1c3 
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Irish Bank should not be taken for granted as a long-term solution. Given 
these principles, the Governing Council cannot commit to maintaining the 
size of its funding to these institutions on a permanent basis.
By November 2010, total Eurosystem funding for the Irish banks 
had reached about €140 billion which was around 85% of Irish GDP and 
almost a quarter of total Eurosystem lending.  At this point, the ECB 
played a crucial role in Ireland’s application for a bailout from the EU 
and IMF.  Jean-Claude Trichet sent a letter to Brian Lenihan threatening 
to cut off ELA funding unless the Irish government submitted a formal 
request to the EU for an adjustment programme.5  The specific wording 
of this part of the letter was as follows.
It is the position of the Governing Council that it is only if we receive in 
writing a commitment from the Irish government vis-a-vis the Eurosystem 
on the four following points that we can authorise further provisions of ELA 
to Irish financial institutions: 
1) The Irish government shall send a request for financial support to the 
Eurogroup; 
2) The request shall include the commitment to undertake decisive actions 
in the areas of fiscal consolidation, structural reforms and financial sector 
restructuring, in agreement with the European Commission, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the ECB; 
3) The plan for the restructuring of the Irish financial sector shall include 
the provision of the necessary capital to those Irish banks needing it 
and will be funded by the financial resources provided at the European 
and international level to the Irish government as well as by financial 
means currently available to the lrish government, including existing cash 
reserves of the Irish government; 
4) The repayment of the funds provided in the form of ELA shall be fully 
guaranteed by the Irish government, which would ensure the payment of 
immediate compensation to the Central Bank of Ireland in the event of 
missed payments on the side of the recipient institutions.
Ireland applied for financial assistance and its EU-IMF bailout pro-
gramme began in late 2010.  Deposits continued to flow out of the Irish 
banking system for a number of months and ELA actually increased sig-
5 The November letter from Trichet to Lenihan is available at https://www.ecb.europa.
eu/press/shared/pdf/2010-11-19_Letter_ECB_President_to%20IE_FinMin.pd-
f?83824135ba733b6091e930d3a25314c9 
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nificantly over those months, from €43 billion in November 2010 to €68 
billion in February 2012.  However, the banking system began to stabilise 
after the release of official stress tests and a large recapitalisation.  Ireland’s 
ELA programme ended in February 2013 when Anglo’s successor organi-
sation, the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation was put into liquidation.
The ECB’s actions in relation to its interactions with the Irish banking 
system raise many questions.
• Given the size of the emerging solvency problem at Anglo Irish 
Bank in Spring 2010, why did the Governing Council approve 
such a large initial ELA programme?
• If the ECB were relying on the Irish state’s backing for Anglo 
as reassurance that the bank’s solvency would be maintained, 
at what point did doubts about the state’s ability to provide this 
assistance emerge?
• If the solvency of the Irish banks was required for continuing 
ELA programmes, why did the ECB not limit itself to a demand 
for recapitalisation of these banks? Almost certainly, the Irish 
government would have had to apply for an official programme 
to meet this demand. But why not let the government make this 
decision instead of insisting on “decisive actions in the areas of 
fiscal consolidation, structural reforms”?  Which aspects of the 
ECB’s legal mandate allow it to demand fiscal consolidation and 
structural reforms as a condition to supply funding to individual 
banks?
Mario Draghi deserves credit for releasing these letters. However, the 
ECB’s response to the release has completely avoided the important ques-
tions about ELA programmes that the letters raise.
3.2 Cyprus
If anything, the ECB’s role in providing and subsequently restricting ELA 
to banks in Cyprus is even more murky and problematic.
While the situation with Cyprus’s two largest banks became known to 
the wider European public in March 2013, it was clear to closer observers 
from early 2012 that these banks were in severe difficulties.  Due to ill-ad-
vised purchases of Greek government bonds, poorly-timed expansions 
into the Greek market and a weakening Cypriot economy, both Bank of 
Cyprus (BoC) and Laiki Bank were effectively insolvent from early 2011 
onwards.
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The restructuring of Greek sovereign bonds sharply reduced Laiki’s 
stock of assets that could be used as collateral for regular Eurosystem 
monetary policy operations.  In October 2011, Laiki applied to the Cen-
tral Bank of Cyprus (CBC) for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) 
which is a form of central bank funding on non-standard terms.  By 
November 2011, Laiki had €2.5 billion in ELA funding from the CBC 
and the amount of this funding increased significantly over the first seven 
months of 2012.  
Because no other bank in Cyprus appears to have been receiving ELA 
at the time, we can track the evolution of Laiki’s ELA in late 2011 and 
2012 using publicly-available information on the CBC’s balance sheet. 
This balance sheet recorded ELA under the heading “Other Assets” until 
April 2013 when it began recording it under “Other Claims”. (There have 
been some small other items recorded under these entries but they are 
tiny relative to the ELA funding.)
In February 2012, the European Banking Authority (EBA) commu-
nicated that Laiki needed a recapitalisation of €1.97 billion while BoC 
required €1.56 billion.  The government of Cyprus was effectively shut 
out of the sovereign bond market at this point and against a background 
of a worsening economy, it was not possible for BoC and Laiki to raise the 
private investment required to meet the EBA’s core equity requirements 
by June 2012.  
In May 2012, the government of Cyprus agreed to underwrite a €1.8 
billion capital raising exercise for Laiki.  On June 25, 2012, Fitch became 
the final ratings agency to downgrade Cyprus to below investment-grade. 
On the same day, the government of Cyprus submitted an application for 
financial assistance from the Eurozone’s bailout funds. Two days later, 
BoC requested state aid of €500 million to allow it to meet its EBA core 
equity requirements.
During the period following the application for financial assistance 
and the final agreement on this assistance in March 2013, the capital 
position of the Cypriot banks continued to worsen. BoC booked new 
provisions for bad loans of €2.3 billion in 2012 and by the end of the 
year, the bank was insolvent with core equity of minus €407 million.  The 
EBA assessed Laiki’s accounts again in June 2012 and found an additional 
capital shortfall of €1.1 billion.  Laiki did not publish year-end accounts 
for 2012 but their final published results for the first nine months of the 
year showed an additional €1.67 billion in losses, again leaving the bank 
on the brink of balance sheet insolvency. 
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As information circulated on Laiki’s capital shortfall and its failure to 
obtain any private equity, deposit outflows increased, particularly at its 
Greek branches. The CBC’s “Other Claims” series shows an increase from 
€3.9 billion in April 2012 to €5.9 billion in May 2012 and €8.2 billion in 
June 2012.  (See Figure 4 for a graph of lending from the Central Bank 
of Cyprus).
The increase in ELA in May 2012 reflected deposit outflows.  The 
June increase, however, also reflected decisions by the ECB that further 
reduced Laiki’s ability to take part in normal Eurosystem operations.  Its 
Greek covered bonds were downgraded and deemed ineligible as collat-
eral while Fitch’s downgrade of Cypriot government bonds led to these 
bonds also being taken off the ECB’s collateral list.  As a result of these 
decisions, regular Eurosystem lending by the CBC declined by €1 billion 
in June 2012.
In July 2012, the ECB removed Laiki from its list of eligible counter-
parties due to concerns about its solvency, a decision that it can take on 
the basis of the rules governing its risk control framework. By the end 
of July 2012, Laiki had no regular Eurosystem funding and its ELA was 
about €9.6 billion. This seems to have been about as much ELA as the 
Eurosystem was willing to lend the bank. The former Governor of the 
CBC, Panicos Demetriades, has explained that “after the Eurogroup of 21 
January 2013, Laiki Bank’s ability to raise emergency liquidity reached a 
plateau due to the reduction in the value of its available collateral.”6
After a long period of delay, which included an election in February 
2013, a financial assistance package for Cyprus was agreed in March 
under extremely stressed circumstances.  
At a meeting of the Eurogroup of finance ministers that ended in the 
early hours of March 16, the ECB’s representative Jörg Asmussen stated 
that the Governing Council was unwilling to continue authorising ELA 
to Cypriot banks unless these banks were restored to solvency by the end 
of March via writing down the value of customer deposits.  It had been 
established by this point that the euro area member states and the IMF 
were only willing to provide €10 billion in funding which meant there 
was not enough money available to finance Cyprus’s fiscal deficits and 
sovereign bond rollovers and also recapitalise its banks.  
The final deal that was agreed with the Cypriot government required 
that the large amounts of ELA provided to the insolvent banks and 
6 Introductory statement before the Investigation Committee on the Economy, 13 Au-
gust 2013. http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=12928&lang=en 
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deposits at Greek branches of the Cypriot banks be repaid in full: These 
requirements greatly increased the size of the “haircut” for depositors 
with the Cypriot banks. Laiki Bank was wound down and the large 
amount of ELA owed by Laiki was transferred to BoC.   
While the deposit write-downs restored BoC to solvency, the ECB 
then placed hard limits on the amount of Eurosystem funding for this 
bank. This refusal to provide further funding for the bank was the key 
factor in the imposition of capital controls that are prevented people from 
transferring their money out of banks in Cyprus to elsewhere in the EU.  
The ECB’s decisions in relation to the Cypriot banks raise a number 
of questions
• Did the ECB realise that Laiki was heading towards being highly 
insolvent when it provided it with ELA in late 2011?
• As the ECB provided more funds to Laiki in 2012, were they 
assuming the Cypriot government would provide the money that 
would restore the bank to solvency? In the end, the government 
did not have the capacity to do this.
• On what grounds did the ECB delay its demand for a recapitali-
sation of the Cypriot banks until after the 2013 election?
• At what point did ECB and the European authorities decide 
that the recapitalisation in Cyprus should take place via deposit 
write-downs?
• Why did the wind-down of Laiki bank not see the Central Bank 
of Cyprus take the underlying collateral that had been pledged? 
In other words, why was Laiki’s ELA transferred to be the respon-
sibility of another bank?
• Did the ECB play a role in the decision to limit deposit write-
downs to customers in Cyprus while leaving depositors in Greece 
protected?
• Given that Bank of Cyprus is now solvent, why does the ECB 
continue to place limits on its ELA funding, limits that have the 
repercussion of keeping international capital controls in place?
It is to be hoped that, as with the Irish case, the ECB will also release 
documents that will explain its actions in Cyprus.  I suspect, however, we 
may be waiting a long time for such a release.
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3.3 Greece
A consistent theme of the Greek debt crisis has been the ECB’s reg-
ular threats (either implicit or explicit) to withdraw or cap funding for 
the Greek banking system.  Greek government bonds and other assets 
backed by government guarantees were regularly withdrawn and then 
added again to the eligible collateral list and while they were withdrawn, 
the Greek banks relied on Emergency Liquidity Assistance from the Bank 
of Greece.  These ELA programmes were constantly reviewed by the ECB 
Governing Council and could be cancelled at short notice if the Council 
decided.  The issue came to a head in 2015 as negotiations between the 
new Syriza government and the European creditors went poorly.
One of the more interesting aspects of the Greek banking crisis of 
2015 is that the major great banks had featured in the comprehensive 
assessment and stress test undertaken by the ECB in 2014 as it took over 
as the single supervisor for the euro area’s banks.  The results of this test, 
announced in October 2014, showed the Greek banks to be solvent and 
to have very limited need for recapitalisation to meet the ECB’s require-
ments.  Indeed, the Financial Times reported about the Greek banks “If 
the final capital needs are indeed nil or very small, this could pave the way 
for converting €11.4bn set aside for bank recapitalisation into a precau-
tionary credit line to help Greece exit smoothly from its bailout program”.7
Despite this positive conclusion, the political uncertainty surrounding 
the January 2015 election led to increased speculation that the new gov-
ernment would default on its debts and that this could result in Greece 
leaving the euro.  Afraid that their deposits would be redenominated into 
a new, weaker currency, deposits began to flow out of the Greek banking 
system and there was a sharp increase in ELA to the banking system to 
finance these outflows.  
After the election of the new government, the ECB insisted that the 
successful negotiation of a new programme would be a necessary condi-
tion for continuing to provide more ELA.  After a number of meetings 
in which the Governing Council raised a cap on the amount of ELA to 
provided, the ECB responded to the announcement by the Greek gov-
ernment of a referendum on the terms of a deal offered by the EU and 
IMF by announcing that it was placing a hard cap on the amount of ELA 
7 See http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/27fe630a-5d1f-11e4-873e-00144feabdc0.html 
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that could be provided.8 Effectively, the ECB announced that it would not 
facilitate further deposit outflows from the Greek banking system.  This 
led to the imposition of capital controls, controls that remained in place 
even after the Greek government agreed a new programme with the EU 
and IMF.
Did the ECB have to take the course of action that it chose? Con-
sider the following alternative version of how the Greek crisis could have 
played out.
1. As tension builds up in Greece prior to the Greek election in 
early 2015, Mario Draghi assures depositors in Greece that the 
ECB has fully tested the Greek banks and they do not have cap-
ital shortfalls. For this reason, their money is safe.
2. Draghi announces that the ECB will thus provide full support 
to the Greek banks even if the government defaults on its debts, 
subject to those banks remaining solvent.
3. Eurozone governments agree that, should Greek banks require 
recapitalisation to maintain solvency, the European Stabilisation 
Mechanism (ESM) will provide the capital in return for an own-
ership stake in the banks.
4. Provided with assurances of liquidity and solvency support, there 
is no bank run as Greek citizens believe there banking system 
is safe even if the government’s negotiations with creditors go 
badly. The ECB stays out of the negotiations for a new creditor 
deal for Greece (because they are not a political organisation and 
are not involved in directly loaning money to the government) 
and its officials assure everyone that the integrity of the common 
currency is in no way at stake.
There were no legal impediments to this scenario. Despite ECB offi-
cials consistently delivering speeches during this period that they were 
forced to act in the way they did by their own rules, the reality is that the 
ECB could have pursued this approach. Supporting banks that you have 
deemed solvent is pretty standard central banking practice. So Draghi’s 
ECB could have provided full and unequivocal support to the Greek 
banks if they wished. They just chose not to. Similarly, procedures are in 
place for the ESM to invest directly in banks so a credible assurance of 
solvency could have been offered.
8 The announcement can be found at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/
html/pr150628.en.html 
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Why did this not happen? Politics is the most likely answer. European 
governments did not want to provide assurances to Greek citizens about 
their banking system at the same time as their government was openly 
discussing the possibility of not paying back existing loans from Euro-
pean governments. Indeed, the ability to unleash a bank-driven “Grexit” 
mechanism proved to be the  been the ace in the creditors’ pack when 
negotiating with Greece. Faced with massive political opposition in Ger-
many and other Northern European countries to their existing mone-
tary policy programmes, Mario Draghi and the ECB Governing Council 
decided it is better for them to play along with the creditor country 
squeeze on Greece than to stabilise the Greek banking system. 
4. The Need for a New Approach
Central banks were put on this earth to be lenders of last resort. Dealing 
with complex situations in which banks are running out of liquidity and 
may or may not be solvent should be a core part of every central bank’s 
tasks.  The ECB, however, does not currently play this role in a coherent 
and comprehensive manner.  
Consider this ECB statement from 2014 in response to a New York 
Times story that revealed leaked minutes of the ECB’s discussion of the Cyp-
riot banking situation.9
The ECB neither provides nor approves emergency liquidity assis-
tance. It is the national central bank, in this case the Central Bank of 
Cyprus, that provides ELA to an institution that it judges to be solvent 
at its own risks and under its own terms and conditions. The ECB 
can object on monetary policy grounds; in order to do so at least two 
thirds of the Governing Council must see the provision of emergency 
liquidity as interfering with the tasks and objectives of euro area mon-
etary policy.
So the ECB’s official line is that it doesn’t provide or approve ELA but also 
that it sort of does. This is a recipe for the kinds of incoherent policy that 
we have seen in recent years. Even more worryingly, there is plenty of 
evidence that political considerations have played a key role in the ECB’s 
decisions about whether and when to provide or cap the provision of 
emergency liquidity.
9 The ECB statement can be found at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/
html/pr141017_1.en.html 
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It is time to develop a completely new approach for the ECB as lender 
of last resort.  The ECB has taken over as the supervisor of the euro area’s 
banks. This removes most of the previous arguments that were in place 
for the current system of ELA provision.  Previously, banks were overseen 
by national supervisors.  As such, it could be argued that those banks that 
got into trouble and required ELA were the responsibility of national cen-
tral banks and that the risk associated with lending to these banks should 
be borne at a national level.
This point no longer holds. Once all of the euro area’s banks have 
complied with the capital raising requirements from the comprehensive 
assessment, then they will all have an official diagnosis of good health 
from the ECB. If further problems arise, they should be considered the 
joint responsibility of all central banks in the Eurosystem. 
For this reasons, I believe it is time to change the system in which 
lending against eligible collateral is a Eurosystem concern while ELA is 
a national concern.  The ECB should be required to approve each and 
every ELA programme and have the risk shared among the Eurosystem. 
As an independent regulator, the ECB should also be a position to assess 
whether the liquidity problems for a bank applying for ELA reflect tem-
porary problems or else reflect deeper structural issues (it is usually the 
latter).  This should help with speeding up the process of restructuring 
problem banks, via recapitalisation or bail-in and the passing of the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive now means that the tools to imple-
ment these kinds of restructuring are now largely in place.  A speedier 
response of this sort would help to avoid a repeat of long-term ELA pro-
grammes in which Eurosystem funding is used to allow private creditors 
to gradually get their money safely out of insolvent banks.
Of course, this proposal will mean the ECB will have to take on more 
explicit responsibility for dealing with financial instability. But the two-
thirds majority voting on ELA at Governing Council has already meant 
that the ECB is effectively taking on this responsibility already.  
One complication with this proposal is that many of the NCBs have 
been given a financial stability responsibility to provide emergency 
lending to banks that is enshrined in national law.  I would argue that the 
ECB should establish a protocol that all ELA programmes are centrally 
approved and subsequently request amendments to national central bank 
legislation if this is required.
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BANK SELF-INSURANCE, THE SAFETY 
NET AND STRESS TESTING
Til Schuermann1 
In his elegant analysis of the financial crisis, Mervyn King (2016) dis-
tilled its origins to three forces, one good, one bad, and one ugly. The 
good was a period of unprecedented stability: low inflation and steady 
growth, guided by independent central banks. This was accompanied, 
unfortunately, by a steady rise in debt levels (the bad) and the develop-
ment of a fragile banking system (the ugly). We know what happened 
next, and in the post-crisis clean-up, the official sector has pursued two 
broad lines of reform. The first is a strong push to more self-insurance 
on the part of banks, largely through more (and better) capital and more 
liquidity thanks to the reforms from the Basel Committee. The second is 
a strengthening of the institutional ecosystem wherein banks live … and 
die. A core component of that ecosystem is the banking union in Europe.
There are three pillars to that banking union:2 the Single Supervi-
sory Mechanism (SSM); the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRP); and 
the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). The SSM, which came 
into being in November 2014, provides systematic supervision across 19 
euro-countries. It mitigates uneven and inconsistent supervisory treat-
ment of banks by centralizing and coordinating banking oversight in a 
single institution. Moreover, the SSM can make efficient use of scarce 
supervisory expertise. And it can fully leverage the main, and possibly 
1 til.schuermann@oliverwyman.com. Oliver Wyman and Wharton Financial Institu-
tions Center. I would like to thank Hector Sants and Davide Taliente for very helpful 
comments and suggestions, and Elena Carletti for her encouragement. All remaining 
errors are mine, of course.
2 Speech by Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the ICMA 
Annual General Meeting and Conference 2013, organised by the International Capital 
Market Association, Copenhagen, 23 May 2013: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/
date/2013/html/sp130523.en.html 
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only informational advantage of the supervisor (vis à vis the supervised): 
the ability to compare horizontally across banks to gain a better under-
standing of range of practices, weed out poor practices, pick up good 
practices and promulgate them. The SSM is able to make concrete micro- 
and macroprudential objectives of supervision, namely to assess the cap-
ital adequacy, safety and soundness of each individual bank and to assess 
the resilience of the banking system as a whole.
The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which became fully oper-
ational just this year (1 January 2016), implements the EU-wide Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in the euro area. It provides 
for a credible mechanism to deal with fatal events, accidental or other-
wise, without threatening the stability of the financial system. Finally 
the EDIS, which provides deposit insurance for retail depositors up to 
€100,000, still remains a proposal. It was flagged by the Five Presidents 
Report (2015)3 as a key step towards a fully fledged banking union.
In addition to making the institutional infrastructure of our financial 
ecosystem more robust, regulators have imposed constraints on activ-
ities. For example, the Volcker rule forbids any proprietary trading by 
banks and has thus forced banks to develops ways of identifying trading 
activities which are market making and thus permissible (and presum-
ably even encouraged) but not proprietary in nature. In the Uk, the adop-
tion of the proposals from the Vickers commission effectively ring-fence 
current accounts and overdrafts for retail and SME clients and force rela-
tionships with other parts of the group on arm’s length basis, e.g. by con-
ducting internal funding transfer on market-based terms.
Meanwhile banks have been forced into a much greater degree of 
self-insurance, both through the increased capital requirements of Basel 
III, and the increased liquidity requirements: the liquidity coverage ratio 
(LCR) to cover short term liquidity needs, and the net stable funding ratio 
(NSRF) to cover longer term funding needs. Basel III has increased the 
capital requirements via capital ratios in three ways. First, it has raised the 
minimum capital ratios for all banks and levied additional requirements 
for those banks deemed to be globally systemically important. Second, it 
has made the denominator of the ratio, the risk-weighted assets (RWA), 
more stringent. For example, exposures to financial institutions attract 
higher capital charges as do securitizations, especially complex ones. And 
3 The Five Presidents’ Report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. 22 
June 2015. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/publications/background-docu-
ments-economic-and-monetary-union_en 
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third, for capital to count towards meeting the requirements (the numer-
ator), it has to be of a high quality such as common equity. By forcing 
banks to hold more(and the largest yet more) and better capital, to hold 
a meaningful part of the balance sheet in high quality liquid assets and 
to discourage the use of short term wholesale funding in favor of retail 
deposits and long term debt, the regulators have pushed more of the tail 
risk to the banks. 
System-wide stress tests have been added to the supervisory toolkit – 
and with great success. Stress testing was widely used as a crisis response 
tool on both sides of the Atlantic, and it is making its way into peacetime 
use for assessing bank resilience to shocks. Stress testing has many vir-
tues, among them their clarity. Stress scenarios described in terms of a 
sharp increase in unemployment, a drop in house prices, stock markets, 
and GDP are easy to understand, certainly in comparison to abstract tail 
probabilities that are the stuff of regulatory or economic capital models. 
A bank has to have enough capital to withstand a clearly and simply 
described financial storm and still come out sailing strong. The public 
can judge the severity of the scenario, the impact on the banks (and thus 
how conservative – or not – the banks and supervisors are in translating 
the scenario to bank losses), and the hurdle they need to clear to be 
deemed strong enough to pass. 
To take two examples, Figure 1 compares two variables (real GDP 
growth and equity prices) for two countries (US and Uk) over the course 
of several stress test cycles: seven for the US, conducted by the Federal 
Reserve, and three for the Uk, conducted by the Bank of England. Stress 
scenarios nearly always front-load the pain: the economy and the mar-
kets experience a sharp decline followed by a recovery.4 The shape of the 
US scenarios has remained quite constant over the past six years which 
introduces the risk that US banks have by now prepared themselves well 
for just this particular scenario, as opposed to being resilient to a broader 
range of threats. The Bank of England’s scenarios are somewhat more 
varied, with the most recent being notably harsher in terms of both the 
real economy and equity markets.
In addition to this clarity, stress testing has forced tight collaboration 
of the authorities across European borders due to the simultaneity and 
4 Please note that US real GDP growth is on a year-on-year basis, while for the Uk it is 
represented on a quarter-on-quarter basis; hence the difference in scale on the vertical 
axis. Further note that the scenario horizon is three years for the Federal Reserve test 
and five years for the Bank of England test.
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scope of the exercise. All banks need to run the same scenario at the 
same time under the same conditions. Indeed the introduction of the 
SSM was preceded by the ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment which was 
a combination of an Asset Quality Review (AQR) and a stress test of 130 
banking groups from 19 countries, covering over 80% of total banking 
assets in the SSM (so about €22 trillion). The AQR was a deliberate exer-
cise to ensure that banking organizations from countries and thus dif-
ferent supervisory approaches would operate from a level playing field 
once under the oversight of a single supervisor.
How should we assess credibility of the stress tests? Certainly the 
severity of the actual scenario(s) gives an immediate and easy to under-
stand impression. But a stress test is only as severe as the impact on the 
capital position of the banks. The success of the early US stress test (the 
2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program or SCAP) was in large 
part due to the significant impact on the banks: the capital requirement 
was $75 billion. In contrast, the 2010 and 2011 European exercises yielded 
€3.5 billion and €2.5 billion in total capital needs respectively. 
This has changed recently. The 2014 Comprehensive Assessment 
revealed a total capital need of nearly €25 billion. Once banks are prop-
erly capitalized, a subsequent stress test should reveal further capital 
needs only rarely. A measure of severity is then the capital impact or cap-
ital consumption due to the stress scenario. Table 1 compares the decline 
in high quality capital (common equity) across four exercises in basis 
points: ECB (2014), Bank of England (2015), and the two most recent 
CCAR tests by the Federal Reserve (2014, 2015). Aggregate capital con-
sumption across all banks range from 340 to 400 bps, with a median bank 
impact of 240 to 400 bps. Banking systems on both sides of the Atlantic 
have clearly become more resilient. For example, the total amount of cap-
ital available to the 31 banks that participated in the 2015 CCAR after the 
stress (so net of capital consumption due to the stress) roughly equaled 
the total amount of capital in the whole US banking system at the end of 
2006 at the dawn of the financial crisis.
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Table 1: Capital (Common Equity Tier 1 or Tier 1 Common) 
consumption due to stress tests; in basis points
Aggregate (all banks) Median bank
ECB (2014) 340 400
Bank of England 
(2015)
400 365
Federal Reserve 
CCAR (2014)
400 270
CCAR (2015) 370 240
But stress tests can’t do it all. Stress testing, however effective, is not 
enough to span the pillars of a complete and successful banking union. 
Of the three pillars – the single supervisor, effective resolution, and 
deposit insurance – the last is the farthest from completion. Yet deposit 
insurance may be especially important to get right. In addition to the 
obvious role of small retail depositor protection and a bulwark against 
bank runs, it allows banks to play a critical shock absorber role when 
the financial system experiences adverse liquidity events. As the capital 
markets ceased to function properly in 2007 and 2008, and short term 
funding was no longer available to firms, banks re-intermediated to meet 
liquidity demands via loan commitments. At the same time there was 
a flight into the banking system, a safer place to park short term funds 
than, say, money market funds. This effect has been well documented; 
see, for example Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), and Gatev, Schuermann 
and Strahan (2006) for evidence following the demise of LTCM in 1998. 
Importantly, this effect did not exist, at least in the US, prior to the intro-
duction of deposit insurance; see Pennacchi (2006).
Policymakers have recognized that the creation of a banking union 
is a necessary step in the direction of full fledged monetary union in 
Europe. The challenges to implementation are daunting, but Europe is 
well on the way. Meanwhile, stress testing has emerged as the tool of 
choice to both respond to the financial crisis and as a peacetime mecha-
nism for banking oversight. It can serve to solidify all three pillars of the 
banking union by providing unique insight in banks’ resilience to shocks. 
But it is hardly the solution for filling the gaps in governance in Europe, 
the topic of this conference.
Bank Self-Insurance, the Safety Net and Stress Testing  -  Til Schuermann 
208
Figure 1: US and Uk Stress Scenarios compared
Source: US : https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests-capital-
planning.htm  
Uk: http://www.bankofengland.co.Uk/financialstability/Pages/fpc/stresstest.aspx 
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